Thursday, July 5, 2018

Predictive Scheduling: Yet Another Type of Law For Employers To Worry About

Originally published by Robert G. Chadwick, Jr..

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Seltzer, Chadwick, Soefje & Ladik, PLLC.

In recent years, the rights of applicants and employees have been expanded significantly through new state and local initiatives. These initiatives have included ban-the-box laws, which protect the rights of applicants with criminal conviction records, paid sick time laws, harassment training laws, and laws which ban inquiries about the salary history of job candidates.

In 2014, San Francisco became the first jurisdiction to adopt another new type of employment law. The Formula Retail Employee Rights Ordinances addressed predictive scheduling for employees in the retail industry. As with most new initiatives, other jurisdictions, including Seattle and New York City, quickly followed suit. On July 1, 2018, Oregon became the first state with a predictive scheduling law.

So, what are predictive scheduling laws?

Predictive scheduling laws vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Common components, however, include:

* Advance written notice to an employee before the employee’s work shift.

* Rest periods between work shifts.

* The right of an employee to decline any work shift not included on the employee’s written schedule or which encroaches on a rest period.

San Francisco, Seattle and Oregon allow for variances, but subject to compensation schedules favorable to employees. New York City has completely banned the practice of on-call scheduling.

Which employers are subject to predictive scheduling laws?

For now, predictive scheduling laws apply only to employees of retail, hospitality and food services establishments. Some legal scholars, however, are predicting the laws could expand to other industries.

Where else are predictive scheduling laws under consideration?

In New York, a proposed new State Labor Department predictive scheduling regulation was published for comment on November 22, 2017. A predictive scheduling ordinance is currently under consideration in Chicago. Proposed legislation has also been introduced in Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina and Rhode Island.

What should employers take away from these developments?

As noted in a previous article on this blog, states and municipalities are increasingly the new frontier in employment law. For multi-state employers, this reality presents multiple challenges, including (1) understanding new types of laws for which guidance is sparse or nonexistent, (2) keeping up with fast-changing laws in multiple jurisdictions, and (3) compliance with laws which vary from state-to-state and municipality-to-municipality and which frequently have location-specific mandates. Although these challenges are more daunting with the passage of each new law, the price for not facing the challenges can be fines, damages, or worse.

 

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Tuesday, July 3, 2018

Austin Bar and AYLA name new leaders

Originally published by Adam Faderewski.

The Austin Bar Association and Austin Young Lawyers Association, or AYLA, announced new officers recently.

Adam Schramek, of Norton Rose Fulbright, is now president of the Austin Bar; president-elect is D. Todd Smith; Kennon Wooten is secretary; David Courreges is treasurer; and Amy Welborn will serve as immediate past-president. Other members of the board of directors are Blair Dancy, Chari Kelly, Amy Meredith, Cindy Saiter, Amanda Arriaga, Vasu Behara, Greg Sapire, and Amanda Taylor.

AYLA’s new president is Jorge Padilla, who took office on July 1. Additional new leaders include Sandy Bayne as president-elect; Rachel Jones as secretary; David King as treasurer; and Austin Kaplan will serve as immediate past-president. Michael Choate, Sarah Harp, Eric Nelson, Kayvon Rashidi, Francesca Di Troia, Blair Leake, Brittani Miller, and Monica Stallings comprise the rest of the board of directors.

The Austin Bar Foundation will hold elections for its officers and board later this summer.

For more information, go to austinbar.org.

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Distinction between Military Deployment and Military Station

Originally published by Michelle O'Neil.

The Texas Family code provides special provisions regarding parenting time and access to children when the military parent is deployed.

Military deployment is not the same as a change of duty station (“PCS”). Deployment begins with the physical movement of individuals and units from their home installation to the designated theater of operations. One of the greatest distinctions between a duty station and a deployment, relevant to the questions pertaining to conservatorship, possession and access of a child the subject of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, is the inability of friends and family to accompany the military member on a deployment. On the other hand, family members accompany the military member to a duty station, and the military member can maintain a relationship with his or her child. A deployment is a temporary location of service, where a duty station is intended to be a more permanent assignment.

