Wednesday, July 13, 2022

Preventive Law Demands Accommodating the Disability and not the Essential Functions of the Job

An emerging issue is whether when it comes to accommodating a person with a disability in an employment situation, are you accommodating the disability or are you accommodating the essential functions of the job. The easy scenario where that matters is when dealing with an employee with a service dog. Recently, Hobby Lobby was sued by the EEOC for denial of letting an employee use a service dog, here. However, there are other situations where the distinction between accommodating the essential functions of the job v. accommodating a person’s disability can matter a great deal. Our case of the day, Wilson v. Sec. of Veterans Affairs, an unpublished decision from the 11th Circuit decided June 3, 2022, is such a case. As usual the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; court’s reasoning reversing summary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim; court’s reasoning affirming summary judgment on the retaliation claim; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to concentrate on any or all of the categories.

 

I

Facts (taken directly from the opinion with very very minor changes for readability and flow).

 

Wilson, a veteran, suffers from degenerative disc disease and partial paralysis in both feet. In February 2009, Wilson started as a probationary Veteran Claims Examiner (VCE) for the Atlanta VA Regional Office. At the time, the Atlanta VA Regional Office only permitted permanent employees to use the on-site parking deck. Probationary VCEs could park at an off-site parking area roughly one mile from the office, from which they could either take a shuttle or walk to work. The VA shuttle ran for one hour in the morning and one hour in the evening. It ran sporadically at best and could only hold up to 25 individuals at a time—even then, there were only 15 seats. And because the shuttle lacked handlebars, standing passengers were forced to either be “pressed against an individual” or “use [their] body as a stance” to avoid falling over. Roughly 80 probationary VCEs commuted per day. Because of the shuttle’s shortcomings, Wilson effectively faced the option of either walking to work—which “put enormous pressure on her nerves” and caused her legs and feet to swell—or parking in unassigned handicapped spaces in the on-site parking deck.1 Wilson made the latter choice, leading to numerous parking tickets and counseling memos about her unauthorized parking.

 

As an employee with a disability, Wilson was told to bring any requests she may have for workplace accommodations to Celesta Chapin, her Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor with the VA’s Rehabilitation and Employment Division. Between March and July 2009, Wilson communicated her needs for a parking accommodation on six occasions to VA personnel—in all instances, Wilson stated that the VA refused to accommodate her requests in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Wilson identified six distinct failures by the VA to accommodate or respond to her requests for an accommodation, occurring on the following dates in 2009: (1) March 31, (2) April 13, (3) April 17,2 (4) May 12, (5) July 7, and (6) July 8 and thereafter. The record evidence shows the following regarding these events.

 

With respect to the first failure, Wilson emailed her vocational rehabilitation counselor with the VA’s rehabilitation and employment division that the parking situation at the VA aggravated her disability and that she needed a parking accommodation. The rehabilitation counselor told Wilson that she would make a workplace accommodation request to human resources on her behalf, but Wilson never received follow-up from that meeting.

 

With respect to the second failure, Wilson stated that she met with Eboni White, her direct supervisor, after receiving a counseling memo for unauthorized parking in the on-site parking deck. During the meeting, Wilson explained that her disability forced her to park on-site and that she was working with Chapin to obtain permission to park in the onsite parking deck, for which she needed White’s assistance. White then said that she would communicate with Chapin. However, White did not relay Wilson’s request to Chapin or anyone in HR, nor did White follow up with Wilson regarding her request.

 

With respect to the third failure, Wilson stated that she emailed Praileau Young, an HR assistant, to ask where she could find the paperwork necessary to submit a parking accommodation request. Young responded that she had forwarded Wilson’s email to the “appropriate person,” but Wilson never received the requested information. On the same day, Wilson emailed Chapin again to confirm the status of her request. Chapin responded that she thought Wilson dropped the matter, but then requested from Wilson the name of her supervisor so that Chapin could request an assessment. Wilson responded and asked Chapin to submit the request on her behalf.

 

With respect to the fourth failure, in the same affidavit, concerning the fourth instance, Wilson stated that she met again with Chapin on May 12, 2009. At this meeting, Chapin reminded her to discuss her request with her supervisor. Wilson testified that she believed management was ignoring her since she had already spoken with White to no avail.

