Friday, August 31, 2018

Top 10 from Texas Bar Today: Shareholders, Shuttered Business, and Shyness in Law School

Originally published by Joanna Herzik.

10. Associates: Top 10 Questions to Ask Your Supervising AttorneyCordell Parvin @cordellparvin of Cordell Parvin LLC in Dallas

9. Overcoming Shyness in the Law School Setting – Nancy Luebbert of the Law School Academic Support Blog

8. Your Shuttered Business: Bankrupt It, Dissolve It or Walk Away?Cleve Clinton of Gray Reed & McGraw @GrayReedLaw in Dallas

7. When Attorney Sports the Mediator’s Hat: Settlement Agreement Drafting EthicsAndrew Tolchin of Tolchin Law Firm, PLLC in Angleton and 713 Mediator in Houston

6. Panda in a Monkey Selfie Copyright Situation? Zoo Sells Paintings Created By Panda Bear – Peggy Keene of Klemchuk LLP @K_LLP in Dallas

5. New Tools for Defeating Nonclient Suits Against LawyersGregg Weinberg of Roberts Markel Weinberg Butler Hailey PC @RMWBHlaw in Houston

4. Design Contracts Imposing Duties Beyond Ordinary Care Create Extraordinary RiskTim Soefje of Seltzer Chadwick Soefje, PLLC @SCSLawFirm in Dallas

3. Court Holds That Attorney Did Not Have An Attorney-Client Relationship With A Company’s Directors and ShareholdersDavid Fowler Johnson @TXFiduciaryLit of Winstead PC in Fort Worth

2. Just When is a Modification or Accommodation Necessary Under Title III?William Goren of William D. Goren, J.D., LL.M., LLC

1. Court Upholds Finding of Easement by EstoppelTiffany Dowell Lashmet @TiffDowell, Assistant Professor and Extension Specialist in Agricultural Law with Texas A&M Agrilife Extension in College Station

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Court Holds That Attorney Did Not Have An Attorney-Client Relationship With A Company’s Directors And Shareholders

Originally published by David Fowler Johnson.

In Pennington v. Fields, the majority of shareholders of a closely held business forced the buy-out of the minority shareholder and litigation ensued. No. 05-17-00321-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 6601 (Tex. App.—Dallas August 21, 2018, no pet. history). Later, the minority shareholder sued the majority shareholder’s attorney and alleged that he committed legal malpractice by, among other things, negligently advising the majority to engage in oppression and breaches of fiduciary duties and that he failed to advise the minority shareholder to protect his interests against the misconduct of the majority. The attorney filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that he owed the minority shareholder no fiduciary duty because he never represented him, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff appealed.

Regarding the existence of the attorney-client relationship, the court of appeals stated:

The existence of a duty is an element of a legal malpractice claim. The attorney—client relationship is a contractual relationship that arises from a lawyer’s agreement to render professional services to a client. The agreement may sometimes be implied from the parties’ conduct. But whether an agreement is express or implied, there must be evidence that both parties intended to create an attorney—client relationship. One party’s subjective belief is insufficient to raise a question of fact to defeat summary judgment.

Id. (internal citations omitted). The plaintiff cited to two engagement letters between the company and the attorney, which referenced doing legal services “as required by the board of directors,” of which the plaintiff was one at the time. The court of appeals held:

These two agreements do not raise a fact issue regarding the existence of an attorney—client relationship between Pennington and Collins. Both agreements are between Advantage and Collins. A corporation is a legal entity separate and apart from the people who compose it, making it distinct from its stockholders, officers, and directors. Thus, rendering legal services to a corporation does not by itself create privity between the attorney and the corporation’s officers, directors, or shareholders. We disagree with Pennington’s argument that Collins was “clearly engaged to represent Advantage’s shareholders,” including Pennington. Pennington was not named in nor did he sign the agreement. The agreement was clearly between Collins and Advantage. Evidence of an agreement between Collins and Advantage is no evidence of an attorney—client relationship between Collins and one of Advantage’s directors or shareholders.

Id.

The plaintiff then contended that there was an implied agreement for legal representation. The court stated:

Although an attorney—client relationship may be implied from the actions of the parties, the parties must manifest an intention to create an attorney—client relationship. Whether there was a meeting of the minds must be based on an objective standard, examining what the parties did and said and not their alleged subjective states of mind… Both sides discuss the case of MacFarlane v. Nelson from the Third Court of Appeals. In that case, the court of appeals noted that when a lawyer represents a small entity with extensive common ownership and management, difficulties can arise in determining the existence of an attorney—client relationship. MacFarlane v. Nelson, No. 03-04-00488-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7681, 2005 WL 2240949, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 15, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The opinion listed several factors to consider in determining whether a lawyer for the entity also represents an individual owner: (1) whether the lawyer affirmatively assumed the duty of individual representation; (2) whether the owner had independent representation; (3) whether the lawyer previously represented the owner on a personal basis; (4) and whether the evidence demonstrates the owner’s reliance on or expectations of the lawyer’s separate representation. Id. An attorney—client relationship is not created with the individual owner simply because the owner discusses matters with the lawyer that are relevant to both the owner’s and the entity’s interests. Id.

Id. The plaintiff asserted that those factors weighed in favor of a finding that an attorney-client relationship existed, but the court disagreed:

Pennington met Collins on the day he was removed as Advantage’s president. Thus, Collins had not previously represented Pennington. Although Pennington did not have independent representation at that time, he retained his own legal counsel shortly after the June 27 meeting. Pennington asserts he believed Collins was “advising him and representing his interests” because Collins represented to Pennington that Pennington’s interests were not adverse to Fields’s and Phillips’s. He contends Collins admitted he was representing all three directors. To demonstrate this, he relies on Collins’s deposition testimony. In his deposition, Collins was asked if he thought he was helping Pennington. Collins stated he was trying to “find a solution for all of the parties to work together” and if it worked out, it would have helped Pennington. His goal was to help his clients, who were Fields and Phillips and later Advantage. Pennington’s summary judgment evidence does not show that Collins affirmatively assumed a duty to represent Pennington individually. Evidence Pennington had a subjective belief that Collins was representing him is insufficient. Whether there was a meeting of the minds about representation must be based on an objective standard, and there is no objective evidence Collins intended to create an attorney—client relationship with Pennington. An attorney—client relationship was not created between Collins and Pennington simply because Collins discussed matters with Pennington that were relevant to both Pennington’s and Advantage’s interests.

Id. The court held that the evidence did not raise a fact issue regarding the existence of an attorney-client relationship and affirmed the summary judgment motions.

Interesting Note: This case raises an important issue for attorneys who represent closely held businesses and the owners and operators of those businesses. The parties should be careful to properly document who the client is and the scope of the representation. Otherwise, there may be confusion as to whom the attorney owes fiduciary duties.

Certainly, an attorney can represent more than one party; in fact, that is very common. For example, a law firm may represent a shareholder and the company in an asset sale transaction. More commonly, a law firm may represent both spouses in the sale of real property, the leasing of minerals, or in estate planning. See, e.g., Estate of Arlitt v. Paterson, 995 S.W.2d 713, 720–721 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (an attorney may represent a couple as joint estate planning clients, in which case the attorney will owe a duty to both clients). So, a reasonably prudent attorney should identify who he or she represents and clarify that he or she does not represent a party when the attorney first communicates with a party regarding a legal matter. See Tex. R. Disc. C. 4.03 (“In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.”). Though not dispositive, a “trier of fact may consider the construction of a relevant rule of professional conduct that is designed for the protection of persons in the claimant’s position as evidence of the standard of care and breach of the standard.” William V. Dorsaneo, Texas Litigation Guide, § 322.02 (Citing Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 52, Comment f).

