Wednesday, July 13, 2022

Are you suspicious of hidden assets in your divorce?

Both spouses should be forthcoming with their financial details when dividing property during a divorce. However, it’s not given that your spouse will be honest. They may fail to disclose some assets, intentionally or not, since they do not want to lose them when dividing the marital estate.

Hiding assets during a divorce is not only against the law but also denies you a fair share of what you deserve from the divorce. If you notice something amiss, you ought to protect your financial interests.

How assets are hidden

Failure to disclose assets is just one of the many ways of hiding assets during property division. You should be wary of the other ways assets can be hidden. Some of the red flags include:

  • Irregular payments or cash flow in the months preceding the divorce
  • Property transfers to family or friends
  • Under-reporting income earned
  • Undervaluing assets
  • A change in the address where financial information is sent
  • Changes in passwords to accounts or investments held by your spouse, among others

All these can point to something underhanded, and you should act fast before it’s too late.

What should you do?

If you discover any financial anomalies by your soon-to-be-ex regarding the divorce, it is crucial to bring them to the court’s attention. However, before sounding the siren, it is important to have evidence of your claims, such as bank records or financial statements.

There are many ways of uncovering hidden assets, but it is wise to get professional help throughout the process so you can best protect your interests – and your future.



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Texas Supreme Court: Texas Central Has Eminent Domain Power for High Speed Rail

 

In a case we’ve been closely following, Miles v. Texas Central Railroad & Infrastructure, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court held that Texas Central does have the right to exercise eminent domain power in building the high speed rail from Dallas to Houston.

Background

This case revolves around the proposed high-speed electric-powered passenger train that would run between Dallas and Houston. In 2012, TXHS Railroad, Inc. was formed and in 2015, the company changed its name to Texas Central Railroad & Infrastructure, Inc. (“Texas Central”) with a purpose to “plan, build, maintain, and operate an interurban electric railroad.”  In 2017, Integrated Texas Logistics (ITL) was formed to “construct, acquire, maintain, or operate lines of electric railway…” and “to operate and transact business as a railroad company…”

In 2015, Texas Central sent Mr. Miles a packet including details about the project, an outline of the survey process, an invitation to open house meetings, and a survey permission form.  Mr. Miles refused to sign the survey permission form and refused to grant Texas Central access to survey his land.

Mr. Miles filed suit, seeking a declaration that Texas Central could not conduct the type of survey requested on the permission form as the form exceeded certain provisions in the Texas Transportation Code related to railroads and interurban electric railways.  Essentially, Mr. Miles did not argue that a “railroad company” or an “interurban electric railway” could not use eminent domain power; only that Texas Central and ITL did not meet the statutory definition of a “railroad company” or an “interurban electric railway.”  Mr. Miles based this on the facts that Texas Central owned no trains or railroad tracks, had constructed no train stations, had obtained only a small portion of the financing necessary for the project, and that ITL had no employees, officers, or office space independent of Texas Central.  Further, Mr. Miles argued that the “interurban electric railways” referenced by statute were obsolete for over 70 years and the statute was not intended to apply to a high speed rail.

Texas Central responded, seeking its own declaratory judgment that it was a “railroad company” and an “interurban electric railway” under the Texas Transportation Code with the right to conduct survey examinations as such. ITL intervened seeking the same declaration against Mr. Miles.  The entities based their argument on Texas Central’s expenditure of over $125 million on the project, engaging 100 technical experts and 200 employees and contractors, completing over 2,000 surveys, obtaining hundreds of option contracts to purchase the necessary land, a signed agreement with Amtrak to connect with Amtrak’s interstate rail system, retaining an engineering firm and railway company that have experience with building and operating high speed rails, and working for years to secure required federal and state permits.

Applicable Law

There are two statutes central to this case.

First, the Texas Transportation Code Section 81.002 defines a “railroad company” as “(1) a railroad incorporated before September 1, 2007 or (2) any other legal entity operating a railroad, including an entity organized under the Texas Business Corporation Act or the Texas Corporation Law provisions of the Business Organizations Code.”  Since both entities were incorporated after 2007, it is only the second clause at issue.  A “railroad” is defined by Texas Transportation Code Section 199.002(a)(1) as “an enterprise created and operated to carry passengers, freight, or both on a fixed track. The term includes all real estate and interests in real estate, equipment, machinery, materials, structures, buildings, stations, facilities, and other improvements that are necessary to, or for the benefit of, the enterprise.”  A railroad company has the right to use eminent domain authority  per Texas Transportation Code Section 112.002(5).

Second, an “interurban electric railway company” is a “corporation chartered under the laws of this state to conduct and operate an electric railway between two municipalities in this state.”  See Tex. Transportation Code Section 131.011.  Companies meeting this definition and have the purpose of transporting freight, passengers, or both freight and passengers are granted the power of eminent domain.  See Tex. Transportation Code Section 131.012.

Lower Court Rulings

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on these issues.  The trial court sided with Mr. Miles, declaring that neither Texas Central nor ITL were “railroad companies” or “interurban electric railways.” Mr. Miles was also awarded attorney’s fees.  Texas Central and ITL appealed.

The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Texas Central and ITL were both “railroad companies” and “interurban electric railways” per Texas statute.  Thus, the companies do have the right to use eminent domain power.  [Read blog post here.]

