Wednesday, June 13, 2018

Compliance into the Weeds-Episode 85-Professor Coffee on the Dearth of IPOs

Originally published by tfoxlaw.

Compliance into the Weeds is the only weekly podcast which takes a deep dive into a compliance related topic, literally going into the weeds to more fully explore a subject. In this episode, Matt Kelly and I take a deep dive back into the issue of the decline in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). We consider […]

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Texas Supreme Court Redefines an Offset Well Clause

Originally published by Charles Sartain.

Co-author Chance Decker

In Murphy Exploration & Production Co. — USA v. Adams the Texas Supreme Court held that an offset well clause in an oil and gas lease did not require the lessee to drill wells calculated to protect against drainage. Four dissenting justices believed the majority disregarded the well-established meaning of “offset well” used in the oilfield for decades.


The facts

Murphy’s two oil and gas leases with the Herbsts had identical offset well clauses:

… in the event a well is completed as a producer … on land adjacent to and contiguous to the leased premises, and within 467 feet of the premises covered by this lease, that Lessee … is obligated to . . . commence drilling operations on the leased acreage and thereafter continue the drilling of such off-set well or wells with due diligence to a depth adequate to test the same formation … . (emphasis ours)

When a well on a neighboring tract triggered the clause, Murphy drilled a well on the Herbsts’ tract 2,100 feet from the triggering well.  Everyone agreed this well would not prevent drainage. The Herbsts argued the well did not satisfy the clause because it was not designed to protect against drainage.

Murphy responded that the well satisfied the clause because all the clause required was that the well be drilled on the leased premises to the same depth as the triggering well. That an offset well must actually protect against drainage or even be calculated to do so has no place in horizontal drilling in tight shale formations where drainage is minimal.

The ruling

The clause did not require Murphy to drill a well to protect against drainage. Murphy’s well satisfied the clause.

The opinion was based on two premises. First, the leases provided their own definition of “offset well”: Murphy had to drill a well:

  • on the Herbsts’ tract,
  • with due diligence,
  • to the same depth as the triggering well, and
  • drilling “such offset well” would satisfy the Clause.

“Such offset well” did not require proximity or actual protection from drainage, and the Court would not impose those terms.

Second, as it was entitled to do, to inform its interpretation the Court considered the “surrounding circumstances” under which the leases were negotiated and executed. The Court concluded that the leases were drafted with horizontal drilling in mind.  Expert testimony was that drainage is almost non-existent from horizontal wells in tight-shale formations like the Eagle Ford.  Thus, it would be “illogical” for an offset well clause to require a well – even an “offset well” – to even attempt to protect against non-existent drainage.

The dissent

According to the dissenters the commonly understood definition of “offset well” required Murphy to drill its offset at a location where a reasonably prudent operator would drill to protect the leasehold from actual or potential drainage, regardless of whether drainage was actually occurring.  The majority opinion effectively read “offset” out of the leases.

The dissent also challenged the majority’s conclusion that the Herbsts negotiated the leases with horizontal drilling in mind. They just wanted production, and the majority ignored other, non-shale formations.

Where will the Court go from here?

The Court purported to limit its holding to these facts, but the opinion could have far-reaching consequences. Wells drilled in the most active plays in Texas today are by and large horizontal, tight-shale wells. The opinion indicates the historical understanding of an “offset well” is antiquated in this context. How can operators protect against drainage that doesn’t exist? Does the Supreme Court believe they can’t and don’t have to even try?

Stay tuned!

We will soon have more on this topic in a lengthier client advisory.

Lessors who can’t get a break from the court, allow yourself to be distracted by today’s musical interlude. Car songs are good therapy.

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Tuesday, June 12, 2018

Website accessibility under the ADA – what do new standards mean?

Originally published by Richard Hunt.

W3CThe latest iteration of the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines became effective with the publication of version 2.1. on June 5, 2018.  The newest version adds an additional 17 success criteria for compliance with WCAG, 12 of which are part of success level 2, the level that has become a de facto standard for the ADA.* I’ve shared my thoughts on how this may change the ADA litigation landscape with Usablenet, which just published its overview of the changes in “New Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1 – What When How.” In this blog I’d like to consider the deeper questions posed by this revision: Who gets to decide what discrimination means?