The downside to an attorney is that an attorney may inadvertently create an attorney-client relationship and be held to fiduciary duties that are not anticipated. To have an attorney-client relationship, there does not have to be a formal agreement. “While it is generally a relationship created by contract, an attorney-client relationship can be implied based on the conduct of the parties.” Sotello v. Stewart, 281 S.W.3d 76, 80-81 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, pet. denied) (citing Sutton v. Estate of McCormick, 47 S.W.3d 179, 182 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) and Mellon Service Co. v. Touche Ross & Co., 17 S.W.3d 432, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.)). “The attorney-client relationship may be implied if the parties by their conduct manifest an intent to create such a relationship.” Daves v. Commission For Lawyer Discipline, 952 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, pet. denied). For the relationship to be established, “the parties must explicitly or by their conduct manifest an intention to create it. To determine whether there was a meeting of the minds, we use an objective standard examining what the parties said and did and do not look at their subjective states of mind.” Roberts v. Healey, 991 S.W.2d 873, 880 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). “More specifically, an attorney-client relationship can be implied from the attorney’s gratuitous rendition of professional services.” Sotello v. Stewart, 281 S.W.3d at 80-81 (citing Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied)).

It should also be noted that an attorney may be liable for not informing a party that it is not representing the party. Querner v. Rindfuss, 966 S.W.2d 661, 667-68 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, writ denied) (recognizing that an attorney’s advice may give rise to an informal fiduciary duty even when no formal attorney-client relationship is formed). The Querner court stated:

Although an attorney hired by an executor generally represents the executor and not the beneficiary, an attorney for an executor may undertake to perform legal services as attorney for one or more beneficiaries. An attorney-client relationship may develop between the attorney retained by the executor and the beneficiaries either expressly or impliedly. Even absent an attorney-client relationship, an attorney may be held negligent for failing to advise a party that he is not representing the party. ‘If circumstances lead a party to believe that they are represented by an attorney,’ the attorney may be held liable for such a failure to advise.

Id.; see also Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied); Burnap v. Linnartz, 914 S.W.2d 142, 148 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied).

So, to avoid confusion, the attorney should always have a written engagement letter that expressly identifies the client or clients, the attorney is not representing any other party not expressly mentioned, the scope of the engagement, and when the engagement will be terminated. Further, if appropriate, the attorney should follow up and orally tell those that he or she is not representing, but with whom the attorney often communicates, that he or she is not representing them and is only representing his or her client(s). Further, individuals should also seek clarification and ask an attorney who the attorney represents and whether the individual should retain his or her own attorney. Everyone should strive to be on the same page regarding who is the attorney and who is the client. This important issue may also impact who may claim the attorney-client privilege regarding communications.

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The Texas Supreme Court Denies Review In A Case Awarding Mental Anguish Damages, Exemplary Damages, and Other Damages For A Trustee’s Breach Of Fiduciary Duty

Originally published by David Fowler Johnson.

Today, the Texas Supreme Court denied review in Wells Fargo v. Militello, No. 05-15-01252-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 5640 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 20, 2017, pet. denied). In Militello, the court of appeals affirmed a trial court’s judgment against a trustee regarding a beneficiary’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and fraud where the trial court awarded $1,328,448.35 past economic damages, $29,296.75 disgorgement of trust fees, $1,000,000.00 past mental anguish damages, $3,465,490.20 exemplary damages, and $467,374.00 attorney’s fees. The trustee appealed, alleging that the evidence was not sufficient to support many of the damages awarded but did not appeal the liability finding. The beneficiary agreed that the economic damages should be remitted (decreased) by around $340,000, which would also impact the exemplary damages award.

The court of appeals affirmed an award of damages based on Militello’s expenses associated with dealing with tax issues, including accountant fees and attorney’s fees, incurred due to Militello having to litigate tax issues caused by the trustee’s actions. The court of appeals also affirmed, in part, the award of mental anguish damages, holding that the $1 million award was not supported by the evidence and suggested a remittitur down to $310,000 based on evidence of other actual damages. The court of appeals also affirmed the award of exemplary damages because it concluded there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s express finding that the trustee was grossly negligent. The court did suggest a remittitur due to the decrease in economic damages.

This is an interesting case because it dealt with a relatively new area of potential damages: an award for expenses incurred by a beneficiary in remedying a breach of duty by a trustee. Further, though several cases in Texas hold that a plaintiff could recover mental anguish for a breach of fiduciary duty, few cases discuss the claim and the standards for such an award in a trustee/breach-of-fiduciary-duty case. Similarly, few cases discuss the standards for an exemplary damage award in a trustee/breach-of-fiduciary-duty case. So, it would seem that the issues in the case would be ripe for Texas Supreme Court review. The trustee has the right to file a motion for rehearing on the denial of its petition for review.

 

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Free legal clinic for veterans in Conroe

Originally published by Eric Quitugua.

Veterans in need of legal assistance can attend a free clinic in Conroe on Saturday, September 8, from 9 a.m. to noon. The event will be held at the Conroe VA Outpatient Clinic, 690 S. Loop 336 W., 77304.

Veterans and spouses of deceased veterans can receive one-on-one advice from a volunteer attorney in any area of law, including family law, wills and probate, consumer law, real estate and tax law, and disability and veterans benefits.

Veterans who qualify for legal aid and are in need of legal representation may be assigned a pro bono attorney from the Houston Volunteer Lawyers.

The clinic is sponsored by the Montgomery County Bar Association, the Houston Northwest Bar Association, The Woodlands Bar Association, and the Houston Bar Foundation’s Veterans Legal Initiative.

No appointment is necessary.

For more information on the clinic, as well as the Houston Bar Foundation’s Friday clinics at the Michael E. DeBakey VA Medical Center, go to hba.org.

To view a list of other free veteran legal clinics around the state, please go to the State Bar’s Texas Lawyers for Texas Veterans web page at texasbar.com/veterans.

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Design Contracts Imposing Duties Beyond Ordinary Care Create Extraordinary Risk

Originally published by Tim Soefje.

Contract ShockDesign professionals are under assault by those in the construction industry determined to contractually alter the standard of care that applies to these design professionals’ work.

Every design professional and construction contracts comes with its own set of risks. But design professionals that agree to heighten the standard of care that applies to their work not only subject themselves to extraordinary risks, but also jeopardize their available insurance coverage when mistakes are made.

In ancient times, the standard of care for builders was to do exactly what the king, pharaoh, or ruler ordered them to do. If they failed to adhere to those exacting standards, severe consequences, including execution, could follow. Fortunately, the legal standard of care today is not quite that strict.

Today, most states define the standard of care for design professionals as a duty to use ordinary care.

The classic statement of the design professional’s standard of practice is found in Coombs v. Beede, 89 Me. 187, 36 A. 104 (1896). In Coombs, a client won a trial court judgment based solely on what the client and architect discussed verbally regarding price and design. The Supreme Judicial Court overturned the ruling, holding:

“The responsibility resting on an architect is essentially the same as that which rests upon the lawyer to his client, or upon the physician to his patient, or which rests upon any one to another where such person pretends to possess some skill and ability in some special employment, and offers his services to the public on account of his fitness to act in the line of business for which he may be employed. The undertaking of an architect implies that he possesses skill and ability, including taste, sufficient to enable him to perform the required services at least ordinarily and reasonably well; and that he will exercise and apply, in the given case, his skill and ability, his judgment and taste, reasonably and without neglect. But the undertaking does not imply or warrant a satisfactory result. It will be enough that any failure shall not be by the fault of the architect. There is no implied promise that miscalculations may not occur. An error of judgment is not necessarily evidence of a want of skill or care, for mistakes and miscalculations are incident to all the business of life. Id at . 36 A. at 104-05.