Mr. Miles sought review from the Texas Supreme Court. Initially, the Court declined to hear the case, but then granted Mr. Miles’ motion for reconsideration.  During briefing, the State of Texas wrote a brief supporting Mr. Miles arguing that Texas Central should not have eminent domain power.  Oral argument was held on January 11.

Supreme Court Majority Opinion

The Texas Supreme Court affirmed in a 5-3 decision.  The majority opinion was authored by Justice Lehrmann and joined by Chief Justice Hecht, and Justices Boyd, Busby, and Young. [Read Majority Opinion here.]

Interestingly, the majority began by noting “it is important to recognize what this case is about and what it is not about.  The case involves the interpretation of statutes relating to eminent domain; it does not ask us to opine about whether high-speed rail between Houston and Dallas is a good idea or whether the benefits of the proposed rail service outweigh its detriments. The narrow issue presented is whether the two private entities behind the project have been statutorily granted the power of eminent domain, a power otherwise reserved to the State and its political subdivisions because of the extraordinary intrusion on private-property rights that the exercise of such authority entails.”

Interurban electric railway company

The Court tuned first to the statute granting eminent domain authority to interurban electric railway companies.  “Miles asserts that modern high-speed rail cannot be ‘shoehorned’ into the concept of the interurban electric railway the Legislature envisioned…in 1907.”  Miles argues that the concept of an interurban electric railway is a technical term referring specifically to the single-car interurban electric railways that grew out of the trolley car and ran through Texas in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.   The Court disagreed.

“Viewed as a whole, Chapter 131 is simply not limited in the way that Miles and the dissent contend.”  First, the statute does not limit the speed a train may reach, size of train, or distance between municipalities the railway connects.  Second, the Court points to statutory provisions within Chapter 131 discussing 200 foot right of ways to build railways and the ability to take additional land necessary to properly construct and secure railways as contemplating projects of similar scale as the Texas Central high speed rail. Third, the statute contemplates a railway being able to cross a major body of water and build the necessary infrastructure to do so.   In summary, “we do not read Chapter 131 to implicitly place the above-described limitations on the statute’s scope–regarding speed, size, and distance–that the Legislature easily could have placed expressly but chose not to.”

Next, the Court addressed Mr. Miles’ argument that when the statute was originally enacted in 1907, the modern version of the high speed rail had not been developed and, therefore, it cannot apply.  This is based on the concept that when a statute contains undefined terms, courts should consider the terms’ ordinary meaning when the statute was passed.  The Court disagreed for several reasons.  First, the Court does not seek to determine the meaning of an undefined term; the statute expressly defines an interurban electric railway company.  Second, even if the term were undefined, the statute does not grant eminent domain only to an “interurban electric railway company.”  Instead, it grants the authority more broadly to a “corporation chartered for the purpose of constructing, acquiring, maintaining, or operating lines of electric railway between municipalities in this state for the transportation of freight, passengers, or both freight and passengers.”  There is no dispute about the ordinary meaning of any of these words and, therefore, the historic meaning was not relevant.

Then, the Court noted that it has “long interpreted statutes, including eminent domain statutes, to embrace later-developed technologies when the statutory text allows.”  For example, in interpreting eminent domain statutes for telegraph companies, the Court held those statutes applied to telephone companies as well even though the legislature likely did not have telephones in mind when it used the word “telegraph.”  Thus, although the 1907 Legislature would not have considered a high speed rail, had that technology become available the next year, no one would have thought the Legislature needed to pass another statute to accommodate it.   This is not unlimited, the Court notes.  For example, it says that it would not read the interurban electric railway statute to apply to steam-powered locomotive, but nothing in the language  limits applicability to the small, single train streetcar as Mr. Miles argues.

The Court then turned to Mr. Miles’ argument that the statute applies to a type of train that has been extinct in Texas since 1948. Simply put, the Court stated, “nothing in the statute limits its application in this way.”  This would have meant the statute remained on the books with no purpose for over 70 years, despite being recodified in 2009 in an attempt to eliminate repealed, duplicative, expired and executed provisions.  The Court said this statutory revision program made little sense if the interurban electric railway statute was as outdated and useless as Miles and the dissent claims.

Next, Mr. Miles cited several Transportation Code provisions that do expressly apply to a high speed rail.  The Court said it failed to see how other provisions, with different definitions, somehow indicates that the high speed rail does not fall within the scope of the electric railway definition, particularly when nothing in the provisions in inapplicable with Chapter 131.

Lastly, Mr. Miles asserted that the 1989 enactment and 1995 repeal of the High-Speed Rail Act demonstrates that Chapter 131 cannot encompass Texas Central’s proposed railway.  The Court disagreed finding that Act established a state agency to award a franchise to a private entity to build a high speed rail and gave that entity eminent domain power, essentially creating a public-private partnership.  It then dissolved that partnership, but did not purport to restrict eminent domain authority authorized under different statutes.

Thus, the Court held that Texas Central and ITL are interurban electric railways who have the power of eminent domain.

Railroad company

Although the parties raised the issue of whether Texas Central is a railroad company, and the Chief Justices’ concurrence would hold that it was, the majority held it need not address that issue.