 

With respect to the fifth failure, on July 1, 2009, union representative Rebecca Manning gave her own parking badge to Wilson with permission to use it to park at the on-site parking deck. Because the badge did not work, Wilson asked an HR Liaison, Vivian DeLoach, for help. On July 7, 2009, DeLoach informed Wilson that she was not authorized to park there. Making this the fifth occasion, Wilson testified that she believed then that her request had been denied after all.

 

With respect to the last failure, Wilson testified that she emailed DeLoach on July 8, 2009, to request “the appropriate paperwork to file for reasonable parking accommodations due to my service-connected disability,” which she identified as “degenerative disc disease, with [herniated] discs and partial paralysis in both of [her] feet.” Wilson stated that she would be willing to provide medical documentation and facilitate contact with her doctor if necessary. On July 16, 2009, Unit Chief John Clayton Smith—who replaced White as Wilson’s direct supervisor—followed-up to verbally inform Wilson that he consulted with HR and that they “d[id] not see a connection [between parking privileges] and the essential function of you performing your job.” (Emphasis mine). Wilson interpreted this as the sixth instance of the VA’s failure to accommodate. Wilson then emailed DeLoach for written confirmation of Smith’s “denial” of her request for accommodations. Smith followed up with Wilson via email and reiterated that neither he nor HR saw the need for an accommodation but did not deny the request outright. DeLoach responded that although she was not the approving official for accommodation requests, she would assist Smith in helping Wilson understand how to properly submit a request.

 

On July 22, 2009, Wilson filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discrimination by the VA. Within hours of filing the complaint, Wilson received a letter from Smith titled “Certification of Need for a Reasonable Accommodation.” Smith therein acknowledged Wilson’s accommodation request and requested, inter alia, medical documentation to evaluate her request. The letter also reminded Wilson yet again that “parking is not a condition of employment, nor related to the essential functions of your position.” This was the same language that Smith used in previously denying her request. (Emphasis mine). Wilson testified that she never provided the documentation because she understood the letter to be a preemptive denial. Wilson did not receive any follow-up.

 

Wilson testified that she soon thereafter suffered harassment. This harassment consisted, in part, of what she considered a pretextual disciplinary reprimand for leaving overtime work 45 minutes early because she felt ill. Wilson also applied for a Rating Veteran’s Service Representative position (RVSR) around this time but was not selected despite her allegation that she was more qualified than the selected applicant. On September 3, 2009, Wilson withdrew her EEOC complaint on advisement from her EEOC counselor. Her EEOC counselor discussed the matter with DeLoach, who responded, “if [parking] was going to be a problem [Wilson] might want to reevaluate her decision to work there.” Wilson stated that she continued to park in on-site handicapped spaces and amassed several parking tickets and letters of counseling because she believed that the VA unlawfully denied her accommodations request. Wilson also received a negative performance appraisal during this time, to which she filed a union grievance. Shortly thereafter, Jeannie Daniel, the VA Regional Assistant Education Officer, recommended to the VA regional Director Alfred Bocchicchio that Wilson be terminated for poor performance. The VA terminated Wilson on December 18, 2009, with a letter citing both her parking violations and poor performance as justification. Wilson applied again for the RVSR position in 2011, and was again not selected, despite her allegation that here, too, she was the most qualified candidate. Wilson stated that she believed she was not selected on either occasion because the decisionmakers knew of her disability and her EEOC complaint.

 

Wilson brought suit alleging both discrimination against terror and the terms and conditions of her employment and retaliation. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Veterans Affairs administration and Wilson appealed.

 

II

Court’s Reasoning Reversing Summary Judgment on the Failure to Accommodate Claim

 

  1. An employer’s obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation is triggered when the employee makes a specific demand for a reasonable accommodation.
  2. After the employer is placed on notice of the employee’s disability and request for an accommodation, the employer has to make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation.
  3. Determining an appropriate reasonable accommodation may mean going through the interactive process.
  4. It is when the employer fails to provide the accommodation after it was demanded that the plaintiff can sustain a discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act.
  5. Wilson made repeated requests (see §I of this blog entry), for the specific accommodation to park in the VA parking deck. She repeatedly explained her reasoning and her request to many different people at the VA who either discouraged, ignored, or provided inadequate follow-up to those requests.
  6. A reasonable juror could find that Wilson’s first two communications with the VA were requests for an accommodation.
  7. It is sufficient that Wilson requested to park on site and justified her request by informing the VA about her mobility limitations and her belief that an accommodation would resolve the issue.
  8. It took the VA four months to even attempt to initiate the interactive process, despite being repeatedly placed on notice of Wilson’s disability and her request. As such, a jury could find that the VA’s four month long inaction in addressing Wilson’s request constitutes a failure to accommodate in violation of its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act regardless of Wilson’s subsequent failure to provide the documentation.