Section 2.2 of American Institute of Architect’s (AIA) B101, Standard Form of Agreement between Owner and Architect (2007), incorporates this classic standard.

“The Architect shall perform its services consistent with the professional skill and care ordinarily provided by architects practicing in the same or similar locality under the same or similar circumstances. The Architect shall perform its services as expeditiously as is consistent with such professional skill and care and the orderly progress of the Project.”

 The Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee (EJCDC) E-500, Paragraph 6.01.A, Agreement between Owner and Engineer for Professional Services similarly defines the standard of care for engineers.

“The Standard of Care for all professional engineering and related services performed or furnished by Engineer under this Agreement will be the care and skill ordinarily used by members of the subject profession practicing under similar circumstances at the same time and in the same locality.  Engineer makes no warranties, express or implied, under this Agreement or otherwise, in connection with any services performed or furnished by Engineer.”

 Other commonly used standardized form contracts available from ConsensusDOCS do not include a definition of the standard of care applicable to architectural and engineering services. The ConsensusDOCS drafters decided it was better for design professionals to be held to a standard imposed on them by their own profession (i.e., one imposed by the standard a court would endorse) rather than one defined by the ConsensusDOCS.

There are significant differences between AIA, EJCDC, and ConsensusDOCS forms, but regardless of what forms used, every industry organization wisely recommends that the agreements should not be modified.

The Association of General Contractors (AGC) for example cautions that adding language that would hold a design professional to a standard of care above that which is customary and normal for design professionals in the same time and location also might result in the unintended consequence of voiding professional liability coverage available to the designer

Despite this widely shared warning, it unfortunately remains common place for owners to demand that design professionals sign contracts committing them to a significantly higher level of professional services than the common law standard of ordinary care.

Design professional must be on the lookout for an owner and other parties to insert phrases into a contract such as “highest level of care,” “with no material errors,” or “trust and confidence.”

The problem arises because these phrases like “highest level of care” are not well-defined by code, case law, or by peers working on similar projects. The design professional likely may not discovery how a court would define such a contract term until after another design professional testifies in litigation about the latest and greatest, cutting-edge technology being used by other design professionals on the other side of the country.

Other terms like “trust and confidence” can imply a special relationship between the design professional and the client, and thus a severely heightened standard of care.

Design professionals also should avoid agreeing to contract terms that commit them to comply with all regulations, codes, ordinances, and laws, and assume liability for the owner’s damages resulting from a failure to comply.

Such terms may seem reasonable at first glance but they create the potential for an absolute warranty and guarantee that the services provided comply with regulations, codes, ordinances, and laws that the design professional erroneously believed did not apply.

Ironically, often the owners insisting on these heightened standards of care are those working on the tightest budgets, and therefore expecting the best possible service for the lowest possible price.

Additionally, experience reveals that the owners demanding these contractually heightened standards of care greater than the industry norms frequently turn out to be the most difficult and demanding clients.

An owner demanding that the design professional execute an onerous contract should always be a red flag the project may not be worth the fee.

If a demanding owner insists on the use of these terms, the design professional may be able to skillfully negotiate additional language that mitigates the risk or eliminates it entirely. For example, a design professional may consider including limiting language elsewhere in the contract such as:

“No terms contained this contract are intended to create a guarantee, warranty, or a strict liability standard. The parties agree that the design professional shall only be required to not perform its professional services negligently, or as a result of willful or reckless misconduct. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to establish a fiduciary relationship between the parties.”

As discussed above, contractually raising the standard of care above the ordinary care standard also can jeopardize insurance coverage. Most professional liability insurance policies exclude coverage for acts other than ordinary negligence. The insurer will perceive this as a voluntary assumption of risk for which the design professional would not otherwise be responsible, and therefore uninsurable.

For example, the design professional may defeat a claim for negligence but lose on a breach of contract count based on other contract language creating a higher standard of care. As a result, the design professional’s professional liability insurance policy may not cover the loss because it may be excluded by either the “contractual liability” or “warranty” exclusions of the policy.

Fortunately, design professionals can eliminate many of these situations by taking a few simple steps:

  1. Be diligent. Every design professional should implement a strong internal contract review process. Additionally, many design professionals surprisingly remain unaware that many of the best professional liability insurance policies provide for contract review services as part of the benefits available in the policies.
  2. Never sign a contract that alters the standard of care from the common law or industry standard language without first consulting an experienced construction law attorney to fully understand the terms used and potential risk assumed.
  3. Consult with an insurance broker that specializes in the field to make sure that every risk assumed by the design professional in the contract is insured if it is insurable.
  4. Negotiate limiting or mitigating language to redefine the terms used in the contract to mean ordinary care and to hopefully eliminate any unintended standards of care, guarantees, or warranties

Construction contracts are a minefield of potential liability for the unwary or inexperienced design professional. A strong contract review team is the first and best line of defense.

But every design professional also must be prepared to walk away from a deal where the owner insists on contract terms that increase the standards of care beyond an acceptable standard, or be prepared that such onerous contracts may likely result in no insurance coverage when something inevitable goes wrong.

Tim Soefje - 04--09-18Timothy B. Soefje is the Managing Member and head of the professional liability and construction defect group at the boutique firm of Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC based in Dallas, Texas. He is admitted in Texas and Oklahoma. For regular information about professional liability matters, follow him on Twitter at @TimSoefje and search #ProfessionalLiability. For more information, visit us at www.realclearcounsel.com or contact him  at tsoefje@realclearcounsel.com.

sbaldwinSamuel P. Baldwin is Of Counsel at the boutique firm of Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC based in Dallas, Texas. He is admitted in Texas. His practice focuses on the defense of professional liability, construction defect, and complex commercial litigation claims. For regular information about professional liability matters, follow him on Twitter at @Sam_Baldwin5 and search #ProfessionalLiability. For more information, visit us at www.realclearcounsel.com or contact him at sbaldwin@realclearcounsel.com.

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Managing Cross-Border Data Protection Amid an Evolving Privacy Landscape

Originally published by Deana Uhl.

 

Modern conventions of privacy date back only as far as the industrial revolution, when society adopted the concept of individual and familial privacy,
      

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IRS Provides New Guidance Under Code Section 162(m)

Originally published by Haynes and Boone Benefits Group.

In December 2017, under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Congress broadened the $1 million deduction limitation under Code Section 162(m) for a public company’s top executives by, among other things, broadening the scope of “covered employees” and eliminating the performance-based compensation exception. The more restrictive Code Section 162(m) generally applies for tax years after 2017, but certain arrangements in existence on November 2, 2017, may be grandfathered. On August 21, 2018, the IRS issued new guidance on Code Section 162(m) under IRS Notice 2018-68 (the “Notice”). Notably, the Notice provides guidance with respect to the grandfathering relief (including the impact of negative discretion and what constitutes a material modification), and provides guidance on the expanded scope of who is a “covered employee” (and will remain a covered employee). The Notice leaves open for comment several issues, including, the rule which allows certain newly public companies to limit the application of Code Section 162(m) during a transition period, the application of Code Section 162(m) to foreign private issuers, and the application of the SEC disclosure rules for determining the applicable executives for a taxable year that does not end on the same date as the last completed fiscal year. The IRS anticipates that the guidance in the Notice will be incorporated into future regulations that will apply to taxable years ending on or after September 10, 2018.

View a copy of the Notice.