Application of Denbury “reasonable probability” test

Even if the companies could be interurban electric railway companies with eminent domain authority, Mr. Miles argues that merely filing a charter claiming to be one is insufficient.  Relying on Texas Rice Land Partners v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Tex., LLC (Denbury 1) and  Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC v. Texas Rice Land Partners (Denbury 2), Mr. Miles argues that Texas Central and ITL must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the project will produce the public good for which the authority is sought.  Texas Central, Mr. Miles argues, has failed to do so.

The Court rejected this reading of Denbury, noting that “while both the Texas Constitution and our precedent preclude an entity from obtaining condemnation authority by checking a box, they do not support the reasonable-probability-of-completion test Miles proposes, which would constitute an unwarranted sea change in eminent domain law with far-reaching consequences.”

The Court noted that in Denbury 1, the issue involved common carrier pipelines.  The Court held that for a person intending to build a CO2 pipeline to qualify as a common carrier, there must be a reasonable probability that the pipeline will, at some point after construction, serve the public by transporting gas for one or more customers who would retain ownership or sell to customers other than the carrier.

Thus, Texas Central does not qualify for eminent domain authority by simply checking a box.  However, here, there is no argument that Texas Central was charged for the purpose of building an interurban electric railway and is engaged in activities in furtherance of that purpose. There is also no question this railway would be for a public purpose.  “Miles’s argument that the Texas Central Entities must further show a reasonable probability that the railway will successfully be completed finds no support in Denbury or the Constitution.”

The Court notes that Mr. Miles’ attempt to “contort Denbury in this way is rooted in legitimate policy justifications” to protect Texas landowners from ill-equipped entities who take land and abandon it when funding runs dry.  The Court noted, however, there are a number of protections for property owners in that situation including a number of statutory provisions listed out in the opinion on page 26.  “The constitutional and statutory provisions governing eminent domain, as a whole, reflect a balance between the rights of property owners and the benefits served by projects for which eminent domain is authorized. It is not our place to second-guess the product of that balance.”

Thus, the Court rejected Mr. Miles’ reasonable probability of completion test interpretation of Denbury.

Expiration of authority

The Texas Government Code Section 2206.101 required entities that acquired eminent domain power before December 31, 2012 to submit a letter to the comptroller.  Failure to do so resulted in the expiration of the entity’s eminent domain authority on September 1, 2013.   Texas Central was formed in December 2012, but did not amend its charter for the purpose of operating an interurban electric railway company until 2015.  Texas Central submitted a letter to the comptroller in December 2012 claiming authority as a railroad company, but not as an interurban electric railway.  Thus, Mr. Miles argues its authority under the interurban electric railway statute expired.  The Court disagreed finding that since Texas Central did not amend its charter purpose to build an interurban electric railway until 2015, its authority did not expire.

Thus, the majority affirmed the Court of Appeals decision holding that Texas Central and ITL qualify as an interurban electric railway that may utilize eminent domain authority.

Concurring Opinion (Chief Justice Hecht, joined by Justice Young)

Chief Justice Hecht wrote separately to explain why he would hold that Texas Central and ITL also qualify as “railroad companies” under the statute.  [Read concurrence here.] The statute grants eminent domain authority to a railroad incorporated before September 1, 2007 or to any legal entity operating a railroad.  Mr. Miles argued that this requires trains running on tracks.  “The chicken-and-egg logic is obvious: an entity cannot obtain a right-of-way on which to run trains on tracks without first running trains on tracks.”  Mr. Miles’ approach would essentially ban all new railways in Texas after 2007.  Nothing in the history, the concurrence notes, indicates this intent. Further, the statute allows a company to condemn right-of-ways and “roadbed” which would occur before tracks are laid.  In fact, a company may condemn before incorporating, which the concurrence reads as “before doing any business at all.”  The statute also allows condemnation necessary to build the railroad, as well as operating and running it.  This language makes clear the Legislature did not intend to limit applicability to companies with trains running on tracks.

Concurring Opinion (Justice Young)

In an opinion expressly recognizing the great power and serious impact that eminent domain can have on property owners, Justice Young wrote to make clear the presumption that if there is any doubt as to the scope of the power, the statute granting eminent domain authority is construed in favor of the landowner remains.   [Read concurring opinion here.]  Justice Young notes that eminent domain power is great, “scary” and confusing.  He notes that there are times when “no compensation can accurately value the sweat, tears, pride, love, beauty, and history that, for some property at least, is its chief value.”  It is these circumstances, he notes, that explain why courts carefully scrutinize the exercise of eminent domain authority.  This is true for government takings, and is only heightened in situations where a private entity wields eminent domain power.

He says that nothing in the majority opinion disagrees, and where the scope of the power is in doubt, statutes shall be construed in favor of landowners.  The majority applied the exacting level of scrutiny in this case.  However, there was simply no “doubt” as to whether the interurban electric railway statute applied.  “We can judicially invalidate an exercise of condemnation only upon the kind of ‘doubt’ about the scope or meaning of statutory or constitutional provisions that is textually demonstrable. Even when we would much rather the result be different, and even when we persuade ourselves that the legislature must have intended otherwise, ‘we are bound by ‘the words of the statute’ and cannot ‘rewrite those words to achieve an unstated purpose.’”

