Tuesday, June 21, 2022

Unreasonable Delay in Granting a Reasonable Accommodation Request is Actionable

What if an entity slow walks the reasonable accommodation process with the hope that the person with the disability will, for example, graduate, age out of the program, simply go away? Is an unreasonable delay in granting a reasonable accommodation actionable under the ADA? Two cases out of the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit say that it is. It is interesting that it is two cases from Illinois as the Seventh Circuit is not generally speaking, particularly generous to people with disabilities with the exception of mandatory reassignment, which we discussed here, and unreasonable delay. The cases of the day are McCray v. Wilkie decided by the Seventh Circuit on July 16, 2020, here, and DiFranco v. City of Chicago decided by the Northern District of Illinois on March 7, 2022, here. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: McCray facts taken from the opinion; McCray’s reasoning that a delay in providing an adequate replacement van was actionable; McCray’s reasoning with respect to failing to reassign plaintiff or give him a new office; DiFranco facts taken from the opinion; DiFranco’s reasoning that failure to accommodate claims can proceed; DiFranco’s reasoning that the ADA and the Illinois Human Rights Act discrimination claims get tossed; and McCray DiFranco thoughts/takeaways . Of course, the reader is free to concentrate on any or all of the categories.

 

I

McCray Facts

 

McCray is an employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). McCray worked at the Milwaukee VA Vet Center as a readjustment counselor from July 1997 until September 2000, when he left for graduate studies. After earning a Master’s degree in Educational Psychology/ Community Counseling and practicing as a community psychologist, he returned to the VA in March 2004 as a Mental Health Case Manager. In that capacity, McCray provides a variety of support services for military veterans, among them engaging in one‐on‐one counseling (including drug and alcohol counseling), conducting clinical groups, helping to complete benefits applications, making in‐home visits in at‐risk neighborhoods, providing case management for veterans with severe mental illness, and transporting clients to clinical appointments.

 

McCray alleges that he was subject to multiple forms of workplace discrimination. Two of the three claims he has pursued on appeal are claims that the VA failed to accommodate his disabilities; the third is a disparate treatment claim positing that other VA employees received more favorable accommodations than he did based on their race. (McCray is African American; the comparators are white women.) No. 19‐3145 3

 

McCray served in the Army for a period of eight years in the 1980s (achieving the rank of Sergeant prior to his honorable discharge), and in the course of his service sustained injuries to his big toes, ankles, knees, lower back, and shoulders. He also sustained mental injuries and has been diagnosed as having an adjustment disorder with depressed moods. As of February 2013, his VA disability rating was 100 percent. In addition to his service‐related disabilities, McCray suffers from hypertension, arthritis, diabetes, sarcoidosis (which is in remission), and post‐traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). McCray’s physical disabilities have a substantial negative impact on his ability to bend, stoop, climb, reach, twist, carry, sleep, and walk; pain attributed to McCray’s arthritis also causes him to experience difficulty with concentration. His mental disabilities likewise affect his ability to concentrate and in addition his breathing ability; they also contribute to a sense of extreme fatigue.

 

In July 2012, McCray asked his supervisor, Dr. Erin Williams, that the van he was using to transport VA clients to their appointments be replaced, because the van was hurting his knee. Since his return to the VA in 2004, McCray had not previously needed an accommodation in order to perform his duties. After a preliminary meeting between McCray and an ergonomics employee in August, the van was evaluated in October by a specialist, who concluded that the “knot” on McCray’s knee seemed to be caused by a lack of leg room in the van. (McCray is 6 feet 3 inches tall and weighs 390 pounds.) In November, the van began to “buck and jerk” in traffic. Although the motor pool evaluated the van and told McCray they could find nothing wrong, a co‐worker who drove the van one day experienced the same problem and told McCray the van was unsafe. In December, he was offered a temporary replacement van which he eventually accepted, but the replacement van allegedly had a cracked windshield, no rear brakes, inoperable power steering and horn, and was too small: McCray described it as worse than the original. McCray continued to ask for an appropriate replacement van as he had since he first made the request in July, but he did not get it until June 2013, 19 days after he told Williams that he was going to file an EEO complaint over the matter. In 2014, shortly after a white female coworker complained about her van bucking and jerking, all of the case managers received new vans.

 

In August 2013, McCray filed a charge (his second) with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (“EEOC”) complaining that he had improperly been denied a promotion to a higher grade level and that the VA had not reasonably accommodated him when he had requested a replacement van.

 

In October 2013, McCray experienced difficulty concentrating at work, which he attributed to various acts of discrimination and retaliation committed by co‐workers in the wake of the charges he had filed with the EEOC. He was initially granted a two‐week leave of absence, after which he returned to work and suffered a series of panic attacks. He asked that he be reassigned to another position as a reasonable accommodation; he also was prescribed (and granted) a second leave of 30 days. The following month, he was advised that the VA was unable to find him a reassignment.

 

In response, McCray indicated that he could probably manage to continue working without reassignment if he were to be given an office on a lower floor as an accommodation to his disabilities. That request was denied, notwithstanding the fact that there were vacant offices two floors down in the building. By contrast, when a white female co‐worker requested in February or March 2014 that her office be moved due to a medical condition, her request was granted.