The post IRS Provides New Guidance Under Code Section 162(m) appeared first on Haynes and Boone Blogs.

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Texas A&M’s New Law Dean Discusses Rankings and Importance of Diversity

Originally published by Angela Morris.

 

“At this law school, there is a great deal of passion for being part of A&M in every sense. In the practical, functional sense, but also in the sense of the community and the network and the family that our law students are becoming a part of,” Bobby Ahdieh said.
      

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Thursday, August 30, 2018

California Supreme Court Affirms Broad And Liberal Construction Of Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity Provision

Originally published by Billie Wenter and Caroline B. Burnett.

This month the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that workers’ compensation laws are the exclusive remedy for an employee’s injuries. In King v. CompPartners, the Court ruled that an employee’s tort claims against a utilization review company and a doctor performing a mandatory utilization review were preempted. In so doing, the Court reminded employees that the Court construes the Workers Compensation Act (WCA) liberally and broadly, in favor of awarding workers’ compensation, not in permitting civil litigation.

 

 

Background

This case arose after an employee sustained a back injury at work and suffered a series of seizures after abruptly stopping Klonopin (a psychotropic drug to treat anxiety and depression) when a utilization reviewer (defendant Dr. Sharma) concluded Klonopin was medically unnecessary. The employee alleged that work-related back pain caused anxiety and depression. His mental health professional prescribed Klonopin. As part of the utilization review process outlined in Labor Code section 4610 (the process where employers, through utilization reviewers, determine whether a recommended treatment plan for an industrial injury is medically necessary), Dr. Sharma denied the treatment recommendation.

The employee filed a complaint in superior court claiming negligence, infliction of emotional distress and other tort claims against Dr. Sharma and the utilization review company, CompPartners. He alleged that the Dr. Sharma caused him additional injuries by denying the request without providing a weaning regimen or warning him of the possible side effects of abruptly ceasing the medication. Defendants demurred, arguing that the WCA preempted the employee’s tort claims The trial court agreed and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, except as to the failure to warn theory, which the court concluded was not subject to the WCA’s exclusive remedies because it did not directly challenge Dr. Sharma’s medical necessity determination.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The California Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the employee’s injuries caused by the utilization review are the sort of injuries the WCA’s exclusivity provision covers. However, the Court disagreed with the appellate court’s determination that the WCA did not apply to the extent that the employee complained Dr. Sharma failed to warn of the adverse consequences of abruptly stopping the medication.

The Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred, because the employee’s injury arose out of and in the course of the utilization review — “a statutorily required part of the workers’ compensation claims process, to which he would not have been subject had he not suffered a work-related injury.”

Court’s ruling resulted from the application of two principles favorable to employers:

  • The WCA’s exclusive remedy provision preempts injuries that are collateral to or derive from a compensable workplace injury, including additional or aggravated injuries that stem from conduct occurring in the workers’ compensation claim process. Because the employee’s injuries occurred within the scope of the employment relationship—i.e., from errors in the utilization process that his employer had to establish as part of the claim process—the compensation the employee received for his workplace back injury was his sole and exclusive remedy under Labor Code section 3602.
  • The WCA’s exclusivity provision protected CompPartners and Dr. Sharma because they stood in the shoes of the employer. Though a literal reading of the WCA’s definition of “employer” seemingly excluded them, the Court reasoned that the Act, properly interpreted, also preempts claims against utilization reviewers because they discharge the employers’ responsibilities to their employees. In so doing, the Supreme Court expanded the list of third parties entitled to protection from tort claims based on a compensable workplace injury.

In sum, this case illustrates the fundamental public policy rationale behind the exclusivity provision. The Court explained:

The treatment of utilization reviewers is, however, consistent with the basic trade off that underlies the workers’ compensation system as a whole: The employee is afforded swift and certain payments for medical treatment without having to prove fault, but, in exchange, gives up his right to sue in tort for those injuries that result from risks encompassed by the employment relationship.”

Please reach out to your Baker McKenzie employment lawyer with any questions.

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Your Shuttered Business: Bankrupt It, Dissolve It or Walk Away?

Originally published by Cleve Clinton.

After reluctantly shuttering her family owned Widgets-R-Us last month due to insufficient profits to pay even the secured debt, Susie Sears is now dealing with disbelieving unsecured creditors. What should she do?

 

Personal Liability Avoided

Acting on her attorney’s advice last month, Susie took care to avoid potential personal liability for employment taxes, franchise taxes and income taxes, and she confirmed that she has no personal contract liabilities.

Company Dissolution?

Susie should notify all known creditors and, to the extent of available funds, pay all known creditors before distributing any assets or profits. Any money she pays to owners when there are still creditors puts Susie at risk to pay them.  Susie may elect to dissolve the business once operations have ceased and creditors are paid or otherwise resolved. She should wait until the statute of limitations expires before paying any questionable claims and before dissolving. Most importantly, she should follow the Widgets-R-Us governing documents and/or Texas statutes regarding dissolution voting rights and the order of dissolution.

Initiate Final Dissolution

If all employment taxes, franchise taxes and income taxes have been paid, if there are no assets other than that paid to the secured creditors and if, therefore, the purpose of the Company has legitimately come to an end then Susie may elect to either: (a) keep the Company open until, for example, the statute of limitations runs out, or (b) shut down the Company so long as it was in existence and in good standing during the time in which the business had operations.

Tilting the Scales in Your Favor

Don’t Forget. As an officer / director Susie still owes a fiduciary duty of due care and loyalty. The duty of due care requires directors and officers to make fully-informed, good faith decisions in the best interests of the company. The duty of loyalty imposes on directors and officers the obligation not to engage in self-dealing and instead to put the interests of the company ahead of their own. Even if the company is insolvent, directors and officers still owe fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty to the company, meaning they must maximize enterprise value first for the creditors and then the owners.

Legal Options to Wind Down

Options to wind down range from an informal approach all the way to a public bankruptcy filing, a brief overview of which are:

  • Walk Away. Assuming there is no value or assets that are not subject to a secured creditor, Susie eventually lays off her employees, and shuts down her operations without a formal termination and dissolution. Be advised that an informal wind down can leave legal loose ends with unintended consequences.
  • Dissolve It. Formally winds up the corporate affairs, liquidates assets, and ends the company’s legal existence. This option may be elected when bankruptcy protection is not needed or preferred, but a formal, legal wind down of the corporate entity is wanted.
  • Bankruptcy – Chapter 7: Upon filing with the United States Bankruptcy Court, an appointed bankruptcy trustee takes control of company’s assets, including the company’s attorney-client privilege. The directors and officers no longer have any decision-making authority over the company or its assets. The filing triggers the bankruptcy automatic stay preventing secured creditors from foreclosing on company assets and prevents creditors from pursuing or continuing lawsuits.  The Trustee assumes all litigation authority and may pursue preferential transfers and possible breach of fiduciary duty claims against directors or officers.
  • Bankruptcy – Chapter 11. Filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and also triggers the bankruptcy automatic stay. Unlike a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, in the Chapter 11 reorganization bankruptcy the board and management remain in control of the company’s assets (at least initially) as a “debtor in possession” or DIP. Business operations many continue with funding at the higher cost of the Chapter 11 process requiring DIP financing and/or use of a lender’s cash collateral. This process permits a venture-backed company to sell assets “free and clear” of liens, claims and interests through a Bankruptcy Court-approved sale process under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

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New Tools for Defeating Nonclient Suits Against Lawyers

Originally published by Gregg Weinberg.

 

Recent Texas Supreme Court rulings have supplied some tools for lawyers who find themselves having to defend themselves from malpractice lawsuits by pro se litigants.
      