Dissenting Opinion (Justice Devine)

Justice Devine authored a dissenting opinion.  [Read opinion here.]  Justice Devine believes that this case should be construed pursuant to Section 17(b) of the Texas Constitution, which provides that “public use” does not include the taking of property…”for transfer to a private entity for the primary purpose of economic development or enhancement of tax revenues.” The Court has not addressed this section since its amendment in 2019, and “although this case presents such an opportunity, the Court squanders it.”  He notes that the parties did not raise this issue and normally courts do not consider arguments not raised, but believes that this is a time when “prudence dictates the contrary.”

Justice Devine notes that Texas Central itself recognizes the primary purpose of building the rail is for economic development and enhancement of tax revenues. In briefing, Texas Central repeatedly pointed to the economic benefit of the high speed rail including additional jobs and tax revenues.  This was exactly the concern that promoted the post-Kelo amendment to Section 17(b) of the Texas Constitution. “The Court’s holding today flies in the face of that history and proud legacy of safeguarding the sacred right of land ownership.”  Further, he notes, “the Court incentivizes private businesses—even foreign ones—to exercise eminent-domain authority over Texas landowners. But giving such power directly to a private entity is not what our forefathers intended in drafting the Texas Constitution. Nor is it what Texans intended in amending the Constitution in 2009.”

He would have applied Section 17(b) of the Texas Constitution to hold that Texas Central is not entitled to exercise eminent domain power because the requirement of ‘public use’ is not met.  He statutes that the majority opinion “advances a devastating erosion of Texas landowners’ property rights” and respectfully dissents.

Dissenting Opinion (Justice Huddle, joined by Justices Devine and Blacklock

Justice Huddle also filed a dissenting opinion.  [Read opinion here.]

The dissent notes that the majority holds that two for-profit corporations wield the power to take thousands of parcels of privately owned Texas land along the proposed route of a high speed rail they hope to someday build and operate based on a 115-year-old statute governing sisters to the trolley car.  “No one questions that the statute, Transportation Code Section 131.012, granted eminent-domain authority to facilitate construction of small electric railways for ferrying Texans short distances between adjacent towns and up and down Main Streets alongside horse-drawn carriages. But it blinks reality to conclude, as the Court does, that the same trolley-car statute confers eminent domain power on private entities aspiring to build—in 2022—a massive $30 billion infrastructure project capable of supporting an elevated, 672-foot-long high-speed train as it traverses hundreds of miles and thousands of privately owned parcels between Houston and Dallas.”

First, Justice Huddle discusses the concept that eminent domain statutes are strictly construed to protect private property rights for those situations whereby cases clearly fall within a statute’s terms. Texas Central, he would hold, does not “clearly fall within” the scope of the interurban electric railway statute.  He would look to the historical context of the statute as applicable to streetcars or trolleys.  “Texas Central’s high-speed rail system is a world apart from this–in design, scale, and intrusiveness.”  He cannot conclude that Texas Central’s project “clearly falls” within the statutory terms.  He also notes that the proposed Texas Central railway would be incompatible with several other statutory provisions within Chapter 131 as it could not navigate municipal streets or alleys as the statute envisions, for example.

Next, the dissent notes that the court should not erode fundamental rights based merely on embracing later-developed technologies.  He cites to Kyllo v. United States, whereby the court held that a police officer’s use of a thermal imager to surveil a home was an unlawful search, which he says stands for the proposition that the “fixed nature of the constitution assures preservation of that degree of privacy against the government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” The same is true here, he believes.

Finally, he notes that Texas Central also does not qualify as a “railroad company.”  He would not rely upon the Code Construction Act, as did the court of appeals, which provides that words in the present tense include the future tense.  That Act, he notes, is meant to clarify common situations and this case is “anything but common.”  Texas Central has never operated a railroad and it will take years and billions of dollars before it can ever do so.  This does not “plainly fall within” the terms of the statute and, thus, the statute should be construed in favor of the landowner.

In conclusion, the dissent writes:

“Whether Texas Central’s project will succeed is anyone’s guess. What is certain is that today’s decision places Miles and hundreds of other Texas landowners at Texas Central’s mercy. Texas Central may take their land and, if the project succeeds, bisect each parcel with an enormous infrastructure project on which a train blazes past at 200 miles per hour every thirty minutes. Or it could begin construction and abandon the project, unfinished, leaving behind half-built viaducts leading nowhere. Or it may take their land and do nothing for a decade, triggering a feeble repurchase ‘remedy’ for landowners.”

Conclusion 

Although this case focuses on the narrow issue of statutory interpretation for interurban electric railways, it certainly has the potential to have greater impact on eminent domain cases going forward.  In the coming weeks, I will be releasing a podcast episode with Luke Ellis, a landowner eminent domain attorney from Austin to discuss how this case (and the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Hlavinka v. HSC Pipeline) will impact Texas landowners going forward.  Be sure to subscribe to the Ag Law in the Field Podcast so you don’t miss it!

 

 

The post Texas Supreme Court: Texas Central Has Eminent Domain Power for High Speed Rail appeared first on Texas Agriculture Law.