 

II

McCray’s Reasoning That a Delay in Providing an Adequate Replacement Van Was Actionable

 

  1. Rehabilitation Act requires a federal employer to reasonably accommodate the known physical and mental disabilities of a qualified employee.
  2. The Rehabilitation Act incorporate the standards of the ADA when determining whether an employer had discriminated against an employee. Therefore, cases under both statutes are looked to in evaluating an employer’s compliance with that duty.
  3. Plaintiff alleged that he had a variety of physical and mental conditions that could obviously affect major life activities. He also alleged that prior to 2012, he had been able to perform the essential functions of the job without any accommodations, and that all he needed to continue was a new van to resolve the difficulty have begun to experience with his knee.
  4. An unreasonable delay in providing an accommodation for an employee’s known disability can amount to a failure to accommodate his disability that violates the Rehabilitation Act.
  5. Whether a particular delay qualifies as an unreasonable one necessarily turns on the totality of the circumstances, including but not limited to looking at such factors as: 1) the employer’s good faith in attempting to accommodate the disability; 2) the length of the delay; 3) the reason for the delay; 4) the nature, complexity, and burden of the accommodation requested; and 5) whether the employer offered alternative accommodations.
  6. Plaintiff informed his supervisor that the van he was driving was causing him pain when he was driving and an ergonomics specialist agreed that he needed a different van. Replacing the van was not an especially complex or burdensome accommodation since new vans were given to all counselors in the following year. Plaintiff also raised the issue at weekly staff meetings with his supervisor, and yet the only interim accommodation he was offered was a van that was even worse in material respects.
  7. The employer had no dialogue with the plaintiff about what else could be done and on what timeline. Such a lack of dialogue could be understood to violate the employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process with its employee to arrive in an appropriate accommodation. It is also evidence of the employer’s lack of good faith.
  8. None of the other cases cited by the defendant, which were summary judgment matters, suggest that a delay in granting a reasonable accommodation of any particular duration will be invariably reasonable regardless of the surrounding circumstances.

II

McCray’s Reasoning with Respect to Failing to Reassign Plaintiff or Give Him a New Office

 

  1. It is unclear whether the failure to reassign or to give plaintiff a new office is a failure to accommodate claim or a retaliation claim.
  2. Such confusion can be cleared up because the case is remanded for further proceedings and plaintiff can then clarify and support that claim.

III

Di Franco Facts Taken Directly from the Opinion

 

Marco suffered from cystic fibrosis, a permanent and progressive lung disease, and cystic fibrosis-related diabetes. Doc. 1 at ¶ 9. At the time of his death, he was employed by the City as a CPD police officer. Id. at ¶ 1. Marco informed the City of his cystic fibrosis and cystic fibrosis-related diabetes when he began working for CPD in May 1998. Id. at ¶ 11. In 2005, Marco was assigned to the Narcotics Division, which required him to work at CPD’s Homan Square facility and in the field. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.

On March 9, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the Governor of Illinois issued a Disaster Proclamation, and on March 13, the President declared a National Emergency. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 21. COVID-19 can lead to “serious, long-term complications in some cases, including inflammation and clogged air sacs in the lungs, restriction of the body’s oxygen supply, blood clots, organ failure, liver damage, intestinal damage, heart inflammation, neurological malfunction, and acute kidney disease.” Id. at ¶ 15. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), individuals with underlying medical conditions, such as lung disease and diabetes, face an increased risk of severe illness and death from COVID-19. Id. at ¶ 16.

On March 19, 2020, Marco received an email from CPD’s Chief Communications Officer advising all CPD employees of the CDC’s guidance that individuals with “health conditions like heart disease, diabetes, and lung disease are more likely to have serious illness” if they contract COVID-19. Id. at ¶ 22; Doc. 1-2 at 9. The email instructed employees who “believe[d] that [their] . . . medical condition places [them] at a higher risk of serious illness from COVID-19” to “contact the Medical Section of the Chicago Police Department to discuss next steps.” Doc. 1 at ¶ 22; Doc. 1-2 at 9. The Medical Section oversees and approves medical and sick leaves for CPD employees. Doc. 1 at ¶ 23. The email further instructed “[s]worn [m]embers” like Marco to “have your healthcare provider provide documentation related to your condition to medical.section@chicagopolice.org,” and stated that, “[o]nce your documentation is reviewed by the Medical Director, you will be contacted by Medical Services staff for instructions.” Id. at ¶ 25; Doc. 1-2 at 9.

Less than two hours after Marco received the email, his doctor sent a letter to the Medical Section stating that Marco had cystic fibrosis and cystic fibrosis-related diabetes. Doc. 1 at ¶ 26; Doc. 1-2 at 11. The letter further stated that, “[w]ith this underlying lung condition and these comorbidities, [Marco] is at higher risk of developing serious illness from COVID-19,” and asked that he “be given the opportunity to work remotely or be provided with alternative accommodations to distance himself from others while at work.” Doc. 1 at ¶ 26; Doc. 1-2 at 11.

While that request was pending, Marco was required to and did continue reporting for work at Homan Square and in the field. Doc. 1 at ¶ 27. On March 20, Marco called the Medical Section about his accommodation request and was told that someone would call him back. Id. at ¶ 28. He did not receive a call back that day. Id. at ¶ 29. On March 21, Marco called the Medical Section six times, but nobody answered his calls, and he could not leave a voicemail because the Medical Section’s voicemail inbox was full. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. Also on March 21, Marco emailed the Medical Section a signed “Employee Self-Certification of Medical Condition” form certifying that he had a serious chronic medical condition placing him at an increased risk for contracting or suffering from complications of COVID-19. Id. at ¶ 32; Doc. 1-2 at 13. Later that day, a non-medical member of the Medial Section told Marco that a doctor employed by the City would review his accommodation request and contact him. Doc. 1 at ¶ 33. No City doctor contacted Marco on either March 21 or March 22. Id. at ¶ 34.