It is worthwhile to start with a look at the stated purpose of the ADA itself. The declaration of policy in 42 U.S.C. §12101 never uses the word “accessible” and refers to “access” only with respect to public services. The focus of the ADA is discrimination, and standards for accessibility are only part of Congress’ intent to “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” (42 U.S.C. §12101(b)(2)).

The first of these standards concerned physical accessibility and took the form of the ADAAG, a set of construction requirements that are “as precise as they are thorough” according to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.** The original standards were replaced and expanded by the 2010 Standards now in effect, but a facility built when the old ADAAG were in effect still meets the requirements of the ADA. If you do it right the first time, you don’t have to keep re-doing it as standards for accessibility change.

This is notable because it is an example of the kind of compromise built into the ADA. Not making a facility accessible according to statutory standards is “discrimination” as defined in the ADA, but the statute was not intended to require that businesses perpetually update their physical premises as standards change. There are other compromises as well. The required door widths, slopes, and so forth are all based on what is accessible to most disabled individuals; not all. Those compromises were worked out over many years through the regulatory process with input from disability rights advocates, technical experts and the affected businesses. More recently adopted standards for ATM’s, movie theaters and the like were worked out the same way, balancing the degree of access with the cost of existing technology. In every case businesses were allowed lead times of many years to adapt to the new standards. No one was expected to become accessible overnight.

Until, that is, the Department of Justice decided that the internet should be accessible and that the ADA was the means to enforce that accessibility. I’ve written before about the legal issues this raises,† but the practical issues are far more important. DOJ prosecuted internet access cases long before it had begun work on accessibility standards for the internet, and then deep sixed regulations that were almost complete for political reasons.‡ The business community, usually not anxious to be regulated,  is now trying to persuade Congress to force DOJ to publish regulations in order to end the chaos brought on by a lack of standards.

In the meantime, we have the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines, now in version 2.1. They are published by the World Wide Web Consortium, a private organization made up of tech companies and academics from around the world. The Guidelines were developed with input from experts in accessibility, but not, it appears, members of the business community most affected by the Guidelines; that is, people who sell things on the internet or use web sites in support of ordinary physical businesses. The Guidelines were intended to be private and non-binding, so naturally they do not take into directly into account either the time or cost of implementation; after all, if there were no ADA a business could take as long as it needed to implement them, and could limit its implementation if cost were an issue. They are being used as government regulations without the process and compromises that such regulations ordinarily require.

This is not the fault of W3C of course. It is merely fulfilling its mission of providing web standards, with accessibility standards being just one such standard. It is disturbing though that an international NGO with no political or financial accountability has been delegated the job of regulating American business by the political paralysis of DOJ and the Congress and the willingness of the Courts to entertain website accessibility lawsuits. For businesses the only effective response is to assume that WCAG 2.1 will be the basis of a new round of lawsuits claiming that the definition of “discrimination” under the ADA was changed overnight by the publication of WCAG 2.1, and to begin updating their websites accordingly.

 

* Those interested in the exact changes can find them at “Comparison with WCAG 2.0.”

** Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2011)

† See our earlier blogs “ADA and the internet – the confusion continues,” and “Trending now – the ADA covers some of the internet, maybe” just to mention a few.

‡ “ADA and the Internet Update – DOJ sends its regulations to Hanger 51

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Using Credit Histories in Employment Decisions: An Overview of Divergent State & Local Requirements

Originally published by Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

By Pamela Q. Devata , Robert T. Szyba, and Stacey L. Blecher

Seyfarth Synopsis: Over the past few years, restrictions regarding the use of credit checks by employers on applicants and employees have been passed at various state and municipal levels, and the federal government has indicated its own concerns of potential discriminatory impact of the use of credit checks. The nuanced differences in obligations and requirements that may govern in any particular jurisdiction have created a legal mine-field for employers who utilize credit checks.

Jurisdictions Limiting Use of Employment Credit Checks

In recent years, ten states (California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont and Washington), the District of Columbia, and the cities of Chicago, New York City and Philadelphia have passed laws restricting the use of credit reports used by employers for employment purposes, with several more jurisdictions poised to join the trend. In addition, Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) and Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) have proposed bills in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate that would restrict the ways in which consumer credit information could be used for employment purposes.