This distinction was outlined by the Amarillo Court of Appeals. In re Marriage of Hess, 2009 WL 4824693 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2009, no pet). There the military member father was stationed in North Carolina where he could have possession of and access to the child the subject of the suit. However, father claimed that it was a deployment under the Texas Family Code and the terms of the parties’ final divorce decree. The trial court rejected this argument, which was affirmed by the Amarillo Court, finding that father’s location in North Carolina was a duty station and not a deployment under the considerations of the Texas Family Code. Id.

Likewise, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals distinguished between a deployment and a duty station. In re Russell, 321 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth, 2010, pet. denied). There, step-father was granted right of access to the child the subject of the suit following divorce from the child’ mother. After divorce, step-father relocated in the military to a duty station in California. He filed for modification of the order, seeking to substitute his parents for himself according to the Texas Family Code provisions regarding deployment of a military member. Following temporary orders hearing, the trial court granted step-father’s parents right to periods of possession of the child finding that father was “deployed” outside the state of Texas. Further dispute arose between mother and step-father’s parents over enforcement of the step-father’s parents’ right of possession, at which point the trial court removed mother as primary conservator of the child, awarded primary conservatorship to step-father’s parents and restricted mother’s access to the child. The trial court denied mother’s challenge to the step-father’s parents’ standing to intervene in the suit. Mother sough mandamus of the standing ruling. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals distinguished between a deployment and a duty station, holding that step-father was “stationed” in California but not “deployed”. Thus, his parents had no standing to intervene as if it were a deployment. Id.

A change of duty station (“PCS”) is different than a deployment such that special parenting provisions do not apply to a change of duty station.

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Simulated MBE Struggles

Originally published by lawschool academicsupport.

For most students, the bar review simulated MBE was last week. Many students walk out of that test discouraged. They don’t receive as many correct as they wanted and wonder if the passing percentage is attainable. It is a rough…

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Monday, July 2, 2018

James v. Young: Are Landowners Liable for Horse Riding Injury to Child?

Originally published by tiffany.dowell.

 

A recent case out of the Waco Court of Appeals, James v. Young, is the real-life version of many landowners’ nightmare.  When a six-year-old child fell off of a horse the landowners’ allowed him to ride, his parents filed suit.  Did the Farm Animal Liability Act apply to shield the landowners from liability?

Background

The James family and the Young family were friends.  One weekend, the two families were spending time at the Young ranch.  The mothers and two of the children rode horses while several of the men worked cattle.  When the mothers and children returned, six-year-old Bradey James said he wanted to ride the horse as well.  Bradey and another child, Daniel, got on two of the horses and rode down a gravel road.  They turned around and headed back towards other horses up the road and the horses they were riding began running.  Bradey hit his head on the saddle horn, fell off of the horse he was riding, and was injured.

The James family filed suit against Justin and Paul Young for negligent handling of animals claiming that they failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the horse from injuring Bradey and that they allowed the child, who was only six-years-old, to ride their horse and failed to determine the ability to safely manage the horse before allowing Bradey to ride.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Justin and Paul Young and dismissed the case.  The court found no genuine issue of material fact in this case to justify going to trial.  The James family appealed.

Texas Farm Animal Liablity Act

This case centers on the application of the Texas Farm Animal Liability Act.  Under that statute, a person is not liable for injuries to participants in a farm animal activity if they were the result of dangers or conditions that are an inherent risk of  a farm animal activity.  For example, if a horse spooks and bucks someone off, that would likely be held an inherent risk of riding a horse and the owner would not be liable.  [For a more detailed explanation of the Farm Animal Liability Act, click here and here.]

There are, however, a list of exceptions to the limited liability found pursuant to the Act.  The one at issue in this case is found in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 87.004(2), which says that a person is liable for damages arising from a farm animal activity if “the person provided the farm animal  and the person did not make a reasonable and prudent effort to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the farm animal activity and determine the ability of the participant to safely manage the farm animal, taking in to account the participant’s representations of ability.”

The Youngs claim that the Farm Animal Liability Act relieves them from liability.  The James family concedes that the Act applies, but claims that they at least raised a genuine issue of material fact over whether the exception was applicable and their claims may go forward.

Waco Court of Appeals Opinion

The Court sided with the Youngs.  [Read full opinion here.]

Prior cases have held that this exception does not require “a formal, searching inquiry” into a person’s ability to ride a horse.  Instead, it requires only a reasonable, prudent effort to determine the person’s ability to ride.  The burden of proving failure to inquire rests with the injured party.