 

III

Court’s Reasoning Affirming Summary Judgment on the Retaliation Claim

 

  1. Wilson’s argument that her parking requests were independent protected activity is new on appeal. Since a court will generally not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal, Wilson waived the argument.
  2. Wilson does not demonstrate that the VA’s other basis for termination, i.e. her subpar work performance, was pretextual. The VA produced evidence that the regional VA director considered Wilson’s failing to meet the minimum monthly expected and products and produce numerous errors in her work that had to be corrected by supervisors. She also requested overtime pay for hours that she did not work and received a counseling memo for doing so. Wilson did not dispute that her record was unsatisfactory and did not produce evidence that would lead a reasonable jury to find pretext. She therefore cannot show that the protected activity was causally connected to the adverse employment action and the rich allegation claim fails.

 

IV

Thoughts/Takeaways

 

  1. The VA’s focus on the essential functions of the job rather than on accommodating her disability got the VA in a bunch of trouble here. As a matter of preventive law, per Felix-which we discussed here-, it is much better to focus on accommodating the disability rather than focusing on accommodating the essential functions of a particular job. Taking this approach will certainly prevent litigation down the road and make the person with the disability feel valued so that he/she/they will want to succeed.
  2. You want to make sure at trial that all arguments are preserved for appeal.
  3. Magic words, as we have discussed numerous times in our blog, such as here, are not required for activating the interactive process.
  4. Always utilize the interactive process whenever a request for a reasonable accommodation/modification is made. The interactive process is not optional in my opinion despite the court’s use of the word, “may.”
  5. Don’t forget about the do’s and don’ts of the interactive process, which we discussed here.
  6. An unreasonable delay in granting a reasonable accommodation, as we discussed here, is actionable.
  7. Since this involved a federal employee, it was §501 of the Rehabilitation Act that was involved and not the ADA. However, by statute §501 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §791, here, tracks title I of the ADA.
  8. The trend is very much that a failure to accommodate claim as a separate cause of action.
  9. Case illustrates how an underlying disability discrimination claim can go forward even where a retaliation claim does not. I have also seen cases where it would to allegation act claim goes forward but the underlying disability discrimination claim does not.
  10. Negative reports on an employee can of course be done at any time. However where an employee has initiated a request for reasonable accommodation, you want to make sure such a report is part of your regular processes and not an attempt to justify disciplinary proceedings after a reasonable accommodation request has been made. Such an action could also rate the question over whether the performance issued would have been cured if reasonable accommodations have been granted in the first place.


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Monday, July 11, 2022

Success Story Of The Month – Overcoming A Defective Or Less Than Powerful Power Of Attorney

What could go wrong when using a general durable power of attorney for an agent to sign a deed (in this case, a Ladybird deed) on behalf of the principal (the one who signed the power of attorney)? Are there additional powers that should be considered in the power of attorney other than language approved by the state legislature or some form document?

Facts: Husband and wife are in a nursing home and are on long-term care Medicaid whereby the government helps subsidize the cost of their care. Both have signed a power of attorney (that covers many financial decisions including real estate transactions) that was notarized. The most valuable asset they have is a homestead worth $350,000. Although the homestead is a noncountable resource for Medicaid eligibility, the state will have a right to make a claim against the home to the extent Medicaid benefits were advanced on behalf of the survivor of them (i.e., the nursing home costs paid by the government including medications). One exception to Medicaid having a successful estate recovery claim is if there is a surviving spouse. As a result, benefits advanced on behalf of the first spouse to die would not result in a successful claim by the state. However, under Texas law, the state would have a right to make a claim against the homestead if the homestead of the deceased Medicaid recipient’s home passes by intestate (without a will) succession of by Will. As a result, many Medicaid recipients (or their agent under a power of attorney) sign a Ladybird (enhanced life estate) deed whereby the home passes by deed at death instead of by Will or intestacy. Texas is one of a few states that permits a Ladybird deed to protect the home from a successful claim by the state.