The Benefit—and Risks—of Credit Checking

“Credit checks are useful to employers generally because they provide a variety of information not able to be confirmed by other sources and because they are viewed as a valid indicator of a person’s judgment and potential risk to the company . . . the vast majority of employers . . . use credit reports for a very limited number of positions such as jobs dealing with company finances, positions in accounting departments, high level executives or positions dealing with sensitive personal data of customers or employees.” Statement of Pamela Quiqley Devata, Esq., Seyfarth Shaw LLP, before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), October 20, 2010, “Employer Use of Credit History as a Screening Tool.” The EEOC, on the other hand, has taken on greater scrutiny of background checks in employment decisions because of their potential adverse impact on classes of applicants under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”).

The EEOC has taken issue with employers who utilize criminal history screening in their hiring decisions, and also has broadened their scrutiny to include credit checks for the same reason: the belief that credit checks create a disparate impact on certain minority groups. See for instance EEOC Enforcement Guidance, Number 915.002, issued April 25, 2012, entitled, “Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decision under Title VII. See also EEOC v. BMW Manufacturing Co., 2015 WL 5719928 (Verdict and Settlement Summary) (Sept. 8, 2015) (EEOC claimed that automobile manufacturer excluded black logistic workers from employment at a disproportionate rate after BMW implemented a criminal background check policy, which had statistically disparate impact on black employees; the case settled for $1,600,000). EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Learning Educ. Corp., 2014 WL 1378197 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (EEOC failed to demonstrate that Kaplan’s use of credit reports had an adverse impact on African American applicants where “race rating” methodology was discredited).

Federal and State Laws Also Govern the Use of Credit Reports

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) does not expressly preclude employers from using credit reports when making employment decisions, but other applicable laws may impact an employer’s use of credit reports of its applicants or employees. The FCRA disclosure form must expressly state that a credit check will be procured, however, it is illegal in certain jurisdictions to refer to credit at all if there is no lawful reason for the credit check. See Stop Credit Discrimination in Employment Act, N.Y.C. §§ 8-102(29), 8-107(9)(d), (24) (2015); D.C. “Fair Credit in Employment Amendment Act of 2016,” Act 21-673 (2016).

The jurisdictions that have enacted laws prohibiting the use of credit history for employment decisions have largely based the legislation on the premise that credit generally is not a relevant factor in employment decision-making. Thus, these prohibitions typically prevent use of a credit report in the context of employment when the report is not sufficiently related to the nature of the position.

These prohibitions, however, are only subject to certain narrow exceptions. For example:

  • Banks and financial institutions (Chicago, Colorado, Connecticut, DC, Hawaii, Maryland, Oregon, Philadelphia, and Vermont);
  • Managerial positions (as defined by the particular state/city legislation) (California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, and Philadelphia)
  • Positions with access to specified personal information (other than routine transactions and as defined by the particular state legislation) (California and Maryland)
  • Positions with access to confidential/proprietary information, security data, or trade secrets (California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, New York City, Philadelphia, and Vermont)
  • Positions in law enforcement (California, DC, New York City, Oregon, Philadelphia, and Vermont)
  • Positions involving access to assets of above a certain amount or with signatory authority to enter transactions on behalf of the employer (California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, New York City, Philadelphia, and Vermont)
  • Positions with regular access to more than a certain amount in cash (California – $10,000 and Illinois – $2,500)
  • Positions with access to expense accounts or corporate cards (Connecticut and Maryland)

Importantly, no state or city prohibits use of credit report information when such use is specifically permissible under federal or state law.

Penalties range from $100 per day to $250,000, depending upon the jurisdiction.

Overall Trends

Given the increase in state and local laws passing credit check laws, as well as the EEOC’s stance on the use of credit checks (namely, that credit checks create a disparate impact on certain minority groups), there appears to be a trend of all employers decreasing the number of credit checks that they conduct. Given the potential exposure, even financial organizations are no longer running credit checks on all of their workforce unless they are either specifically required to do so by law or those employees are in positions of trust—specifically, those positions with signatory authority over third party assets of $10,000 or more, and positions that have a fiduciary responsibility to enter financial agreements on the employer’s behalf.

Employer Outlook

Given the incredible breadth, and potential damages of the numerous (and growing) credit report laws and the recent upsurge of private litigation on this issue, employers should not directly or indirectly request credit information and/or conduct credit checks unless required to do so under state or federal law or unless an exemption is met. Employers who seek credit information for positions that fall into jurisdictional exemptions also should review the requirements for compliance and additional process guidance. Most significantly, employers should review their applications, FCRA forms, and other employment-related documents to ensure that there are no references to the procurement and/or use of credit information. Employers in multi-state jurisdictions should also ensure compliance with the laws of all other applicable jurisdictions that regulate employers’ use of credit information.