Here, the court found that the James family introduced no evidence that the Youngs failed to make appropriate efforts to determine Bradey’s riding ability, or that any such failure was the cause of the accident.  The court noted that Bradey’s parents consented to him riding the horse and his mother admitted she was knowledgeable of Bradey’s riding abilities and believed he was good enough to ride alone, which he had done before.

Thus, the James family failed to present evidence that a factual dispute existed over whether the exception applied, and the Farm Animal Liability Act shielded the Youngs from liability.  The decision of the trial court was affirmed.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

Chief Justice Gray issued a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in this case.  [Read full opinion here.]

Justice Gray agreed that the Texas Farm Animal Liability Act applied to this case.  In fact, he said “this is the type of suit for which [the Act] was enacted.”

Where he disagreed, however, is whether the James family offered sufficient evidence that the exception applied to grant summary judgment in this case.  He believes they did.

Justice Gray notes that any statute, such as this, with phrases like “reasonable and prudent effort” or “safely manage” make summary judgment very difficult to obtain, because they lend themselves to factual issues.  He believes that the James family did put forth factual evidence that could possibly convince jurors that the Youngs failed to make an adequate injury such as Justin not asking Bradey’s parents about his skill or experience, Justin never seeing Bradey ride a horse alone,  Bradey’s parents relying on Justin saying Bradey would be fine, the fact that Justin knew that age and size were important factors in riding safely, that Justin knew it could be dangerous of a six year old to ride without a halter, and that Justin knew the tendency of a horse to run back towards another horse.  This evidence was sufficient to allow jurors to determine Paul and Justin failed to inquire into the child’s ability, and the jury should be the one to make the determination of whether the exception applied or not, rather than the court on summary judgment.

Take Aways

Landowners are often, and rightfully, concerned about their potential liability if someone is injured riding horses on their property.  What can landowners do to protect themselves?

First, landowners should ensure they have an adequate liability insurance policy that would cover this type of situation on their land.  Having insurance is likely the best protection landowners have to protect their operation from financial disaster in this type of situation.  Landowners should visit with their insurance agent to ensure they have sufficient coverage, both with regard to the scope of activities covered an the dollar amount obtained.

Second, landowners should be aware of limited liability statutes such as the Farm Animal Liability Act, Recreational Use Statute, and the Texas Agritourism Act and take the steps necessary to ensure compliance with those statutes.  [Click here to learn more.]

Third, landowners providing horses to others to ride should always take care to determine the ability of the participant and to ensure any tack provided is in sufficient condition.  These are exceptions under the Farm Animal Liability Act that may be relied upon by plaintiffs to circumvent the limited liability offered by the Act.

Finally, landowners should take care to exercise caution and common sense anytime allowing other persons to be on their property, particularly when riding horses is involved.  We all know that accidents can happen even when the utmost care is used, but trying one’s best to ensure safety can oftentimes avoid disaster.

 

The post James v. Young: Are Landowners Liable for Horse Riding Injury to Child? appeared first on Texas Agriculture Law.

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Louisiana Lender Not Liable for Lease Violations

Originally published by Charles Sartain.

Co-author Brittany Blakey*

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s reversal of the lower courts in Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc. corrects a profound judicial mistake eliminates a source of anguish for Louisiana energy lenders and their borrowers. You might recall our report on the court of appeal opinion.

Facts:

Gloria’s Ranch granted an oil and gas lease to Tauren Exploration, who transferred an undivided 49% working interest to Cubic Energy. Cubic mortgaged its interest in several hundred leases, including Gloria’s Ranch, to Wells Fargo and assigned an override and a net profits interest as collateral. Tauren conveyed its 51% interest in the deep rights to EXCO.

Gloria’s Ranch demanded that the leasehold owners and Wells Fargo execute a recordable act evidencing that the lease expired for failure to produce in paying quantities.

Lower court proceedings

Gloria’s claim that attracted all the attention was the demand for damages from all defendants, including the lender. The damage award before the Supreme Court was $22 million for lost leasing opportunities, $242,000 in royalties, $484,000 in double royalties as a Mineral Code art. 140 penalty, and $936,000 in attorney fees. Most significant was the finding that lender Wells Fargo was solidarily liable with the other defendants for damages.

The big issue

Was mortgagee Wells Fargo solidarily liable as an “owner” of the lease under Mineral Code art. 207 and a “lessee” under art. 140?