In this case, the children of the Medicaid recipients (their parents) thought it would be best to use the parents’ signed general durable power of attorney so that the agents (acting on behalf of parents) could sign a joint Ladybird deed to avoid a successful claim by the state for Medicaid estate recovery as the property would pass by deed instead of by Will or intestacy.

Problem 1: Notary error. The notary who notarized the husband’s power of attorney filled in the blanks incorrectly as she indicated that husband was the notary and that she was the one signing the document as the principal.

Solution 1: Find the notary and have her correct by crossing out, initialing and dating. Otherwise, the county clerk will not record the power of attorney which would be required for the deed to be effective.

Solution 2: Husband could sign the Ladybird deed or sign a new power of attorney properly notarized assuming husband/parent has sufficient mental capacity and was not under undue influence or duress at the time the document was signed.

Problem 2: Originals must be recorded. The children could not find dad’s original power of attorney. If an agent is acting on behalf of the principal in connection with real estate, the original power of attorney must be recorded. The county clerk will not record a copy of a power of attorney.

Solution: Husband/parent will either sign the Ladybird deed (since the copy of the existing power of attorney could not be recorded) or sign a new power of attorney assuming mental capacity and that he had sufficient mental capacity and was not under undue influence or duress at the time he signs the document before a notary.

Problem No. 3: Questionable Capacity. Although it is believed husband/parent had sufficient mental capacity to sign the deed or new power of attorney, there was not certainty. Even if husband/parent signed the deed, if a title company believed there wasn’t sufficient mental capacity, then it would not insure title at the time the property is sold.

Solution: Have a geriatric psychologist or psychiatrist examine dad and sign a capacity affidavit confirming capacity at the time of signing of the deed and/or power of attorney.

Problem No. 4: Adequate Authority. Most powers of attorney either permit no gift giving authority or limit any gifting to the annual gift tax exclusion (presently $16,000 per year, per person). As a result, some title companies would not give title insurance saying the agent was acting beyond the powers given.

Solution: The power of attorney should not just be a statutory form or a form off the internet. The power of attorney in this case should clearly permit broad gift giving, the ability to create or change a Ladybird deed, and perhaps permit self-dealing if the parent wanted the agent (child in this case) to be able to deed the property to the agent. Other examples of authority that should be considered in the power of attorney include the right to create and fund a trust. So, for example, the Ladybird deed could name a trust as a grantee (as opposed to being an individual or individuals) to reduce risk, if: (1) there is more than one grantee and the grantees do not agree on the sale, lease or mortgage of the property; (2) one of the grantees has creditor issues; (3) one of the grantees has marital issues; (4) one of the grantees is a spendthrift; (5) one of the grantees is a minor; (7) one of the grantees dies before parents or whomever is grantor; (8) one of the grantees has an addiction; or (9) one of the grantees is disabled. There can be a contingent trust within the trust to protect a beneficiary who has any of the issues listed above.

Problem No. 5: Too Old. This week a client reported a title company would not permit the agent (child) to sell the property since the power of attorney was nine years old.

Solution: Go to a different title company. Powers of attorney generally terminate on death. However, it is up to the underwriter to determine if it is willing to insure or not. So, if one title company is not willing to insure, then consider if another title company would. Of course, another option, (assuming mental capacity) is for the principal to sign another power of attorney or just sign the deed and other closing documents without the use of a power of attorney.

If interested in learning more about this article or other estate planning, Medicaid and public benefits planning, probate, etc., attend one of our free upcoming virtual or in person Estate Planning Essentials workshops by clicking here or calling 214-720-0102. We make it simple to attend and it is without obligation.



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Uncertified

On a Texas tort-law question about liability for a brake failure, the Fifth Circuit reasoned:

We do not think this question is close enough to warrant certification to the Supreme Court of Texas. See McMillan v. Amazon.com, 983 F.3d 194, 202 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that certification is usually reserved for close questions of state law with “scant on-point precedent”). Certification is appropriate when “consequential state-law ground is to be plowed” and “any Erie guess would involve more divining than discerning.” Id. Our guess today is a safer bet. The Guijarros have not identified a single case cabining Armstrong to the realm of products liability. See Troice v. Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P., 921 F.3d 501, 504–05 (5th Cir. 2019) (declining to certify because multiple intermediate courts had adopted one view of the issue, and the plaintiff had not identified any contrary authority). Nor does such a distinction make sense. Add to the one-sidedness of this issue that neither party requested certification.