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Cezy Collins, Larry McDougal recommended as State Bar president-elect nominees

Originally published by Lowell Brown.

The Nominations and Elections Subcommittee voted today to recommend the nomination of Jeanne Cezanne “Cezy” Collins of El Paso and Larry P. McDougal Sr. of Richmond as candidates for 2019-2020 State Bar of Texas president-elect, after interviewing six potential nominees in Austin.

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Wednesday, August 29, 2018

Investors in UDF IV REIT Want Texas Federal Judge to Approve $13.5M Ponzi Fraud Settlement

Originally published by P. Clarkson Collins Jr..

Investors who placed their funds in the Texas-based United Development Funding IV real estate investment trust are asking a federal judge to approve a $13.5M REIT fraud settlement they’d reached with the company over the allegations that it had been run like a Ponzi-like scam and concealed this. The plaintiffs contend that UDV IV and its affiliates not only made false statements but also they did not disclose material facts involving business and operations.

They brought their REIT fraud case against the UDF companies three years ago, accusing the defendants of using investors’ funds from newer offering to pay investors who had gotten involved in earlier offerings. The investors, who want class certification, alleged that disclosures they were offered were misleading and lending practices lacked transparency.

Both sides eventually arrived at the $13.5M settlement—$10.5M in cash and another $3M once the REIT hits its $75M cash flow target in two years. This deal is separate from a settlement the plaintiffs reached with UDF accountants, as well as those that underwrote and sold the allegedly fraudulent offerings.

UDF IV Ponzi Allegations Lead to FBI Raid in Dallas
It was in early 2016 that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a raid on United Development Funding’s offices in Dallas. The raid came after The UDF IV was hit with allegations that it had been operated like a Ponzi scam for years. UDF, meantime, tried to counter those allegations contending that it was the victim of false and disparaging allegations.

Investors have alleged that UDF IV’s alleged misconduct caused about $204.5M in damages. In July, the US Securities and Exchange Commission filed charges accusing UDF IV, UDF III, and four executives for allegedly misleading investors when they failed to disclose that distributions could not be paid and money from UDF IV, which is the newer fund, was used to pay investors of UDF III, which was the older fund.

Our Texas REIT fraud law firm represents investors that have suffered losses from investing in the UDF IV or another UDF fund. Contact one of our UDF fraud lawyers so that we can help you explore your legal options.

Investors In ‘Ponzi-Like’ REIT Seek Initial OK Of $13.5M Deal, Law360, August 24, 2018

Read the SEC Complaint (PDF)

More Blog Posts:
Texas REIT UDF Files Lawsuit Accusing Hedge Fund Manager of Damaging False Statements, November 30, 2017

The FBI Raids UDF IV Offices in Dallas, Texas, February 19, 2016

The post Investors in UDF IV REIT Want Texas Federal Judge to Approve $13.5M Ponzi Fraud Settlement appeared first on Securities Fraud Attorney.

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The Courtroom Clash Between Truth and Scienc

Originally published by John Floyd.

The law seeks the truth; science seeks the facts. The two frequently clash in a court of law.

 

The Texas Rules of Evidence permit two kinds of opinion testimony—lay and expert. Rule 701 permits the lay testimony of the more traditional witness, like those who either saw or participated in the events surrounding the crime charged. Rule 702 permits the specialized testimony of an “expert” witness.

 

Lay opinion testimony encompasses both a witness’s perceptions and experiences associated with the event about which they are testifying, including what they saw, heard, smelled, touched, felt, or tasted. Expert opinion testimony, however, is dependent upon “the degree of education, training, or experience a witness should have before he can qualify as an expert is directly related to the complexity of the field about which he proposes to testify.” The admission of the latter testimony is predicated on three basic factors:

 

  1. The witness must be qualified in the area of expertise for which the evidence is proffered;
  2. The expert’s testimony must be grounded in the scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge in that particular area of expertise; and
  3. The testimony must assist the trier of fact.

 

While the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has never addressed the issue of whether a witness with training and experience can testify as a lay witness, the court has authorized the admission of such testimony as both lay and expert opinion. In other words, a witness with specialized knowledge may testify about their own observations under Rule 701 and testify about the theories, facts and data used in their own area of expertise under Rule 702.

 

Texas prosecutors often use law enforcement officers to give both lay and expert testimony, resulting in nasty head-butting between truth and science. The experiences and observations gleaned by law enforcement during the investigation and apprehension process are too frequently presented as specialized knowledge. For example, the courts have recognized law enforcement opinion testimony under both Rule 701 and 702 in the following situations:

 

  • Ventroy v. State – police officer’s experience and personal knowledge about the scene of an accident;
  • Yohey v. State – police officer’s testimony regarding time of death;
  • Austin v. State – police officer’s testimony that “Swedish Deep Muscle Rub” was a term for prostitution;
  • Reece v. State – police officer’s testimony that, in his opinion, based on experience, the actions he observed were consistent with someone selling drugs;
  • State v. Wilson – police officer’s testimony as non-expert opinion witness regarding intoxication based in part on smelling the odor of alcohol.

 

The following are examples of law enforcement testifying purely as “expert” witnesses under Rule 702:

 

  • Thompson v. State – police officer with only 40 hours of training to interpret phone records permitted to testify as expert when the technique used was not complex;
  • Perryman v. State – police officer permitted to testify about profile of sexual assault victim’s assailant;
  • Thomas v. State – police officer allowed to testify as expert regarding the procedures of a con game known as a “pigeon drop” scheme; and
  • Sabedra v. State – police officer permitted to testify as expert regarding his knowledge about stab wounds and to opine about whether the victim’s wounds were serious and permanent.

 

In each of these “expert” cases the courts made a finding that specialized opinions by the law enforcement officers were either helpful to or in some way aided the jury in its effort to determine the truth.

 

In his 2008 Catholic University Law Review article, “Acts of Emotion: Analyzing Congressional Involvement in the Federal Rules of Evidence,” Georgetown University Law Center Teaching Fellow Michael Teter observed that allowing law enforcement officers to testify as “experts” was a “dramatic unintended” consequence of Federal Rule 702.

 

We agree.

 

Law enforcement officers testifying as “experts” about gang involvement, drug profiling, and other areas beyond the bounds of the knowledge they gain through work experience corrupts the truth seeking process.  Law enforcement testimony in the courtroom has turned perception into reality, opinion into fact.

 

We acknowledge there is some evidence that requires both lay and expert testimony to clarify some evidence for the jury.  Law enforcement testimony, however, is not one of them. Law enforcement experience, even expertise, belongs in the investigation and apprehension process, and it should remain there. The truth is simply this: there should be no creature called “expert” law enforcement testimony. The testimony of police officers should be nothing more than a presentation of factual observations and facts. Juries should not be influenced by the “junk science” of expert law enforcement testimony.

 

 

 

 

 

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Challenges Faced by Texas Farms, Ranches, and Dairies After a Tornado

Originally published by Denied Insurance Claim Blog.

Make Sure Your Farm Damage Insurance Policy Includes What You NeedAny business may suffer lost income and damage from adverse weather, but owners who rely on animals and open land could literally see their profits blown away by a tornado. Unfortunately, most standard insurance policies will not cover the types of losses suffered by farmers and livestock owners—and inadequate coverage can force family farms or even large-scale operations out of business. Attorney Bill Voss explores the tornado risks faced by agribusiness owners and the specialty insurance options that can help farmers and ranchers recover.