In a victory for proper statutory construction, sound public policy, and the viability of the oil and gas industry in Louisiana, the Court held that Wells Fargo as mortgagee was not an “owner” under art. 207 and was therefore not liable for failure to release the lease and was not a “lessee” under art. 140, and therefore was not liable for failure to pay royalties.

The opinion was based on this analysis:

  • Cubic maintained its working interest in the lease when it entered into the loan and mortgage. Wells Fargo acquired a security interest, not a working interest.
  • Wells Fargo did not become an “owner” of the lease merely because it assumed rights of control under the loan documents. Such rights incidental to a mortgage and credit agreement do not rise to the level of ownership required under Mineral Code art 207.
  • Under the Mineral Code, ownership rights are distinguishable from security rights. The mortgage and credit agreement provisions were typical of security contracts designed to protect collateral.
  • The loan documents did not convey to Wells Fargo the critical right of a lessee in a mineral lease: to explore for and produce minerals.
  • Acquisition of overriding royalty and net profits interests in no way transformed Wells Fargo’s status from a secured creditor to that of an owner. This goes back to a basic oil and gas principle: The owner of a mineral royalty has no executive rights; nor does he have the right to conduct operations to explore for or produce minerals, citing Mineral Code art. 81.

The Court applied the same analysis to the royalty claim. Under art. 140, a “lessee” is liable for failure to pay royalties that are due. Because Wells Fargo was not liable as a “former owner” under art. 207, it was not liable for unpaid royalties as a “lessee” under art. 140. Wells Fargo was not liable under those provisions.

Tauren’s liability

Tauren as owner of the shallow rights was solidarily liable for the damages because its failure to release the lease breached an indivisible obligation. Tauren’s conveyance of its deep rights to EXCO did not effect a severance of the lease.

Penalty for unpaid royalties – 2X or 3X?

The maximum damage award under art. 140 was twice the amount of unpaid royalties, not royalties plus twice the amount.

Litigation often involves infidelity, real or imagined. Nobody does infidelity better that country music. Who writes songs like that? Among others,

Danny Dill and Marijohn Wilkin (Huh?), and Graham Parsons.

Malcom Gladwell explains it in his podcast, The King of Tears, Why County Music Makes You Cry.

*Brittany, a Gray Reed summer  associate, is a JD-MBA candidate at Baylor and a Texas Tech grad.

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Friday, June 29, 2018

Top 10 from Texas Bar Today: Coverage, Consent, and Covenants

Originally published by Joanna Herzik.

To highlight some of the posts that stand out from the crowd, the editors of Texas Bar Today have created a list from the week’s blog posts of the top ten based on subject matter, writing style, headline, and imagery. We hope you enjoy this installment.

10. Criminal act’s a criminal act – so, no coverageDavid Coale @600camp of Lynn Pinker Cox & Hurst, LLP in Dallas

9. To err is human. To disagree on an appraisal award is not grounds to set it aside.Anne-Marie Abarado of Hanna & Plaut, L.L.P. in Austin

8. Are Employment Class Actions A Thing of the Past?Keith Clouse of Clouse Brown PLLC @ClouseBrownLaw in Dallas

7. What Would Your Law Firm Be Like If You Gave Associates “Fed Ex” Days?Cordell Parvin @cordellparvin of Cordell Parvin LLC in Dallas

6. Can Adults Consent To A Fistfight in Texas? Not Exactly.Brandon Barnett of Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC @BHWLAWFIRM in Fort Worth

5. Privacy Alert – Alexa (and Friends) is Listening!Cleve Clinton of Gray Reed & McGraw @GrayReedLaw in Dallas

4. Texas Supreme Court Finds no Cause of Action for Intentional Interference with InheritanceSim Israeloff of Cowles & Thompson @CowlesThompson in Dallas

3. Three’s a crowd: The latest Texas Supreme Court ruling and its effect on non-parent standingRyan Segall of O’Neil Wysocki, P.C. in Dallas

2. Fifth Circuit Reminder: Words Matter in Employment Contracts, Restrictive CovenantsJoe Ahmad of Ahmad, Zavitsanos, Anaipakos, Alavi & Mensing P.C. in Houston

1. Grow Your Small Law Firm’s Business with Content Marketing – Amy Boardman Hunt of Muse Communications, LLC @MuseCommLLC

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