       We conclude that Texas law requires plaintiffs alleging a brake defect to put forth “competent expert testimony and objective proof” that the defect caused their injuries.

Guijarro v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc., No. 21-40512 (July 5, 2022).

 

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Tuesday, July 5, 2022

Fireworks Laws in Texas | Could a Sparkler Really Cost You $2,000?

Do Not Lose Your Liberty on Independence Day Independence Day is right around the corner. You will probably start seeing the notices spread across social media from local police departments,…

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Exculpatory Clause Does Not Save Operator From Liability

Co-author Trevor Lawhorn

Non-operators under the 1989 Model Form JOA have been hoping to drive a stake through the dark heart of Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC. Bachtell Enterprises, LLC v. Ankor E&P Holdings Corp might be a start. The question was whether the Article V.A. exculpatory clause exonerated the operator who intentionally passed expenses to non-operators without their consent.

The clause did not allow the operator to engage in such activities. The term “activities” is not so broad as to protect an operator such that it can have no liability for breach of any contract, absent willfulness.

Facts

Ankor the operator negotiated with CDM to construct a gas plant and told the non-operators that third-party ownership of the plant would, among other things, “eliminate[ ] the need for the [nonoperators] to provide capital for construction.”

The non-operators approved AFE’s for expenses totaling $385,000. Additional AFE’s would cover certain other expenses. The JOA required non-operator consent for “ .. any single project reasonably estimated to require an expenditure in excess of $50,000.”

Article V.A. required Ankor to [c]onduct its activities …  as a reasonably prudent Operator, … It shall have no liability as Operator … for losses sustained or liabilities incurred, except such as may result from willful misconduct.”

A year after the CDM agreement, Ankor told the non-operators that until the plant was paid off CDM would “retain[ ] all plant revenue as credit towards the full operating costs, transfer and fractionation fees, and amortized capital. Any balance due [CDM] is born by the Ownership. The balance … due [CDM] is approximately $1,590,000.” Ankor then sent a JIB totaling $1.6MM. The non-operators refused to pay.

Trial court

Ankor sued the non-operators claiming breach of the JOA for failure to pay the JIBs. Non-operators responded that Ankor breached first by:

  • charging for gas plant construction without consent,
  • withholding revenue without consent or authority,
  • committing non-operators’ gas to CDM without authority,
  • agreeing not to disclose the CDM service agreement, and
  • charging unauthorized attorney’s fees.

The jury found that both Ankor and the non-operators breached the JOAs but Ankor breached first (and its breach was the result of willful misconduct). Both sides were awarded damages by the jury. The trial court awarded damages and attorneys’ fees to Ankor and a take-nothing judgment against the nonoperators.

The appeal

The exculpatory clause did not absolve Ankor of liability for failing to obtain consent for charges over $50,000. Other clauses were a factor in the holding, for example:

  • imposing individual liability for performance of each party’s obligations, and
  • prohibiting Ankor from withholding oil revenues to reimburse costs in the absence of a non-operator delinquency.

In response to Ankor’s argument that “activities” should be construed broadly to include even intentional breaches of contract that do not rise to the level of willful misconduct, non-operators countered that “Ankor’s interpretation of the exculpatory provision turns [it] into a provision that allows the operator to impose liability on the Non-Operators when it is intended only to be a shield to the Operator’s liability.”

The clause was substantially similar to the one in Reeder in which the SCOTX held that the term “activities” broadened the scope of the clause to include actions under the JOA beyond operations. (The 1982 form protects the operator’s “operations”; the 1989 protects “activities”.) InReeder the operator was shielded from liability for

The appellate court refused to extend Reeder to excuse Ankor’s willful misconduct. Ankor could not use the exculpatory clause offensively to impose liabilities on non-operators that Ankor knowingly incurred without consent. The non-operators were excused from their payment obligations. Judgment for Ankor was reversed.

Your musical interlude, as you ease back to work.



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Same-Sex Marriage and its relationship to Estate Planning and family law in Texas

In 2015 the Supreme Court of the United States issued the Obergefell decision which legalized same-sex marriage across all 50 states. This was a major recognition by the Supreme Court that people of the same sex had a right to marry under the United States Constitution. The effect of the decision has had impacts both on the social fabric of our country and on the law. Specifically, we have in mind areas related to family law and estate planning. While same-sex couples Immediately gained recognition for their marriages the decision opened several questions about how these folks wouldn’t go about living their lives.