Your Farm Damage Policy May Not Cover All of Your Tornado Losses

After the debris has been cleared, farmers, ranchers, and dairy farmers will need to work quickly to protect their remaining stock and calculate the amount of their losses. While many commercial insurers offer agribusiness policies, these basic policies may not be extensive enough to cover all business operations, leaving owners out-of-pocket for a large portion of the damage.

If you are a commercial grower or packer, ranch owner, dairy farmer, or head of a family farm, you should carefully consider the add-ons and extensions available to enhance your coverage, such as:

  • Property damage extensions. Farmers who live onsite can include their dwellings in a commercial policy and may choose replacement coverage for a dwelling with a value of over $1M. Depending on coverage limits, owners can be reimbursed for the loss of private structures, household furnishings, and personal property, as well as the increased cost of building code upgrades and temporary living expenses during repairs.
  • Pollutant clean-up. Pollution protection can pay for the costs of cleaning up a widespread spill of fertilizers or dangerous chemicals, and can replace any stock lost as a result of a spill on the owner’s property.
  • Commercial auto coverage. Comprehensive commercial auto insurance protects business vehicles from all perils, including weather damage—and this coverage may be extended to plows, tractors, mowers, excavators, harvesters, and other high-value drivable farm equipment.
  • Lost electronics and equipment. Equipment breakdown can cover the loss of a farm computer, point of sale, automated milking machines, and other specialized electrical equipment.
  • Utility coverage. Utility interruption coverage can pay for power interruption losses, such as alarm system malfunction causing theft, refrigeration failure resulting in spoilage, or animals wandering offsite due to downed electric fences.
  • Specialty stock losses. Vineyard growers with attached wineries or dairies with commercial ice cream and cheese shops onsite may need additional protection from product contamination and spoilage.
  • Animal coverage. Specialized coverages may be available to protect livestock, but also horses and domestic animals needed to perform work on the farm. Enhanced coverage may also include property damage to stables, pens, fences, and corrals.
  • Crop and feed losses. Tornados can rip the tops from silos, level whole fields of green crops, and destroy harvested products waiting to be shipped. Insurance can be extended to cover products such as hay, grass, and corn in storage and in transit, as well as the cost of replanting.
  • Seasonal insurance. A tornado can cause a smaller seasonal yield on cash crops, livestock, and other products, sinking the farm’s overall profits. Seasonal insurance coverage can make up the difference in sales, keeping the business afloat even when a tornado causes a “bad year.”
  • Loss of farm income. It can take weeks or even months to rebuild and reestablish normal operations after a tornado causes widespread damage. Business interruption coverage can replace lost profits for up to six months after a tornado, helping owners supplement their income during renovation and restoration.

If you are having trouble getting your insurance company to cover all of your tornado losses, we can help. The attorneys at the Voss Law Firm can read through your policy carefully and negotiate with the insurer on your behalf, getting you the maximum amount of coverage you are owed. Simply fill out the form on this page today to learn more about your options, or order a free copy of our book, Commercial Property Owners Must Read This BEFORE Filing an Insurance Claim.

 

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Scienter alleged.

Originally published by David Coale.

The plaintiffs in Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Asar alleged securities fraud about the affairs of Hanger, Inc., the nation’s largest provider of orthotic and prosthetic patient care. The Fifth Circuit largely affirmed dismissal, but as to one defendant found adequate allegations of scienter based primarily on statements in an audit committee report, which “support the inference that McHenry shared the objectives of improperly enhancing Hanger’s financial results, or that he at least knew that others were doing so. A dissent would have also dismissed as to him, noting that “the complaint makes no effort to demonstrate which portions of the Report show that McHenry, or any other defendant, had the requisite scienter.” No. 17-50162 (Aug. 6, 2018).

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Overcoming Shyness in the Law School Setting

Originally published by lawschool academicsupport.

While many students are mildly uncomfortable with some of the speaking and social interaction involved in law school, for some students the discomfort can be almost paralyzing. Extreme shyness can make law school seem a Herculean task. Gripping, gut-wrenching social…

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Syllabus Drafting Tips

Originally published by lawschool academicsupport.

This week is what the undergraduate community at my university affectionately calls “syllabus week”–that is, five glorious days where each professor reviews his/her expectations for the course, and does not address any substantive (read, “testable”) material. In law school, however,…

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Panda In A Monkey Selfie Copyright Situation? Zoo Sells Paintings Created By Panda Bear

Originally published by Peggy Keene.

A Vienna zoo has made headlines around the world by offering for sale paintings created by their resident panda. For approximately $500 a piece, enthusiastic […]

The post Panda In A Monkey Selfie Copyright Situation? Zoo Sells Paintings Created By Panda Bear appeared first on Klemchuk LLP.

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The Shrinking Reach of US Jurisdiction in Cross-Border Disputes

Originally published by Brian Boyle.

 

Cross-border disputes that played out in U.S. courts in the past have become more susceptible to jurisdictional challenges from foreign defendants hoping to avoid litigating in the United States.
      

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Reliance on Inherently Disclosed Embodiments in Prior Art is Dangerous

Originally published by Haynes and Boone Benefits Group.

Andrew Cohn
Associate
Haynes and Boone, LLP

Prior art disclosures, and particularly non-patent literature, can be relied on for more than what they explicitly disclose.  For example, many prior art references may be interpreted as including inherent disclosures. However, reliance on inherent disclosures does not come without a large amount of risk, requiring a careful analysis of the inherent yet undisclosed characteristics of the reference. The strict test for inherent disclosures was apparent in Endo Pharmaceuticals Solutions, Inc. et al., v. Custopharm Inc., (Appeal Number 2017-1719, Fed. Cir. July 13, 2018) (“Endo Pharms.”), where a showing that an undisclosed (but actually used) formulation in the prior art was insufficient to find an inherent disclosure.

In Endo Pharms., Endo Pharmaceuticals Solutions, Inc., Bayer Intellectual Property GHBM, and Bayer Pharma AG(“Endo”) sued Custopharm Inc. (“Custopharm”) over infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,718,640 (“the ‘640 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 8,338,395 (“the ‘395 patent”). The ‘640 and ‘395 patents cover Endo’s medication Aveed®, a formulation of testosterone undecanoate (TU) that addresses shortcomings in the administration of TU to patients. The Federal Circuit noted that, prior to the 2003 priority date of the patents, administration of testosterone to treat hypogonadism suffered from three notable defects: first, injectable therapies required visiting a doctor every two to three weeks to receive an injection and topical therapies required daily application; second, the therapies required constant maintenance and monitoring to adjust administration levels based on varying testosterone levels during therapy; and third, the therapies caused instability in testosterone levels that could cause those levels to fall below the proper physiological range. Endo Pharms. at 2-3.

Aveed® provides a “long-acting injectable testosterone replacement therapy for men suffering from physiologically low levels of testosterone.” Endo Pharms. at 2. In particular, the ‘640 and ‘395 patents cover a specific vehicle formulation and administration of TU formulation, with the ‘640 patent specifically covering a formulation for administration of a 750mg dosage of 250mg/ml TU in a claimed mixture of 40-42% castor oil and 58-60% benzyl benzoate, and the ‘395 patent directed to the administration of TU in the same mixture according to a schedule that includes two initial injections followed by a “maintenance phase” of subsequent injections every ten weeks. Representative claims 1 and 2 in the ‘640 patent, and claims 14 and 18 in the ‘395 patent, are reproduced below.

Claims 1 and 2 of the ‘640 patent read:

  1. A composition formulated for intramuscular injection in a form for single injection which contains 250 mg/ml testosterone undecanoate in a vehicle containing a mixture of castor oil and benzyl benzoate wherein the vehicle contains castor oil in a concentration of 40 to 42 vol %.
  2. A composition formulated for intramuscular injection in a form for single injection according to claim 1, which contains 750 mg testosterone undecanoate.