On March 23, Marco received a call from his commanding officer, Commander Ronald Kimble, who had learned from CPD’s Human Resources Department about his accommodation request. Id. at ¶ 36. Kimble “berated” Marco for submitting the request and accused him of trying to draw attention to himself. Id. at ¶ 37. Marco explained the severity of his cystic fibrosis and cystic fibrosis-related diabetes, and said that his sister, who had the same conditions, had died after being infected by a communicable virus. Id. at ¶ 38. Kimble continued to berate Marco, telling him to retire or to go on disability instead of seeking medical leave or placement on “sworn medical roll,” which “has a negative stigma” at CPD. Id. at ¶ 39. Kimble then ordered Marco to advise his sergeant, Sergeant Mark Vanek, of his conditions and of his request for an accommodation, which Marco did that day. Id. at ¶¶ 40-42.

After speaking to Vanek, Marco went to the Medical Section to inquire about the status of his accommodation request, as he still had not been contacted by a City doctor. Id. at ¶ 43. Marco was again advised by non-medical staff that a City doctor would review his request and contact him. Id. at ¶ 44.

From March 19 through March 27, despite his continued inquiries, Marco was not contacted by a City doctor regarding his accommodation request. Id. at ¶¶ 45-46. During that time, as required by CPD policy, Marco continued to report to work at Homan Square, as he had neither received information about his accommodation request nor received clearance from the City to take medical leave. Id. at ¶¶ 45, 47. To access the Homan Square facility, Marco had to place his palm on a biometric palm scanning system, which was used by hundreds of individuals per day and was not sanitized between uses. Id. at ¶¶ 48-51. Marco also had to take communal elevators, in which he came into contact with individuals from other CPD departments who were not wearing masks. Id. at ¶ 52.

On March 28, Marco began experiencing COVID-19 symptoms. Id. at ¶ 53. Around the same time, he was told that three individuals with whom he had been in contact at Homan Square during the previous week had tested positive for COVID-19. Id. at ¶ 54. At least one other detective in the building had also tested positive. Ibid. The next day, on March 29, Marco tested positive for COVID-19. Id. at ¶ 55. Between March 29 and April 2, Marco continued to attempt to contact CPD and the Medical Section about his accommodation request, but he was ignored. Id. at ¶¶ 57, 59, 61. He was never contacted by a City doctor about his accommodation request, nor was his request approved. Id. at ¶ 60. The City and CPD did grant accommodation requests made by other officers and employees, some of which had been submitted after Marco’s. Id. at ¶ 62.

Marco died on April 2 of COVID-related complications. Id. at ¶ 56. CPD classified his death as being in the line of duty. Id. at ¶ 58. On September 18, 2020, in her capacity as the independent administrator of Marco’s estate, Maria cross-filed charges with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”) and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging ADA and IHRA violations. Id. at ¶ 5. The IDHR and EEOC sent Maria right-to-sue letters, id. at ¶¶ 6-7, after which Maria timely filed this suit.

IV

DiFranco’s Reasoning That Failure to Accommodate Claims Can Proceed

  1. Under the ADA, discrimination includes not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the absence of an undue hardship on the operation of its business.
  2. Establishing a claim for failure to accommodate, means that a plaintiff has to show: 1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; 2) the employer was aware of his disability; and 3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the disability.
  3. An unreasonable delay in providing an accommodation for an employee’s known disability can amount to a failure to accommodate his disability.
  4. Citing to McCray, above, the court said that whether a particular delay qualifies as unreasonable turns on the totality of the circumstances and cited to the McCray factors.
  5. Plaintiff’s allegations give rise to a plausible inference that the City’s delay in responding to plaintiff was unreasonable given the circumstances presented by Covid-19 pandemic and was also in bad faith. In particular, plaintiff alleged: 1) that the medical section failed to respond to his request for an accommodation despite his repeated and diligent effort to follow up on his initial request; 2) plaintiff also alleged that the City was aware that Covid-19 posed serious health risk individuals with lung disease and diabetes; 3) the City knew that plaintiff suffered from those conditions; 4) Cmdr. Kimble berated him for requesting an accommodation; and 5) the City managers in the pertinent timeframe did grant other employees’ accommodation requests. Therefore, these allegations are such that the court cannot hold on the pleading that the City’s failure to take action on plaintiff’s accommodation request within 10 days was not unreasonable.

V

DiFranco’s Reasoning That the ADA and IHRA Discrimination Claims Get Tossed

  1. failure to accommodate claims are separate and distinct under the ADA from claims alleging disparate treatment because of a disability.
  2. The essence of a failure to accommodate claim is that the plaintiff asked to be treated differently based on his disability-to be allowed to work remotely or socially distant from his co-workers-but that the Chicago Police Department failed to grant his request. Such allegations cannot be repackaged as a discrimination claim because the claim’s focus is that the Chicago Police Department did not treat plaintiff differently based on his disability.
  3. Plaintiff’s allegation that she was berated for requesting an accommodation by a commanding officer does not support a discrimination claim either because a single hostile call from a supervisor does not rise to the level of materially adverse employment action.