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Preventive Law Demands Accommodating the Disability and not the Essential Functions of the Job

An emerging issue is whether when it comes to accommodating a person with a disability in an employment situation, are you accommodating the disability or are you accommodating the essential functions of the job. The easy scenario where that matters is when dealing with an employee with a service dog. Recently, Hobby Lobby was sued by the EEOC for denial of letting an employee use a service dog, here. However, there are other situations where the distinction between accommodating the essential functions of the job v. accommodating a person’s disability can matter a great deal. Our case of the day, Wilson v. Sec. of Veterans Affairs, an unpublished decision from the 11th Circuit decided June 3, 2022, is such a case. As usual the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; court’s reasoning reversing summary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim; court’s reasoning affirming summary judgment on the retaliation claim; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to concentrate on any or all of the categories.

 

I

Facts (taken directly from the opinion with very very minor changes for readability and flow).

 

Wilson, a veteran, suffers from degenerative disc disease and partial paralysis in both feet. In February 2009, Wilson started as a probationary Veteran Claims Examiner (VCE) for the Atlanta VA Regional Office. At the time, the Atlanta VA Regional Office only permitted permanent employees to use the on-site parking deck. Probationary VCEs could park at an off-site parking area roughly one mile from the office, from which they could either take a shuttle or walk to work. The VA shuttle ran for one hour in the morning and one hour in the evening. It ran sporadically at best and could only hold up to 25 individuals at a time—even then, there were only 15 seats. And because the shuttle lacked handlebars, standing passengers were forced to either be “pressed against an individual” or “use [their] body as a stance” to avoid falling over. Roughly 80 probationary VCEs commuted per day. Because of the shuttle’s shortcomings, Wilson effectively faced the option of either walking to work—which “put enormous pressure on her nerves” and caused her legs and feet to swell—or parking in unassigned handicapped spaces in the on-site parking deck.1 Wilson made the latter choice, leading to numerous parking tickets and counseling memos about her unauthorized parking.

 

As an employee with a disability, Wilson was told to bring any requests she may have for workplace accommodations to Celesta Chapin, her Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor with the VA’s Rehabilitation and Employment Division. Between March and July 2009, Wilson communicated her needs for a parking accommodation on six occasions to VA personnel—in all instances, Wilson stated that the VA refused to accommodate her requests in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Wilson identified six distinct failures by the VA to accommodate or respond to her requests for an accommodation, occurring on the following dates in 2009: (1) March 31, (2) April 13, (3) April 17,2 (4) May 12, (5) July 7, and (6) July 8 and thereafter. The record evidence shows the following regarding these events.

 

With respect to the first failure, Wilson emailed her vocational rehabilitation counselor with the VA’s rehabilitation and employment division that the parking situation at the VA aggravated her disability and that she needed a parking accommodation. The rehabilitation counselor told Wilson that she would make a workplace accommodation request to human resources on her behalf, but Wilson never received follow-up from that meeting.

 

With respect to the second failure, Wilson stated that she met with Eboni White, her direct supervisor, after receiving a counseling memo for unauthorized parking in the on-site parking deck. During the meeting, Wilson explained that her disability forced her to park on-site and that she was working with Chapin to obtain permission to park in the onsite parking deck, for which she needed White’s assistance. White then said that she would communicate with Chapin. However, White did not relay Wilson’s request to Chapin or anyone in HR, nor did White follow up with Wilson regarding her request.

 

With respect to the third failure, Wilson stated that she emailed Praileau Young, an HR assistant, to ask where she could find the paperwork necessary to submit a parking accommodation request. Young responded that she had forwarded Wilson’s email to the “appropriate person,” but Wilson never received the requested information. On the same day, Wilson emailed Chapin again to confirm the status of her request. Chapin responded that she thought Wilson dropped the matter, but then requested from Wilson the name of her supervisor so that Chapin could request an assessment. Wilson responded and asked Chapin to submit the request on her behalf.

 

With respect to the fourth failure, in the same affidavit, concerning the fourth instance, Wilson stated that she met again with Chapin on May 12, 2009. At this meeting, Chapin reminded her to discuss her request with her supervisor. Wilson testified that she believed management was ignoring her since she had already spoken with White to no avail.

 

With respect to the fifth failure, on July 1, 2009, union representative Rebecca Manning gave her own parking badge to Wilson with permission to use it to park at the on-site parking deck. Because the badge did not work, Wilson asked an HR Liaison, Vivian DeLoach, for help. On July 7, 2009, DeLoach informed Wilson that she was not authorized to park there. Making this the fifth occasion, Wilson testified that she believed then that her request had been denied after all.

 

With respect to the last failure, Wilson testified that she emailed DeLoach on July 8, 2009, to request “the appropriate paperwork to file for reasonable parking accommodations due to my service-connected disability,” which she identified as “degenerative disc disease, with [herniated] discs and partial paralysis in both of [her] feet.” Wilson stated that she would be willing to provide medical documentation and facilitate contact with her doctor if necessary. On July 16, 2009, Unit Chief John Clayton Smith—who replaced White as Wilson’s direct supervisor—followed-up to verbally inform Wilson that he consulted with HR and that they “d[id] not see a connection [between parking privileges] and the essential function of you performing your job.” (Emphasis mine). Wilson interpreted this as the sixth instance of the VA’s failure to accommodate. Wilson then emailed DeLoach for written confirmation of Smith’s “denial” of her request for accommodations. Smith followed up with Wilson via email and reiterated that neither he nor HR saw the need for an accommodation but did not deny the request outright. DeLoach responded that although she was not the approving official for accommodation requests, she would assist Smith in helping Wilson understand how to properly submit a request.