Pamela Q. Devata is a partner in Seyfarth Shaw’s Chicago office. Robert T. Szyba is an associate and Stacey L. Blecher is counsel in the firm’s New York office. If you would like further information, please contact your Seyfarth Shaw LLP attorney, Pamela Q. Devata at pdevata@seyfarth.com, Robert T. Szyba at rszyba@seyfarth.com or Stacey L. Blecher at sblecher@seyfarth.com.

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Ticketmaster Sues Prestige Entertainment for Alleged Illegal Bot Use

Originally published by Peggy Keene.

Ticketmaster Uses Federal Technology Laws in Suit Against Prestige A U.S. district judge has given the go-ahead for a federal lawsuit between Prestige Entertainment and […]

The post Ticketmaster Sues Prestige Entertainment for Alleged Illegal Bot Use appeared first on Klemchuk LLP.

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VA Nurses Class Action Overtime Lawsuit Could Open Door to More Plaintiffs

Originally published by Androvett Legal Media Blog.

A lawsuit accusing the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs of failing to pay overtime to nurse practitioners and physician assistants since December of 2006 has been certified as a class action. The certification is listed as an opt-in class, opening the door for more plaintiffs.

Class representatives Stephanie Mercier, Audricia Brooks, Deborah Plageman, Jennifer Allred and Michele Gavin brought the lawsuit on behalf of nurse practitioners and physician assistants from VA facilities across the country. Attorneys estimate as many as 10,000 VA employees nationwide ultimately could be represented in the class action.

According to the lawsuit, nurse practitioners and physician assistants were required to process electronic and computer patient records after work hours using VA facility computers, laptops and sometimes their own personal home computers without compensation. The work is vital to the treatment of patients and is considered mandatory by VA supervisors.

Provost Umphrey attorneys Michael Hamilton of the firm’s Nashville office and Guy Fisher in the Beaumont, Texas, office are among the attorneys working on the lawsuit along with counsel David Cook and Clement Tsao of Cincinnati’s Cook & Logothetis, LLC, Douglas Richards of Lexington, Kentucky and Robert Stropp of Mooney Green, P.C. in Washington, D.C.

“These are medical professionals who are taking care of our veterans,” said Mr. Hamilton. “If we aren’t paying them properly, what sort of statement does that make about the importance of caring for those who watched over us and our rights?”

“Ultimately, it’s about patient care,” said Mr. Cook. “We need to do our utmost for those who have put on the uniform and defended our rights. And, we can start by properly paying the medical professionals who care for them when they need it.”

For more information on how to join the class action, visit: https://www.provostumphrey.com/Veterans-Affairs-Wages-Attorneys

For an interview, please contact Sophia Reza at 800-559-4534 or sophia@androvett.com.

 

 

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Marketing: Further Penetration is Not a Great Cross-Selling Strategy

Originally published by Cordell Parvin.

Many law firms will find a lawyer who has clients with a variety of needs to be a great candidate for their firm. It makes great sense, but most law firms don’t take advantage of the opportunity. Why?

In a nutshell, most firms do a poor job of cross-selling. There are a variety of reasons cross-selling is challenging. One reason is most firms have no plan or strategy for cross-selling. As a result, at best it is done on an ad-hoc basis. At worst, clients resent they are being “sold.”

When I was practicing law, we hired a consulting firm to help us with our strategic plan and paid them more money than I ever imagined. One of the consultants told me,

Cordell, you need to ‘cross-sell’ your firm’s labor and employment lawyers and environmental lawyers to your construction clients.

I replied,

I think that really makes great sense, but you have it backwards. Our labor and employment lawyers and our enviromental lawyers need to demonstrate they understand construction labor and employment issues and construction enviromental law issues.

Later, at a partners’ meeting, the consultants said our marketing cross-selling strategy should be to “further penetrate” our clients.

I raised my hand, stood up and said: “I had taken a survey and my clients unanimously had reported that they did not want to be ‘penetrated’ much less ‘further penetrated.’

I had never heard penetration used in the context of marketing or cross-selling.

I later learned that “penetration selling” means increasing current client revenues through increased usage or additional types of legal work. The problem with it is that it focuses on client revenues rather than client valuable service.

 

The post Marketing: Further Penetration is Not a Great Cross-Selling Strategy appeared first on Cordell Parvin Blog.

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