Separately, the defense argued that the Illinois wrongful death act was preempted by the Illinois pension code, but the court wasn’t buying it.

 

 

 

VI

Thoughts/Takeaways From McCray and DiFranco

 

  1. In the Seventh Circuit, a failure to accommodate claim is a separate cause of action.
  2. Slow walking a delay in processing a reasonable accommodation request is a very bad idea. Even a short amount of time for processing the request may be an unreasonable delay as seen in DiFranco.
  3. McCray does a good job of laying out factors that can be used to figure out whether an unreasonable delay in granting a reasonable accommodation exists.
  4. A failure to accommodate claim cannot be repackaged as a disparate treatment claim without more.
  5. The ADA definitely applies to hostile work environment, see this blog entry for example, but what is a hostile work environment can be a moving target.
  6. You run into trouble when you treat people in protected groups differently from other protected groups in a way that doesn’t make any sense, such as being selective about when you grant accommodations.
  7. The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA get treated the same way. There are differences between the two laws (§504 causation, emotional distress damages if it is a matter involving title II or title III, and program accessibility for example), but the differences are not many.
  8. Undue hardship can either be financial (very difficult to show), or operational (best to think of that as a fundamental alteration).
  9. A bad idea to prorate an employee for requesting a reasonable accommodation. Such conduct raises the issue of hostile work environment. It also raises the issue of retaliation as well.
  10. Otherwise qualified (Rehabilitation Act), and qualified (ADA), mean the same thing.
  11. Remember the do’s and don’ts of the interactive process, here, and be sure to engage in the interactive process.
  12. While both of these cases discussed in this blog entry are title I cases, I see no reason why an unreasonable delay being actionable could not extend to title II and title III cases as well.


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Monday, June 20, 2022

No WARNing needed

The Fifth Circuit found that the natural-disaster exception to the WARN Act did not apply to COVID-19, reasoning:

The natural-disaster exception provides that “[n]o notice under this chapter shall be required if the plant closing or mass layoff is due to any form of natural disaster, such as a flood, earthquake, or the drought currently ravaging the farmlands of the United States.” Congress’s use of the term “such as” “indicat[es] that there are includable other matters of the same kind which are not specifically enumerated by the standard.”  By providing three examples after “such as,” Congress indicated that the phrase, “natural disaster” includes events of the same kind as floods, earthquakes, and droughts.

Easom v. U.S. Well Servcs., No. 21-20202 (June 15, 2022). The Court went on to discuss specific canons of interpretation relevant to this observation.

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Sovereignty and the Need for Consensus Around “Data Privacy"

Privacy Plus+

Privacy, Technology and Perspective

Sovereignty and the Need for Consensus Around “Data Privacy.” This week,

Whatever happened to the inter-connected world?  Only fifteen or twenty years ago, national borders seemed so passé. International cooperation was all the rage, propelling the world toward greater harmony through sharing comparative advantages. At the same time, conference attendees debated the true allegiances of multinational corporations and traded assurances like Thomas Friedman’s “no two countries which both have McDonald’s have ever gone to war.” And (of course) the ever-smoother, ever-growing, cross-border flow of personal data was a key feature of the age.

That was then, however. But for whatever reasons — Facebook’s algorithms? US intelligence surveillance? Autocratic data-hoovering? Brexit? Tax/bureaucratic havens? Putin’s unforgivable invasion of Ukraine? — this is now. Now, data is increasingly siloed within its source countries, per local, sovereign requirements. Top-level, generally impersonal insights can still be shared internationally, but until the Free World sorts out how Max Schrems, multinational companies, Meta, and the NSA can all live in it together, moving personal data across borders will be a pain.

For a thought-provoking explanation of this trend toward “the end of borderless data,” see the following article:

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/23/technology/data-privacy-laws.html?searchResultPosition=1

What’s coming?  As this trend toward “bordered data” develops, we see a new, two-headed paradigm emerging, roughly divided between autocratic countries and free ones.

For autocracies who insist on access to all of their citizens’ personal data, we expect further data localization rules that restrict cross-border data transfer. Foreign or multinational businesses will likely continue to scale back their operations from those jurisdictions or withdraw altogether. Eventually, business operations in autocratic jurisdictions will become too expensive economically, politically, and socially.

For the Free World, we anticipate that compliance requirements across jurisdictions will continue to become increasingly complicated.  Thus, businesses will likely face increasing friction and costs driven by the divergent requirements across jurisdictions. In our view, such requirements are flawed from their foundation, becoming ever-more costly to manage.

What’s the “flaw” in their foundation?  In our view, there are two.

The first lies in trying to anticipate, manage, and control every imaginable issue, here and yet to come, in too much detail. The GDPR, the CCPA, their continuing updates, new Acts, and new regulations are remarkable in their reach and effort. Still, almost all are “too much” – not because they miss things or overreach into trivia, but because their level of detail and specificity is just too big a lift for too many businesses which handle too-sensitive personal data.

The second lies in relying too much on “notice and consent.” Requiring too much detail in disclosures is a real issue, but the real trouble comes from imagining that “notice and consent” will ever work in the first place – much less be enough – to govern data privacy.