 

On July 22, 2009, Wilson filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discrimination by the VA. Within hours of filing the complaint, Wilson received a letter from Smith titled “Certification of Need for a Reasonable Accommodation.” Smith therein acknowledged Wilson’s accommodation request and requested, inter alia, medical documentation to evaluate her request. The letter also reminded Wilson yet again that “parking is not a condition of employment, nor related to the essential functions of your position.” This was the same language that Smith used in previously denying her request. (Emphasis mine). Wilson testified that she never provided the documentation because she understood the letter to be a preemptive denial. Wilson did not receive any follow-up.

 

Wilson testified that she soon thereafter suffered harassment. This harassment consisted, in part, of what she considered a pretextual disciplinary reprimand for leaving overtime work 45 minutes early because she felt ill. Wilson also applied for a Rating Veteran’s Service Representative position (RVSR) around this time but was not selected despite her allegation that she was more qualified than the selected applicant. On September 3, 2009, Wilson withdrew her EEOC complaint on advisement from her EEOC counselor. Her EEOC counselor discussed the matter with DeLoach, who responded, “if [parking] was going to be a problem [Wilson] might want to reevaluate her decision to work there.” Wilson stated that she continued to park in on-site handicapped spaces and amassed several parking tickets and letters of counseling because she believed that the VA unlawfully denied her accommodations request. Wilson also received a negative performance appraisal during this time, to which she filed a union grievance. Shortly thereafter, Jeannie Daniel, the VA Regional Assistant Education Officer, recommended to the VA regional Director Alfred Bocchicchio that Wilson be terminated for poor performance. The VA terminated Wilson on December 18, 2009, with a letter citing both her parking violations and poor performance as justification. Wilson applied again for the RVSR position in 2011, and was again not selected, despite her allegation that here, too, she was the most qualified candidate. Wilson stated that she believed she was not selected on either occasion because the decisionmakers knew of her disability and her EEOC complaint.

 

Wilson brought suit alleging both discrimination against terror and the terms and conditions of her employment and retaliation. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Veterans Affairs administration and Wilson appealed.

 

II

Court’s Reasoning Reversing Summary Judgment on the Failure to Accommodate Claim

 

  1. An employer’s obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation is triggered when the employee makes a specific demand for a reasonable accommodation.
  2. After the employer is placed on notice of the employee’s disability and request for an accommodation, the employer has to make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation.
  3. Determining an appropriate reasonable accommodation may mean going through the interactive process.
  4. It is when the employer fails to provide the accommodation after it was demanded that the plaintiff can sustain a discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act.
  5. Wilson made repeated requests (see §I of this blog entry), for the specific accommodation to park in the VA parking deck. She repeatedly explained her reasoning and her request to many different people at the VA who either discouraged, ignored, or provided inadequate follow-up to those requests.
  6. A reasonable juror could find that Wilson’s first two communications with the VA were requests for an accommodation.
  7. It is sufficient that Wilson requested to park on site and justified her request by informing the VA about her mobility limitations and her belief that an accommodation would resolve the issue.
  8. It took the VA four months to even attempt to initiate the interactive process, despite being repeatedly placed on notice of Wilson’s disability and her request. As such, a jury could find that the VA’s four month long inaction in addressing Wilson’s request constitutes a failure to accommodate in violation of its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act regardless of Wilson’s subsequent failure to provide the documentation.

 

III

Court’s Reasoning Affirming Summary Judgment on the Retaliation Claim

 

  1. Wilson’s argument that her parking requests were independent protected activity is new on appeal. Since a court will generally not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal, Wilson waived the argument.
  2. Wilson does not demonstrate that the VA’s other basis for termination, i.e. her subpar work performance, was pretextual. The VA produced evidence that the regional VA director considered Wilson’s failing to meet the minimum monthly expected and products and produce numerous errors in her work that had to be corrected by supervisors. She also requested overtime pay for hours that she did not work and received a counseling memo for doing so. Wilson did not dispute that her record was unsatisfactory and did not produce evidence that would lead a reasonable jury to find pretext. She therefore cannot show that the protected activity was causally connected to the adverse employment action and the rich allegation claim fails.

 

IV

Thoughts/Takeaways

 

  1. The VA’s focus on the essential functions of the job rather than on accommodating her disability got the VA in a bunch of trouble here. As a matter of preventive law, per Felix-which we discussed here-, it is much better to focus on accommodating the disability rather than focusing on accommodating the essential functions of a particular job. Taking this approach will certainly prevent litigation down the road and make the person with the disability feel valued so that he/she/they will want to succeed.
  2. You want to make sure at trial that all arguments are preserved for appeal.
  3. Magic words, as we have discussed numerous times in our blog, such as here, are not required for activating the interactive process.
  4. Always utilize the interactive process whenever a request for a reasonable accommodation/modification is made. The interactive process is not optional in my opinion despite the court’s use of the word, “may.”
  5. Don’t forget about the do’s and don’ts of the interactive process, which we discussed here.
  6. An unreasonable delay in granting a reasonable accommodation, as we discussed here, is actionable.
  7. Since this involved a federal employee, it was §501 of the Rehabilitation Act that was involved and not the ADA. However, by statute §501 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §791, here, tracks title I of the ADA.
  8. The trend is very much that a failure to accommodate claim as a separate cause of action.
  9. Case illustrates how an underlying disability discrimination claim can go forward even where a retaliation claim does not. I have also seen cases where it would to allegation act claim goes forward but the underlying disability discrimination claim does not.
  10. Negative reports on an employee can of course be done at any time. However where an employee has initiated a request for reasonable accommodation, you want to make sure such a report is part of your regular processes and not an attempt to justify disciplinary proceedings after a reasonable accommodation request has been made. Such an action could also rate the question over whether the performance issued would have been cured if reasonable accommodations have been granted in the first place.