If you are a person in a same-sex marriage, then the issuance of the recent Supreme Court decision in Dobbs likely caused you to consider the possibility that your marriage may become an issue left to state legislatures rather than being recognized as valid under the constitution on a federal level. This potential change has ramifications not only regarding your relationship with your spouse on a personal level but also on how the two of you have mapped out your lives as far as your family structure and planning.

In today’s blog post from the Law Office of Bryan Fagan, our attorneys would like to share with you some perspective and information on what the recent Supreme Court decision overruling Roe versus wade may tell us about the court’s intent to look more closely at prior decisions that involve what is known as substantive due process. Specifically, we would like to share with you some perspective on the Obergefell decision which validated same-sex marriage across the country in 2015. In a time where you may be concerned with the Supreme Court overruling that decision as well, it is no use simply worrying about any issue in doing nothing about it.

In a situation like this, we can imagine that you may feel like forces beyond your control are going into action and you can do little to nothing about it. While courts can and will act on their schedules and based on the legal analysis of justices, you can take certain actions on your own to learn about the basics of these decisions so that you can better make informed decisions in your own life. We hope that this blog post provides you with perspective and information where you can base real-life decisions on reality versus headlines on websites and the news.

Nobody can predict the future. You may find various news outlets or people who are confident in one way or the other in what will happen about several subjects that we discuss in today’s blog post. What matters most in your household is what is specific to you and your spouse. With that said, if you have questions about the material that we share in today’s blog post then please do not hesitate to contact the Law Office of Bryan Fagan. Our licensed family law attorneys offer free of charge consultations six days a week in person, over the phone, and via video. Our three Houston area locations are open to serve you and answer questions and give information about your life and your specific circumstances.

Same-sex marriage in Texas and its impact on Adoption

Once the Supreme Court found that same-sex couples have a right to marry under the United States constitution in Obergefell v. Hodges, Same-sex marriages across the country became recognized, and the door was opened for same-sex couples to marry. Not only does this carry with it significantly impacts on the personal and relational levels but a legal front, as well. Marriage can have a significant impact on how families plan in terms of retirement, estate planning, and health insurance and health care. In today’s blog post we will focus our attention on the legal aspects of gay marriage.

Earlier Supreme Court decisions allowed Texas same-sex couples to gain the right to federal benefits if one of the persons in the marriage was a federal employee. This includes things like Social Security benefits, Veterans Administration benefits, and health insurance and retirement benefits for same-sex spouses whose partners work for the federal government. Whatever benefits exist for spouses in traditional marriage have now been extended to same-sex couples, as well. This is significant in that across the country while in many states same-sex couples could marry there was not necessarily a guarantee or a right to take advantage of benefits under your or your spouse’s employer-based plans. That all changed this supreme court chose to both acknowledge same-sex marriage rights and issue favorable rulings on cases that sought to declare the right to marry lying only in opposite-sex couples.

When it comes to family-related issues for same-sex couples who are married in Texas one aspect of the discussion that is important to take note of is that same-sex couples may be interested in adopting children to complete their families. In Texas, any adult may file a petition to adopt a child. The basic requirements for adoption in Texas or that the person filing the petition for adoption must be at least 21 years old, be a citizen, a permanent resident, or another qualified alien, is financially able to meet the child’s basic material needs and is physically, mentally, and emotionally able to assume parenting responsibilities. These are the broad requirements that must be in place for you and your spouse to adopt a child in Texas if that is your wish.

Ultimately, the best interest standard will be applied when it comes to a court determining whether to grant a petition for adoption. The courts in Texas can technically utilize you’re being in the same-sex marriage against you when it comes to making best interest terminations regarding adoption. This is not to fearmonger or say that a court absolutely would use your same-sex relationship as grounds to deny an adoption petition. You can look around and see same-sex couples who have successfully adopted children. You may even know people who have been successful in adopting children who were also in a same-sex marriage.

But you also need to understand that nothing is stopping a Texas court from allowing evidence to be admitted into the record or testimony from occurring on the witness stand that relates to your sexuality and that of your partner. This could even happen in a Texas family law case like a divorce or child custody matter. Case law in Texas which points to this being a possibility is quite remote having occurred nearly 40 years ago, but it is something for you to be aware of as you plan the next steps in your family life. This is especially true if you plan to adopt A child or grow your family in that way.