Claims 14 and 18 of the ‘395 patent read:

  1. A method of treating a disease or symptom associated with deficient endogenous levels of testosterone in a man, comprising administering by intramuscular injection a composition comprising testosterone undecanoate (TU) and a vehicle consisting essentially of castor oil and a co-solvent, the castor oil being present in the vehicle at a concentration of 42 percent or less by volume, the method further comprising:

(i) an initial phase comprising 2 initial intramuscular injections of a dose of TU at an interval of 4 weeks between injections, each dose including 500 mg to 1000 mg of TU, followed by,

(ii) a maintenance phase comprising subsequent intramuscular injections of a dose of TU at an interval of 10 weeks between injections, each dose including 500 mg to 1000 mg of TU.

  1. The method of claim 14, in which each dose contains 750 mg of TU.

The key elements of dispute between Endo and Custopharm were “(1) 750 mg TU, (2) vehicle consisting of castor oil and a co-solvent (benzyl – benzoate in the ‘640 patent) where the castor oil is 42% or less by volume, and (3) an injection schedule comprising two initial injections at an interval of four weeks followed by injections at ten week intervals (‘395 patent only).” Endo Pharms. at 4-5. During trial, the sole issues became whether claim 2 of the ‘640 patent and claim 18 of the ‘395 patent were obvious. Id. at 5. In particular, three scientific articles describing “small clinical studies involving 1000 mg TU injections” were introduced as prior art. Id. at pages 5-6. The three scientific articles[1] (collectively “the Articles”) explicitly disclose a composition of 250mg/ml of TU in castor oil, but the parties agreed that the Articles did not disclose use of a co-solvent, much less benzyl benzoate. Id. at 6. However, it was later revealed in 2007 (after the 2003 priority date of the patents at issue) that the actual formulation used in the studies was 40% castor oil and 60% benzyl benzoate. Id.

Two additional prior art articles were also introduced. The first article[2] (“Pushpalatha”) describes Proluton Depot (“Proluton”), an injectable form of hydroxyprogesterone that is given to pregnant women, and that includes 40% castor oil and 60% benzyl benzoate. Endo Pharms. at 6. The second article[3] (“Riffkin”) discloses that benzyl benzoate may be used during administration of steroids to improve the solvent abilities of castor oil. Id.

In a bench trial, the District Court found that Custopharm had not met its burden of proving the claims would have been obvious because (1) Custopharm had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that a skilled artisan would lower the dosage from 1000mg to 750mg due to overdosing concerns, and (2) the Articles do not inherently disclose benzyl benzoate as a co-solvent, much less the particular ratio of castor oil to benzyl benzoate. Endo Pharms. at 6-7. The second point was concluded after the District Court noted that “inherency may only supply a missing claim limitation if the limitation at issue is the ‘natural result’ of the combination of prior art elements or a ‘necessarily present’ limitation.” Id. at 7. In particular, the District Court found that Custopharm had failed to establish that the Articles could not have used other vehicle formulations for the administration of TU. Additionally, the District Court found that the prior art did not disclose the injection schedule of the ‘395 patent, and it would not have been obvious to a skilled artisan in light of the prior art.

Custopharm appealed, and the Federal Circuit agreed with the District Court’s decision. Endo Pharms. at 7. The Federal Circuit reviewed the three previous issues: the testosterone dose, the vehicle formulation for the administration of TU, and the injection schedule. First, the Federal Circuit noted that the parties did not contest that the prior art did not disclose the 750mg dose. Id. at 8. However, the Federal Circuit did not find a motivation for one of skill in the art to lower the dose of TU in the Articles from 1000mg to 750mg, as in the ‘640 patent. Id. Custopharm argued that American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists (“AACE”) Guidelines set normal testosterone levels that would have resulted in an injection of 1000mg of TU that would have overdosed patients. Id. at 9. The Federal Circuit noted that this argument relies “on the assumption that a skilled artisan would have applied the AACE Guidelines to the exclusion of other guidelines that existed at the time, including the FDA Guidelines.” Id. Custopharm’s own expert edited a textbook that confirmed that the clinical practice was to use the FDA Guidelines, which would have resulted in normal to underdosing of patients when administering 1000mg TU (measured at specific test intervals after administration). Id. Custopharm argued that a “best” motivation is not required to lower the dose to 750mg, only a “suitable” motivation, but the Federal Circuit found that unpersuasive because “Custopharm needed to affirmatively demonstrate that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to lower the dose of TU despite no clear evidence of overdosing under the FDA Guidelines.” Id. at 10. Finally, the Federal Circuit saw no reason for a skilled artisan to lower the dose when a plausible alternative practice in light of the prior art would instead be to extend the injection schedule and administer TU less frequently.

The Federal Circuit next moved to the vehicle formulation for administering TU using 40% castor oil and 60% benzyl benzoate. Endo Pharms. at 11. Custopharm’s relied on two theories as to why the vehicle formulation was unpatentable in light of the prior art. First, Custopharm argued that the vehicle formulation was inherently described in the Articles because it was later revealed that the vehicle formulation was the actual formulation used by the authors of the Articles when performing clinical studies. Id. at 11-12. Second, Custopharm argued that there was a motivation to combine the Articles with Proluton to achieve a 40% castor oil and 60% benzyl benzoate formulation. Id. at 11 and 16.

Regarding inherency within prior art, the Federal Circuit did not find that the vehicle formulation was “necessarily present” in the prior art even if not explicitly disclosed. Endo Pharms. at 11-16.In particular, the Federal Circuit noted that the proper test for inherency is whether the limitation at issue is “necessarily present” in the prior art, and not that the element might be present in, or could result from, the prior art. Id. at 11-12. Although the authors of the Articles actually used the co-solvent and ratio claimed in the ‘640 patent, Custopharm’s evidence did not support that one of skill in the art would have arrived at this vehicle formulation based on the pharmacokinetic properties and results disclosed in the Articles. Id. at 12-14. For example, the Articles did not necessarily indicate the claimed formulation based on the reported results, and the prior art was replete with other co-solvents. Id. at 12-14. The Federal Circuit also failed to find a motivation to combine the described Proluton vehicle formulation in Pushpalatha with the Articles and Riffkin to arrive at the vehicle formulation of TU in the ‘640 patent. Id. at 16. The Federal Circuit agreed with the District Court that Custopharm failed to meet its burden because, “while Proluton and Riffkin do suggest the use of a co-solvent, they do not suggest that the co-solvent necessarily be benzyl benzoate as opposed to other co-solvents known in the art.” Id. at 17. Moreover, Proluton was administered to pregnant women to prevent miscarriage, which is not an injectable steroid product with prolonged activity for men. Id.

The Federal Circuit also found that the District Court did not err in rejecting Custopharm’s argument that the injection schedule would have been obvious for a skilled artisan to arrive at when adjusting the prior art for each individual patient. Endo Pharms. at 18. Custopharm’s argument relied on the overdose theory using 1000mg TU injections, which was already rejected. Id. at 19. The Articles further taught an initial injection schedule of four injections at six week intervals, and then increasing the interval between subsequent injections. Id. This did not reasonably teach shortening the schedule to four weeks and then increasing to ten weeks, as required in the ‘395 patent. Id. Moreover, Endo provided evidence that TU injections can behave in unpredictable ways so that “dose and regimen changes would require more than routine experimentation. Id. The ‘395 patent aimed to “achieve a commercially viable testosterone therapy,” and regardless of experimentation from the perspective of an individual patient, a skilled artisan would have been confronted by this same issue. Id. at 19-20. Thus, Custopharm failed to properly show that a skilled artisan would combine a lowered dose with an injection schedule based on the prior art.