“Notice and consent” sounds good, is well-intended, honors the individual, and works fairly well in some settings. But where it works – in securities markets, for example — it works because a dedicated, highly trained, well-compensated priesthood of analysts divines the meanings of regular disclosures and shares them with knowledgeable investment advisors, all under the eye of the SEC and other enforcers.

That paradigm doesn’t work in a world where nobody has the time, attention span, or incentive to read detailed disclosure notices for themselves. Like the regulations with which they struggle to comply, many privacy notices struggle to predict and provide for every issue or contingency and are true marvels of effort and genius.  But they don’t work, and can’t work, as the following article explains all too well:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/05/31/abolish-privacy-policies/

A hopeful note:  We see this long season of frustration continuing for a long time as people throughout the Free World struggle to reach a consensus on what we want data privacy to mean and how we want it to be managed.

However, we have some ideas on how it can and should be resolved.  We’ll share some of those ideas next week.

—

Hosch & Morris, PLLC is a boutique law firm dedicated to data privacy and protection, cybersecurity, the Internet and technology. Open the Future℠.



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Quick Hits – If you’re going through hell edition.

Dante’s hell was a complicated place, as this map by Botticelli suggests. Although Rodney Atkins’ advice “if you’re going through hell, keep on going” appears sound, winding through all the complexities of the ADA and FHA can seem like descending through all nine levels of hell. Nonetheless, I’m happy to act on a temporary basis as Virgil and see how far we can get. No promise about whether we’ll find a Beatrice to take you to Paradise.

Self-service kiosks under fire

Davis v. Laboratory Corp. of Am. Holdings,  2022 WL 1682416, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2022) certifies a class of blind users in a class action based on inaccessible self-service kiosks.(7) There is a theme here that runs through a variety of ADA cases dealing with time and cost saving technology. From the famous and finally settled Dominos case through the various kiosk decisions the heart of the question is to what degree those with disabilities must suffer inconvenience in their access to goods and services. Some inconvenience is inevitable – disabilities are disabling – but when the path to goods and services is blocked by technology inconvenience becomes inequality. In Dominos sighted pizza lovers could order a pizza in a few minutes with an app on their phone while blind users had to call and wait on line for a couple of hours. In Davis and similar kiosk cases clients could arrive and log in quickly and easily or, it is alleged, wait a long time for personal service. I find it hard to believe designing an accessible kiosk is especially difficult – standards for ATMs have been in place for a dozen years and the technology is similar. We all know litigation is not the solution to this kind of thoughtlessness, but I advise my clients to avoid the problem by only dealing with vendors who offer accessible technology.

Mootness – non-existence is pretty good proof no meaningful relief is possible.

In Whitaker v. Chan, 2022 WL 1814142 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2022) the court had little trouble finding the original complaint was moot when there was no operating business in the facility being sued. Along the way it reminded us that damages, including nominal damages, cannot be recovered under the ADA and that Unruh Act claims don’t belong in federal court.

Mootness – pulling the trigger a little too soon.

In Dalfio v. J.G. Mgmt Properties IV, LLC et al, 2022 WL 2079716, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2022) the defendants came within 2 alleged ADA violations of getting the case dismissed at the Rule 12 stage. The problem was that while the Court was skeptical about the remaining violations, “the merits of the action are intertwined with the jurisdictional issue of mootness and jurisdictional findings would be inappropriate.” In another case from the same plaintiff the defendant lost a motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff’s expert found remaining ADA violations. Dalfio v. Barlas, 2022 WL 1693827, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 26, 2022). Mootness is tricky because ADA requirements are numerous and complicated. As a defense strategy it must be carefully managed. (9)

Factual attacks on standing – you need to find the trigger

In Johnson v. Rosvin, Inc., 2022 WL 1987857 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2022) the defendant leveled what is called a factual attack on standing at the Motion to Dismiss phase. This requires evidence, which the defendant provided in the form of a defective declaration that had some obvious misstatements of fact. You don’t need to like Scott Johnson or his lawyers to know that having filed hundreds, maybe thousands, of lawsuits they know how to say what needs to be said. I wrote long ago that outrage is neither a defense nor a substitute for a carefully planned strategy.²

An HOA on the warpath.

In Parada v. Sandhill Shores Prop. Owners Assn., Inc., 2022 WL 1693977, (S.D. Tex. May 25, 2022) the defendant attacked the plaintiff’s claims in every way imaginable but failed, predictably, in every case. It’s worth looking briefly at the facts. The plaintiff suffers from Alzheimer’s disease which is a handicap or disability under either the FHA or ADA. The defendant claimed it wasn’t, which was foolish and may have made other defenses less believable. The FHA injury claimed by the plaintiff was the inability to use her house without constant fear and distress because a proposed beach access path would constantly bring strangers near her house, something that can be unusually upsetting for those with profound memory loss. Evidence might eventually establish that her distress was not so severe she could not equally use and enjoy her dwelling, but once you assume the pleadings are true the truth becomes an issue for another day. The defendant treated the plaintiff’s ADA claim as if it were the same as her FHA claim; that is, the only question was the use and enjoyment of her home, which is not an ADA public accommodation. The problem, as the court correctly pointed out, is that there was a public accommodation at issue, the beach.(10) Just because an action interferes with the use of a home doesn’t mean it can’t also interfere with the use of a public accommodation. The last gasp was an effort to stop the federal lawsuit because there was a parallel state court action based entirely on state law principles. Because the outcome of neither was determinative of the other abstention was denied.