Here is a hypothetical situation that may be able to better illustrate the point regarding the best interest of the child standard and decision-making for your family moving forward. Suppose that you are attempting to adopt A child with your same-sex spouse. During that process, the two of you have engaged with an adoption agency that caters to same-sex couples. Throughout this process, you all have worked 2 build relationships and are now at the point where you feel comfortable moving forward with the petition to adopt A specific child.

After filing a petition to adopt a child in hiring an experienced family law attorney to assist in that process it is possible that a family court judge could decide to not approve your adoption petition due to a belief that it is in the best interests of the child you seek to adopt to be placed with a couple in a traditional marriage. It is not as if a court would specifically state this in their reasoning, but courts would be able to do so given that same-sex parents lack certain protections under the law which can lead to discrimination in areas such as the adoption of a child.

Legal planning for same-sex couples in Texas

The critical areas where the federal recognition of same-sex marriage impacted couples most prominently were estate planning and end-of-life planning. When we consider this sort of emotional and hot-button topic, this sometimes dry and mundane world of estate planning usually does not come to mind immediately. Rather, we start to think about the more emotional and visceral areas of life like the relationship itself, marriage, and family life. However, planning for end-of-life scenarios is impacted by marriage and the decisions we make as adults.

Creating a will is something that all people over the age of 18 should find a way to do. This is something, as the attorneys with the Law Office of Bryan Fagan will tell all our clients, is something you should investigate no matter your level of wealth or your age. There are specific advantages for every person when it comes to creating a will based on you are stay in life. This is true no matter if you are wealthy or not. do not buy into the idea that only rich people draft wills. That is simply not true and could be a major mistake for you, your spouse, and your family if you fail to draft a will while you have the opportunity.

To be clear, a will is a legal document under which you can direct how your property will be distributed upon your death. This relates to real estate as well as personal property. Members of the same-sex community have gauged in estate planning for some time out of necessity. The Texas laws on intestate distribution apply to married couples. Before the time when marriage was recognized between gay couples in Texas estate planning was necessary to ensure that your partner would be able to receive your property after your death and vice versa.

Even now when same-sex marriage is legal in Texas it still makes a lot of sense for you and your spouse to have a will. Not only does having a will allow you to specify how you would like your property to be divided upon your debt it also allows for you and your spouse to make provisions that can determine who will care for your child in the event of your passing such as who will be a guardian for your child until he or she reaches the age of 18. It is much better to take advantage of the autonomy that you have on this subject rather than to allow a probate court judge to make decisions for you after your passing.

The simple truth is that you have an opportunity to make these decisions for yourself. However, since none of us know the time or date that we will pass on from this life it is best to strike while the iron is hot and create a bill for yourself now. The Law Office of Bryan Fagan can help you too not only perform estate planning steps but also draft your will alongside you. Our attorneys can help you to problem solve through difficult estate planning questions and help you arrive at solutions that will protect your present in the account for the future of your family, as well.

A question that you may have as someone who was in a same-sex marriage is what impact a future court ruling of the United States Supreme Court may have on the legitimacy of your will and that of your spouse. For instance, what if the Supreme Court were to overturn Obergefell this rendering your marriage invalid? While a Supreme Court decision would not invalidate your marriage, as a rule, it would return the issue to the individual states just as we saw in the recent Dobbs decision related to abortion. However, even as a Supreme Court decision would not specifically invalidate your marriage it is in our opinion, that Texas and our legislature would honor a same-sex marriage without a federal court decision forcing their hand.

If you and your spouse have previously had wills created, then at this time you may choose to do nothing specific in rather monitor the need for change as time goes on. Right now, there is nothing imminent in terms of the overturning of the federally recognized right for same-sex couples to marry. If you have a will that refers to your “spouse” then you likely don’t have to go out and change the will or create a new will. However, there is also nothing stopping you and your partner from creating wheels that do not reference your marriage if you have not yet created a will. Again, same-sex couples in your position have been drafting wheels for generations to protect themselves and their property.

One thing to keep in mind is that if there is any question about the legality of gay marriage in the future about your will then you should know that a probate court will seek to discern what the intent you had was in creating your will in certain provisions within the will. Regardless of whether your will refers to your partner as a spouse or not if your will is challenged the court will look to the plain language at the will and the circumstances of your life to determine your intent.