Obviousness and Inherency – Unrecognized or Unappreciated but Necessarily Inherent Characteristics

Inherency may be utilized to provide a missing claim limitation only when the limitation is necessarily present or a natural result of the elements that are explicitly within the prior art. This strict test means that “probabilities or possibilities” within the prior art are insufficient to show a limitation, such as the “mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances.” Endo Pharms. at 12 citing In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531 at 1533-4 (Fed. Cir. (1993). Instead, the rule requires that “the limitation at issue necessarily must be present [even if unrecognized or unappreciated], or [is] the natural result of the combination of elements explicitly disclosed by the prior at.” Id. at 11-12 citing Par Pharmaceutical v. TWI Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 773 F.3d 1186 at 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

The District Court found that the Articles did not bar other possible vehicle formulations from being used in the prior art formulations. Endo Pharms. at 12. The Federal Circuit agreed that Custopharm had not shown that one of skill in the art could determine that the formulation actually used during the clinical trials in the Articles would only cause the reported results disclosed in the Articles. Id. at 12-13. Nothing in the Articles showed that the pharmacokinetic performance of the administered TU vehicle could only be attributed to the vehicle formulation in the ’640 patent.  Id. Instead, Custopharm was required to show that the Articles necessarily disclosed this formulation based on the pharmacokinetic performance, and had failed to do so. Id. Moreover, the prior art utilized many different co-solvents so that a skilled artisan would not have recognized that benzyl benzoate was actually used. Id. at 13. Custopharm own expert stated that even knowing benzyl benzoate was used would not lead to the proper ratio. Id. at 13-14.

Custopharm’s cited cases include an inherent property that was actually present in a known prior art product. Endo Pharms. at 14. Custopharm’s arguments were predicated on In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation (“Omeprazole”) and In re Crish (“Crish”). Id. at 14-15 citing Omeprazole 483 F. 3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) and Crish 393 F. 3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In Omeprazole, claim 1 at issue was invalidated by a Chong Kun Dan Corporation (CKD) patent application because claim 1 was directed to a process for making a pharmaceutical composition “which included an in situ separating layer or subcoating.” Id. at 14. In the CKD patent application, even though the application “expressly disavowed the presence of a separating layer, the record showed that the in situ separating layer was, in fact, the natural result of using the ingredients outlined in the CKD application.” Id. Thus, this in situ separating layer was inherent in the CKD patent application because “it would result each and every time a skill artisan followed the prior art process.” Id. In Crish, a prior publication disclosed the structure of a HiNV gene, as well as the approximate size of its promoter region, but not the sequence of the promoter. Id. at 14-15. However, this was enough to disclose the HiNV promoter in the claimed invention because “the record was clear that the known HiNV promoter region necessarily contained the sequence that the inventor tried to patent.” Id. That is, the prior publication necessarily disclosed that HiNV promoter region even if it was not specifically recognized by the disclosure.

Custopharm’s did not provide evidence that the vehicle formulation in the Articles would be derived by a skilled artisan based on the Articles’ disclosure. For example, the record did not present any evidence that only the claimed vehicle formulation in the ‘640 patent can be used to achieve the particular pharmacokinetic performance that was disclosed within the Articles. Endo Pharms. at 15. This is likely the main problem with Custopharm’s reliance on inherency – the evidence and experts provided by Custopharm did not provide proof that the pharmacokinetic performance was due to the actually used formulation by the Articles’ authors (i.e., the claimed formulation in the ‘640 patent). Without showing that the author’s results were due to the claimed formulation, and only due to the claimed formulation, Custopharm’s argument failed. In contrast to Custopharm’s interpretation of inherency, the lack of evidence supporting a direct and singular tie between the claimed formulation in the ‘640 patent and the reported results in the Articles ultimately doomed Custopharm.

At the outset, it is noteworthy that the vehicle formulation from the ‘640 patent was actually used during clinical testing. That means that the claimed vehicle formulation was actually present in the prior art and used to obtain those results. Of course, if the researchers had recorded the proper mixtures and combinations in their studies and research papers, there would be no question as to the explicit disclosure of the claimed limitations within the prior art. However, Custopharm failed to provide enough evidence to persuasively link the claimed formulation (although unrecognized, unappreciated, and unrecorded in the prior art) to the pharmacokinetic properties reported in the Articles. Utilizing the reported properties and results in the Articles, Custopharm could have utilized an expert, test results, or other evidence that the claimed vehicle formulation necessarily provides the results disclosed in the Articles. This may have been available since the claimed vehicle formulation was actually present in the Articles. If this was available or could have been obtained, it appears that this type of evidence would have swayed the Federal Circuit. However, without connecting the reported results of the clinical trials in the Articles to the claims of the ‘640 patent, the Federal Circuit was unwilling to find an inherent disclosure within the prior art.

Moreover, it appears that the wide number of available co-solvents further convinced the Federal Circuit that the prior art failed to teach one of skill in the art of the claimed vehicle formulation. While Proluton used a 40% castor oil and 60% benzyl benzoate combination, and Riffkin discusses use of benzyl benzoate with castor oil for the administration of steroids, the prior art included numerous other types of co-solvents. There were numerous other vehicle formulations for administration of intramuscular medications and the high degree of variance that required experimentation to arrive at appropriate vehicle delivery formulations. Further, the Federal Circuit acknowledges the disparities between the administration of TU, a steroid required by men suffering from low testosterone, and hydroxyprogesterone, which assists in preventing miscarriages, and felt that these differences would make it unlikely that one of skill in the art would apply such the formulation in administration of hydroxyprogesterone to a steroid administration. Although Riffkin suggests the benzyl benzoate and castor oil combination, it seems the Federal Circuit was unwilling to combine that with Proluton due to the difference between the drug types.

Custopharm likely believed that they had strong arguments based on the vehicle formulation being actually present when performing the clinical trials. Unfortunately, the failure to provide evidence that only the particular vehicle formulation could have resulted in the reported results in the Articles caused this argument to fail. It is interesting to consider whether it would have been important if the exemplary studies had been sold instead of merely used during clinical trials. Since these were clinical trials, the utilized formulation in the Articles is likely covered as an experimental use. However, a sale would appear to qualify as public use or on sale bar. Without this, Custopharm was forced to rely on inherency, as the clinical trials did not qualify elsewhere as prior art.

 

[1] (1) H. M. Behre et al., Intramuscular injection of testosterone undecanoate for the treatment of male hypogonadism: phase I studies , 140 Eur. J. Endocrinol. 414 (1999), (2) E. Nieschlag et al., Repeated intramuscular injections of testosterone undecanoate for substitution therapy in hypogonadal men , 51 Clin. Endocrinol. 757 (1999), and (3) S. von Eckardstein & E. Nieschlag, Treatment of Male Hypogonadism with Testosterone Undecanoate Injected at Extended Intervals of 12 Weeks: A Phase II Study , 23(3) J. Androl. 419 (2002).

[2] Pushpalatha, et al., Effect of prenatal exposure to hydroxyprogesterone on steroidgenic enzymes in male rats , 90 Naturwissenschaften 40 (2003).

[3] C. Riffkin, et al., Castor Oil as A Vehicle for Parenteral Administration of Steroid Hormones , 53(8) J. Pharm. Sci. 891 (1964).

The post Reliance on Inherently Disclosed Embodiments in Prior Art is Dangerous appeared first on Haynes and Boone Blogs.

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