There was one interesting note at the end of the decision. the HOA claimed it was compelled to place the beach path by the plaintiff’s home by the Texas Open Beaches Act and the City of Galveston Beach Access Plan. It is worth remembering that municipalities and many state agencies are also subject to the accommodation requirements in the Fair Housing Act. Just because it violates the law doesn’t mean it is impossible to do.

Surrender as a strategy, with a twist.

I note default judgment cases, usually from California, just to see what the market price of a default might be. In Cuesta v. DTC Lodging LLC, 2022 WL 2077940 (D. Colo. June 8, 2022) and Meggs v. Colorado Hosp. Group, LLC, 2022 WL 1810597 (D. Colo. June 2, 2022) the defendants took a more affirmative approach to surrender. They admitted all the material allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and moved for entry of judgment against themselves. The goal was explicit – cut off the expenditure of money on attorneys’ fees. The plaintiff opposed the motion because, I suspect, it did the one thing no plaintiff’s firm can live with – it limited the profit they would make from the litigation. It is worth remembering that almost all Title III ADA lawsuits are about money for lawyers, not access for the disabled. In any case the courts thought the defendant’s approach was reasonable and granted the motion for judgment. I have been a proponent of this kind of strategy for a long time, but this is the first time I have seen it successfully implemented.¹

Default as a strategy

In Gastelum v. C. Valley Hosp. LLC, 2022 WL 2072839 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2022) the plaintiff, a serial filer who now seems to file pro se because his attorney, Peter Strojnik, is not practicing law, failed to obtain a default judgment because he couldn’t get the defendants’ properly served. The lesson for defendants, found in the details of the decision, is that adequate service is not subject to rigid rules. Another court might have found service was adequate and granted a default judgment. Default as a strategy should be a choice, not an accident.

The market for default judgments is slipping. In Johnson v. Iguanas Burritozilla, Corp., 2022 WL 1750472 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2022) the court awarded a total of $1085 in attorneys’ fees. All you need to know about the industrial nature of this litigation is that the total attorneys’ time was 2.2 hours and that 14 different legal assistants billed time to the matter. It’s not a law firm, it’s an assembly line.

Johnson and his lawyers did better in Johnson v. Pennylane Frozen Yogurt, LLC, 2022 WL 1750382, (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2022) with an award of $1,912.50. To file this cookie cutter lawsuit required 4 lawyers and 13 legal assistants. It’s a volume business.

If Disney World isn’t your cup of tea

go to Florida for cheap ADA standing. Following the Eleventh Circuit’s lead in Laufer v. Arpan, LLC, 29 F.4th 1268 (11th Cir. 2022), the court in Lugo v. Island Harbor Beach Club, LLC,  2022 WL 1773973, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 1, 2022) denied a motion to dismiss against a serial website tester. The district court had little choice, but the 11th Circuit got it wrong³ and will have to opportunity to deal with the hundreds or thousands of lawsuits that are sure to result.

Disney Land, on the other hand, may be less welcoming. The Court’s analysis of standing in Gastelum v. Pinnacle Hotel Circle LP, 2022 WL 1608704, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2022) is very much in line with the 2nd Circuit’s recent decision in Calcano v. Swarovski N.A. Ltd. (8) The court wanted specific facts justifying an injury and intent to return rather than the usual vague claims about willingness to return at some time in the future. Gastelum is given an opportunity to amend but run into the age old problem of serial litigants: the more you say the easier it is to spot the lies.

It’s hard to make a quick buck with a class action.

Serial litigation is all about making a quick buck. The goal is a lawsuit expensive enough to make the defendant want to settle and an offer of settlement cheaper than the cost of defense. One way to bump up the potential defense costs and risks is a class action, and many ADA serial lawsuits include a class action claim. In Brooks v. Morphe LLC, 2022 WL 2052680, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2022) the defendant didn’t bother to answer the lawsuit, but because it was presented as a class action the court declined to enter judgment without certifying the class. Efforts to certify a class were apparently slipshod – not surprising when the goal is to keep costs as low as possible in order to maximize profits. The result was an order requiring a do-over. I don’t understand why the defendant did not appear to fight the lawsuit because unlike many physical access cases, website cases are very risky in terms of the potential remediation costs. I do understand why the plaintiff’s lawyers didn’t do a good job (according to the Court). Nothing in the ADA serial filer business model calls for it.

Remembering the “nexus” requirement in the 9th Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit has held that a website is covered by the ADA only if it is associated with a physical place of business. Langer v. Oval Motor Sports, Inc., 2022 WL 1914063 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2022) is a reminder that this “nexus” requirement means that a website violates the ADA only if the lack of website accessibility inhibits the user’s ability to take advantage of the goods and services of that physical business. The Court granted a motion to dismiss because the plaintiff only alleged he had trouble accessing the website, not that he had trouble accessing the business itself. The same result was reached in Gomez v. Ackerman Fam. Vineyards LLC, 2022 WL 1693707, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2022). This will be a useful defense against plaintiffs who find it easy to sue based on an inaccessible website but might find it hard to drive all the way to the physical business.

Pigs get fat. . .