So, for example, if you refer to your spouse as such without naming him or her specifically and in the future, the marriage is no longer recognized then it is very possible that the court we’ll simply look to your intent and understand who you were trying to pass property onto even if he or she with no longer be your legal spouse under future changes in marriage laws.

1 way to potentially try and protect yourself and your spouse in the future from any changes in the law would be to state at the beginning of your will that you would like the same person to benefit from provisions in your will regardless of whether he or she is classified as your spouse in the future. The question that we must answer in Texas, should Obergefell be overruled, is whether that decision would apply retroactively to avoid marriage like your own. This would create a great deal of confusion and problems so it may not be the case. However, it is worth monitoring the situation to make informed decisions for yourself and your family.

Questions about the material contained in today’s blog post? Contact the Law Office of Bryan Fagan

if you have any questions about the material contained in today’s blog post, please do not hesitate to contact the Law Office of Bryan Fagan. Our licensed family law and estate planning attorneys offer free of charge consultations six days a week in person, over the phone, and via video. These consultations are a great way for you to learn more about these areas of the law as well as how your family may be impacted by changes in various areas of the law now and in the future.



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Texas Appeals Court Upholds Alcohol Restriction in Divorce Decree

In dealing with Texas custody issues, courts must focus on the children’s best interest. Courts sometimes conclude that the best interest of the children requires certain restrictions on the parents when the children are in their care.  A father recently challenged a provision in the divorce decree prohibiting the parents from drinking at certain times.

Divorce Decree Prohibits Consumption of Alcohol

The parents’ divorce decree prohibited both parents from consuming alcohol while they had possession of the children or within 12 hours before their scheduled possession.  The father ultimately appealed this provision, arguing it was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

According to the appeals court’s opinion, there was evidence of the father’s regular excessive drinking.

 

The appeals court noted that the children’s best interests are the primary concern in issues involving possession and conservatorship.  Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002. Restrictions or limitations on the parent’s right to possession and access are limited to what is required to protect the children’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 153.193.

The father framed the provision as an injunction and argued the court could only impose such a restriction if the traditional elements for a permanent injunction are met.  The appeals court noted, however, that previous cases from the Austin Court of Appeals, from which this appeal was transferred, focused on the child’s best interest in similar cases.  In the cases the appeals court considered, the Austin Court of appeals did not discuss or apply the traditional elements for a permanent injunction.

Appeals Court Finds “Ample Evidence” Supporting Injunction

The appeals court noted there was “ample evidence” in the record that would allow the trial court to reasonably conclude the father drank alcohol in the presence of the children and to excess.  There was evidence the father had operated motor vehicles after drinking or while intoxicated, brought the kids home with alcohol on his breath, averaged twelve to eighteen beers on Friday and Saturday nights, urinated on his daughter’s shoes on the floor, violated temporary orders prohibiting him from drinking when he had the children, and violating temporary orders requiring him to blow into an alcohol monitoring device.

The appeals court pointed out, however, there was little evidence that the father’s drinking had led to physical injury or harm to the children.  The mother testified she had been present to keep the children safe while the father was drinking.  The father stated he sometimes drank more because he knew the mother was there to take care of the children.  There was no evidence that the father would have another adult present to take care of the children if he drank while they were with him after the divorce.

The appeals court noted the father was not completely barred from drinking.  The provision only restricted consumption of alcohol when the children were in his possession or were scheduled to be in his possession within 12 hours.  The appeals court also pointed out that the restriction could be modified if there were a substantial and material change in circumstances.  Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101(a)(1).

Appeals Court Finds that Trial Court Could Preemptively Impose Injunction

The appeals court concluded that a trial court need not wait until a child has physically harmed to impose such a restriction.  The appeals court found the trial court “protect[ed] the children’s best interests in a nominally intrusive way.” There was no abuse of discretion.

The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

In Matters of Custody, Ever Case is Unique – Call McClure Law Group to Assist with Yours Today

In this case, the court heard evidence of both the father’s overall drinking patterns and specific incidents, supporting restrictions on the parents’ drinking during and immediately before their possession of the children.  Under different facts, however, similar restrictions might not be required to protect the best interests of the children.  Custody matters are very fact specific.  If you have concerns about your spouse’s drinking or use of other substances, talk to a knowledgeable Texas custody attorney about your options.  Call McClure Law Group at 214.692.8200 to set up an appointment to discuss your case.



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