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Monday, July 11, 2022

Success Story Of The Month – Overcoming A Defective Or Less Than Powerful Power Of Attorney

What could go wrong when using a general durable power of attorney for an agent to sign a deed (in this case, a Ladybird deed) on behalf of the principal (the one who signed the power of attorney)? Are there additional powers that should be considered in the power of attorney other than language approved by the state legislature or some form document?

Facts: Husband and wife are in a nursing home and are on long-term care Medicaid whereby the government helps subsidize the cost of their care. Both have signed a power of attorney (that covers many financial decisions including real estate transactions) that was notarized. The most valuable asset they have is a homestead worth $350,000. Although the homestead is a noncountable resource for Medicaid eligibility, the state will have a right to make a claim against the home to the extent Medicaid benefits were advanced on behalf of the survivor of them (i.e., the nursing home costs paid by the government including medications). One exception to Medicaid having a successful estate recovery claim is if there is a surviving spouse. As a result, benefits advanced on behalf of the first spouse to die would not result in a successful claim by the state. However, under Texas law, the state would have a right to make a claim against the homestead if the homestead of the deceased Medicaid recipient’s home passes by intestate (without a will) succession of by Will. As a result, many Medicaid recipients (or their agent under a power of attorney) sign a Ladybird (enhanced life estate) deed whereby the home passes by deed at death instead of by Will or intestacy. Texas is one of a few states that permits a Ladybird deed to protect the home from a successful claim by the state.

In this case, the children of the Medicaid recipients (their parents) thought it would be best to use the parents’ signed general durable power of attorney so that the agents (acting on behalf of parents) could sign a joint Ladybird deed to avoid a successful claim by the state for Medicaid estate recovery as the property would pass by deed instead of by Will or intestacy.

Problem 1: Notary error. The notary who notarized the husband’s power of attorney filled in the blanks incorrectly as she indicated that husband was the notary and that she was the one signing the document as the principal.

Solution 1: Find the notary and have her correct by crossing out, initialing and dating. Otherwise, the county clerk will not record the power of attorney which would be required for the deed to be effective.

Solution 2: Husband could sign the Ladybird deed or sign a new power of attorney properly notarized assuming husband/parent has sufficient mental capacity and was not under undue influence or duress at the time the document was signed.

Problem 2: Originals must be recorded. The children could not find dad’s original power of attorney. If an agent is acting on behalf of the principal in connection with real estate, the original power of attorney must be recorded. The county clerk will not record a copy of a power of attorney.

Solution: Husband/parent will either sign the Ladybird deed (since the copy of the existing power of attorney could not be recorded) or sign a new power of attorney assuming mental capacity and that he had sufficient mental capacity and was not under undue influence or duress at the time he signs the document before a notary.

Problem No. 3: Questionable Capacity. Although it is believed husband/parent had sufficient mental capacity to sign the deed or new power of attorney, there was not certainty. Even if husband/parent signed the deed, if a title company believed there wasn’t sufficient mental capacity, then it would not insure title at the time the property is sold.

Solution: Have a geriatric psychologist or psychiatrist examine dad and sign a capacity affidavit confirming capacity at the time of signing of the deed and/or power of attorney.

Problem No. 4: Adequate Authority. Most powers of attorney either permit no gift giving authority or limit any gifting to the annual gift tax exclusion (presently $16,000 per year, per person). As a result, some title companies would not give title insurance saying the agent was acting beyond the powers given.

Solution: The power of attorney should not just be a statutory form or a form off the internet. The power of attorney in this case should clearly permit broad gift giving, the ability to create or change a Ladybird deed, and perhaps permit self-dealing if the parent wanted the agent (child in this case) to be able to deed the property to the agent. Other examples of authority that should be considered in the power of attorney include the right to create and fund a trust. So, for example, the Ladybird deed could name a trust as a grantee (as opposed to being an individual or individuals) to reduce risk, if: (1) there is more than one grantee and the grantees do not agree on the sale, lease or mortgage of the property; (2) one of the grantees has creditor issues; (3) one of the grantees has marital issues; (4) one of the grantees is a spendthrift; (5) one of the grantees is a minor; (7) one of the grantees dies before parents or whomever is grantor; (8) one of the grantees has an addiction; or (9) one of the grantees is disabled. There can be a contingent trust within the trust to protect a beneficiary who has any of the issues listed above.

Problem No. 5: Too Old. This week a client reported a title company would not permit the agent (child) to sell the property since the power of attorney was nine years old.