I’ve never really understood why the saying “pigs get fat, hogs get slaughtered” makes any sense. Not being a farm boy I had to Google the difference between pigs and hogs, the later being (I’m told) bigger than the former. Assuming bigger means greedier I guess this bit of folk wisdom applies to the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Caplan v. All Am. Auto Collision, Inc., 2022 WL 1939553 (11th Cir. June 6, 2022).  It was a standard ADA serial filer case. Mediation failed because the plaintiffs’ lawyers demanded too much in attorneys’ fees. They then moved for summary judgment and won, but the district court cut their fees by 75% based on excessive billing and other conduct that appeared designed to drive up the fees. The Eleventh Circuit agreed, affirming an award of just $7500. On its face that is a very low amount for fees through summary judgment in a federal lawsuit, and I think it can only be understood as reflecting both the District Court and Court of Appeals knowing the case would have settled at mediation but for the excessive attorneys’ fee demands. I have to believe that a more reasonable fee application might have been granted without this kind of reduction. By demanding far too much the plaintiffs’ attorneys showed their true colors.

Real ADA problems make for complicated lawsuits.

Tyler v. Valley MRI and Radiology, Inc., 2022 WL 2067859, (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2022) is not your typical serial filer ADA lawsuit. In fact, it is not a serial filer case at all. The plaintiff was real patient of the defendant and her claim – that the only accessible parking was not as close as it should be to the building – wasn’t obviously correct or incorrect. The legal issue – must accessible parking be as close as possible to a building entrance – couldn’t be resolved without a trial. The discussion of the legal issue is worth reading for any defense counsel facing this kind of claim. The case itself is a refreshing change from the usual endless line of decisions dealing with serial filers.

Lack of pre-suit notice as an ADA defense.

It isn’t clear why the plaintiff in Munoz v. S. Fla. Fair and Palm Beach County Expositions, Inc., 2022 WL 1744013 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2022) thought it was worthwhile to try to strike an affirmative defense based on lack of pre-suit notice, but the result is a good discussion of the role pre-suit notice might play in an ADA case. The bottom line: pre-suit notice is not required by the ADA but a failure to give notice may be evidence that the plaintiff “acted in bad faith, [was] unduly litigious, or [ ] caused unnecessary trouble and expense.” None of these are easy to prove, but all of them might be present in a typical ADA serial filer case.

Doesn’t the point of the law matter?

I’ve been corresponding with William Goren, who just blogged about an interesting standing decision from the Seventh Circuit.(4) The Rehabilitation Act(5) decision in Ellison v. U.S. Postal Serv., 2022 WL 1617435, at *4 (S.D. Ind. May 19, 2022) gets right at the heart of our discussion about tester standing and whether the goals of the statute matter in determining if the tester suffered an injury. The plaintiff, who was wheelchair bound, could not access her local post office because it had stairs. Various solutions were tried but, she said, were not sufficient. She could, however, get the same goods and services from three other post offices within ten miles of her home. The Court dismissed her claims under the Rehabilitation Act because the law was intended to guarantee access to government programs, not government facilities. In this case the post offices were a little more inconvenient, but that didn’t add up to a denial of meaningful access. The case is being appealed, but Indiana is in the Seventh Circuit and the case Bill blogged about suggests the plaintiff will fare no better in the court of appeals.

Indemnity in FHA design/build cases.

The decision in  U.S. v. J. Randolph Parry Architects, P.C., 2022 WL 1645796, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2022) is notable mostly for what it never discusses; that is, whether the FHA as a matter of policy precludes any claim shifting liability to a third party. I’ve blogged about this issue before (6) but the Court never addresses it. Instead the Court simply refuses exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law contribution and indemnity claims because they would clutter up the discrimination case with related but not relevant issues. Of particular concern was the defendant architect’s desire to add 39 additional third-party defendants, essentially treating the case like a typical construction defect case in which everyone who ever walked onto the job suit is brought into the lawsuit in order to get at their insurance. The Court’s approach is sensible because simply allocating injunctive relief among the parties based on their individual faults can accomplish the same thing as overlapping contribution claims. The lawsuit involves fifteen facilities in four states; meaning there’s probably real money at issue. I wouldn’t be surprised to see the parallel state court cases being filed in the near future.

Sanctions against a pro se – possible but not easy.

In Simmons v. Village of Minier, 2022 WL 1607901 (C.D. Ill. May 20, 2022) the Court sanctioned a pro se serial filer, but only after giving him the benefit of the doubt on most of his abusive claims. The standard, quoted from another case, was “when a layman persists in a hopeless cause long after it should have been clear to him, as a reasonable (though not law-trained) person, that his cause was indeed hopeless, sanctions should be imposed….” Lawyers advising clients on the likelihood of attorneys fees after prevailing in a civil rights case should keep this standard in mind.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

¹ See Strategies for Surrender

² See Quick Hits – Vernal Equinox edition, Standing for serial plaintiffs – it’s a legal issue, not a moral problem and Quick Hits – Polar Vortex edition

³ See Stigmatic injury and how the 11th Circuit got in wrong in Laufer v Arpan

(4) See, Is ADA Title II, III Tester Standing a Thing Anymore?

(5) It is, more or less, the ADA for the federal government.

(6) See, Contribution, Indemnity and Disability – Does the FHA make sense? and Time for a do-over – the 9th Circuit gets indemnity and contribution right among others.

(7) See, FHA and ADA Odds and Ends for my latest note on the subject, and track back through the footnotes to the other blogs on this subject. This and other kiosk cases are not typical serial litigant cases involving a tester with dubious standing. DOJ has been active in kiosk cases and as this class certification shows they aren’t going to settle for a few thousand dollars and a meaningless promise to fix the problem.