Solution: Go to a different title company. Powers of attorney generally terminate on death. However, it is up to the underwriter to determine if it is willing to insure or not. So, if one title company is not willing to insure, then consider if another title company would. Of course, another option, (assuming mental capacity) is for the principal to sign another power of attorney or just sign the deed and other closing documents without the use of a power of attorney.

If interested in learning more about this article or other estate planning, Medicaid and public benefits planning, probate, etc., attend one of our free upcoming virtual or in person Estate Planning Essentials workshops by clicking here or calling 214-720-0102. We make it simple to attend and it is without obligation.



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Uncertified

On a Texas tort-law question about liability for a brake failure, the Fifth Circuit reasoned:

We do not think this question is close enough to warrant certification to the Supreme Court of Texas. See McMillan v. Amazon.com, 983 F.3d 194, 202 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that certification is usually reserved for close questions of state law with “scant on-point precedent”). Certification is appropriate when “consequential state-law ground is to be plowed” and “any Erie guess would involve more divining than discerning.” Id. Our guess today is a safer bet. The Guijarros have not identified a single case cabining Armstrong to the realm of products liability. See Troice v. Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P., 921 F.3d 501, 504–05 (5th Cir. 2019) (declining to certify because multiple intermediate courts had adopted one view of the issue, and the plaintiff had not identified any contrary authority). Nor does such a distinction make sense. Add to the one-sidedness of this issue that neither party requested certification.

       We conclude that Texas law requires plaintiffs alleging a brake defect to put forth “competent expert testimony and objective proof” that the defect caused their injuries.

Guijarro v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc., No. 21-40512 (July 5, 2022).

 

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Tuesday, July 5, 2022

Fireworks Laws in Texas | Could a Sparkler Really Cost You $2,000?

Do Not Lose Your Liberty on Independence Day Independence Day is right around the corner. You will probably start seeing the notices spread across social media from local police departments,…

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Exculpatory Clause Does Not Save Operator From Liability

Co-author Trevor Lawhorn

Non-operators under the 1989 Model Form JOA have been hoping to drive a stake through the dark heart of Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC. Bachtell Enterprises, LLC v. Ankor E&P Holdings Corp might be a start. The question was whether the Article V.A. exculpatory clause exonerated the operator who intentionally passed expenses to non-operators without their consent.

The clause did not allow the operator to engage in such activities. The term “activities” is not so broad as to protect an operator such that it can have no liability for breach of any contract, absent willfulness.

Facts

Ankor the operator negotiated with CDM to construct a gas plant and told the non-operators that third-party ownership of the plant would, among other things, “eliminate[ ] the need for the [nonoperators] to provide capital for construction.”

The non-operators approved AFE’s for expenses totaling $385,000. Additional AFE’s would cover certain other expenses. The JOA required non-operator consent for “ .. any single project reasonably estimated to require an expenditure in excess of $50,000.”

Article V.A. required Ankor to [c]onduct its activities …  as a reasonably prudent Operator, … It shall have no liability as Operator … for losses sustained or liabilities incurred, except such as may result from willful misconduct.”

A year after the CDM agreement, Ankor told the non-operators that until the plant was paid off CDM would “retain[ ] all plant revenue as credit towards the full operating costs, transfer and fractionation fees, and amortized capital. Any balance due [CDM] is born by the Ownership. The balance … due [CDM] is approximately $1,590,000.” Ankor then sent a JIB totaling $1.6MM. The non-operators refused to pay.

Trial court

Ankor sued the non-operators claiming breach of the JOA for failure to pay the JIBs. Non-operators responded that Ankor breached first by:

  • charging for gas plant construction without consent,
  • withholding revenue without consent or authority,
  • committing non-operators’ gas to CDM without authority,
  • agreeing not to disclose the CDM service agreement, and
  • charging unauthorized attorney’s fees.

The jury found that both Ankor and the non-operators breached the JOAs but Ankor breached first (and its breach was the result of willful misconduct). Both sides were awarded damages by the jury. The trial court awarded damages and attorneys’ fees to Ankor and a take-nothing judgment against the nonoperators.

The appeal

The exculpatory clause did not absolve Ankor of liability for failing to obtain consent for charges over $50,000. Other clauses were a factor in the holding, for example:

  • imposing individual liability for performance of each party’s obligations, and
  • prohibiting Ankor from withholding oil revenues to reimburse costs in the absence of a non-operator delinquency.

In response to Ankor’s argument that “activities” should be construed broadly to include even intentional breaches of contract that do not rise to the level of willful misconduct, non-operators countered that “Ankor’s interpretation of the exculpatory provision turns [it] into a provision that allows the operator to impose liability on the Non-Operators when it is intended only to be a shield to the Operator’s liability.”

The clause was substantially similar to the one in Reeder in which the SCOTX held that the term “activities” broadened the scope of the clause to include actions under the JOA beyond operations. (The 1982 form protects the operator’s “operations”; the 1989 protects “activities”.) InReeder the operator was shielded from liability for

The appellate court refused to extend Reeder to excuse Ankor’s willful misconduct. Ankor could not use the exculpatory clause offensively to impose liabilities on non-operators that Ankor knowingly incurred without consent. The non-operators were excused from their payment obligations. Judgment for Ankor was reversed.

Your musical interlude, as you ease back to work.



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