(8) See the next blog below this one.

(9) See, Mootness and the ADA – Fighting may not be the best way to win. and my many other blogs with the word “mootness.”

(10) It isn’t clear from the opinion whether the HOA owned the beach or merely owned the land giving access to a publicly owned beach. If the HOA does not own the beach the question of whether the HOA is a public accommodation becomes a little more complex. I suspect that the path to the beach itself is a public accommodation, subjecting the HOA to the ADA with respect to that path.

 

 



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Stories of Recovery: There is an army out there to help you

Editor’s note: This post is part of the Texas Lawyers’ Assistance Program’s Stories of Recovery blog series. TLAP offers confidential assistance for lawyers, law students, and judges with substance use or mental health issues. Call or text TLAP at 1-800-343-8527 (TLAP) and find more information at tlaphelps.org.

After interviewing to move my solo practice to another firm, I celebrated at home with a “solo” bottle of wine. I tried to share the news with my wife, but I couldn’t complete a sentence without slurring. She took a video of me on her iPhone as I tried to re-explain what I had just told her about my interviews. That was a wake-up call.

While I had long dealt with depression, matters only got worse years earlier when my then-firm closed its office and I went solo. Solo practice was not only isolating, but financially terrifying. If clients slow-paid or didn’t pay at all, the food on my table, the tax payments, mortgage, private college tuition payments, and every other bill were literally at stake, too often leaving me working paycheck to paycheck. My family asked why we had to cut the corners off the corners we had already cut even when I was working around the clock seven days a week.

I dealt with that stress by self-medicating. As a solo I had nobody to answer to, so if I drank beer through the day while writing, well surely it was okay to calm my nerves so I could get my work done.

But alcohol didn’t solve my problems. Instead, it compounded my stress, loneliness, and anxiety. When I came home, it isolated me from my family. While I was physically “there,” I was also always somewhere else, mired in self-doubt, self-pity, fear, and self-loathing. My daily goal was to make it to bedtime to start yet another Groundhog Day upon waking.

So, back to the job interview. My wife’s video was a reality check. It confirmed that my drinking wasn’t really just to dull the pain of the bad but to celebrate the good and survive the mundane. So, whatever the day brought, if it ended in the letter “y,” I drank.

I knew I needed help. No question, it was difficult for me to summon the courage to call the Texas Lawyers’ Assistance Program, or TLAP, but when I did, the staff supported and encouraged me and reassured me there was a better way and that I did not have to go through things alone. The concept of lawyers living happily and thriving without alcohol intrigued me.

After embarrassing myself in front of my son one final time, I decided to go all in. I feared attending a cliche recovery meeting, but I knew it couldn’t be worse than my then day-to-day routine. When I joined a meeting by phone and introduced myself, the group applauded me for showing up, invited me back, and offered me support, without judgment, shame, or guilt.

Recovery is hard. But so is parenting, or dieting, or preparing for trial, or, quite simply, being a human being who is alive. In hindsight, I had put in an awful lot of “hard work” digging myself into a position where I had become a mental and physical train wreck. Now I am committed to investing the same energy to turning things around. The bottom line is that there are so many people out there just like me and just like you, who have suffered through the same experiences, and who have good advice, insights, and suggestions to help. We are everywhere— at the courthouse, the grocery store, the doctor’s office, stuck in traffic, or anywhere else you can imagine. The sad fact is that statistics bear that out. We are not pariahs but just humans who need help and help each other.

TLAP helped me find the courage to reach out and find a better and much more fulfilling way of life. My family life, health, and practice have improved dramatically after receiving help freely offered to me from absolute strangers who gave me no judgment or criticism but only support. Many have had it far worse than I could ever imagine, and I respect them so much for their courage and strength—they inspire me every day. If you think there is no hope, then I will boldly tell you that you are dead wrong. I hope you find the courage to make that first life-altering call. There is an army out there to help you once you do so and a whole new life that will be more rewarding than you could ever imagine.



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Friday, June 17, 2022

Precedential Precedent

2 recent opinions state basic principles about stare decisis in Texas:

  • The Texas Supreme Court expressly adopted the “rule of orderliness” concept in Mitschke v. Faiva, No. 21-0326 (May 13, 2022), observing: “If one appellate panel decides a case, and another panel of the same court differently resolves a materially indistinguishable question in contravention of a holding in the prior decision, the second panel has violated the foundational rule of stare decisis. Affording stare decisis authority to the second case would be tantamount to eliminating stare decisis altogether, as nothing would stop a third panel from returning to the initial outcome, or going yet another way.”
  • A recent concurrence by Justice Schenck reminded: “I will … simply note that under the doctrine of stare decisis courts are bound only by the holding and discussion necessary to the resolution of the case. Newman v. Minyard Food Stores, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.).”

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Wednesday, June 15, 2022

Forum, Not Venue.

In a state-court maritime case, this clause: ” . . all parties agree that any legal action seeking relief for a covered dispute must be filed in either (1) the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, or (2) the McCracken County Circuit Court in Paducah, Kentucky” was held to be an enforceable forum-selection clause rather than an impermissible venue-selection clause. Risher v. Marquette Transp., No. 05-21-00289-CV (June 8, 2022).

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